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This dissertation traces moments in the German intellectual tradition in which poetic or aesthetic 
pursuits find themselves confronted with the question of the political: during the period of Weimar 
Classicism, the Weimar Republic, and after the Shoah. I illuminate the underlying progression 
from a sharp separation between politics and poetics to a revision of what it means to be human: 
away from the notions of autonomy and universality and towards those of plurality and alterity. I 
first explore the frame narrative of Goethe’s novella cycle Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten (1795), arguing that its specific textual complexity subverts its apparent narrative 
of positing a program of sociability and founding a closed community based on it. I then examine 
the program of aesthetic autonomy and political abstinence posited by Friedrich Schiller in the 
Announcement for his journal Die Horen (1794), for which Goethe’s Unterhaltungen were written. 
Through a close reading of both texts, I show that Goethe’s frame narrative subverts the gestures 
of autonomy and foundation that are central to Schiller’s program. Turning next to the Weimar 
Republic, I investigate the paradoxical reversal, in 1933, of Gottfried Benn’s poetics of artistic 
autonomy into a subordination of art to political ends. Arguing that this reversal amounts to Benn’s 
misguided aestheticization of politics, I also examine the implications of public address in Benn’s 
poetics before and in 1933. In the second part of my dissertation, I consider three authors 
profoundly informed by their experience of exile. For a critical, post-Shoah revision of the 
 
 
relationship between intellectuality and politics, I examine Hannah Arendt’s two pivotal texts 
written about and addressed to the postwar Germany: her 1950 article “The Aftermath of Nazi 
Rule. Report from Germany” and her 1959 Lessing prize acceptance speech “Von der 
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten.” I show that in these two texts, Arendt offers a political theory 
that revises the very notion of human existence, illuminating its irreducible plurality and 
difference. I then turn to Osip Mandelstam’s 1913 essay “About an Interlocutor,” in which he 
highlights the in-between space inherent to poetry as address and encounter. With Mandelstam in 
the background, I finally consider Paul Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip 
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The readings presented in my dissertation do not offer specialized studies of any of the 
discussed authors and their extensive oeuvres. Each one of these authors – Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Gottfried Benn, Hannah Arendt, Osip Mandelstam, Paul Celan – has 
propelled ever-expanding philological orbits whose level of nuance may prove prohibitive for non-
specialist readers in the field of German Studies and beyond. Mindful of these microcosms’ 
specificity, I aim, rather, to trace a possible constellation of situations, questions, and echoes 
between them. By bringing these authors, some of them rarely associated, into conversation, my 
dissertation contributes to opening up hitherto unexplored avenues for investigation. 
 Without being strictly contained within it, my project can be broadly paraphrased through 
the framework of the tension between something like “culture” and something like “politics” in 
the German-language context: from this tension’s programmatic articulation through Weimar 
Classicism in the wake of the French Revolution; via its intensification at the cusp between the 
Weimar Republic and the National Socialist regime; to its critical revision in postwar Germany. 
Defining what the notoriously vague notions of “culture” and “politics” are supposed to mean 
proves difficult: Just as their relationship shifts in the course of the timespan outlined above, so 
too their individual meanings and implications change. That is, these terms – as much as the 
distinction between them – are themselves situationally conditioned and determined constructs. 
Therefore, the working principle of my dissertation is to avoid static definitions of either term as 
its point of departure; in fact, the terminological binary of “culture” and “politics” does not figure 
prominently within the dissertation itself.  
For the purposes of this introductory paraphrase, however, “culture” is broadly understood 





those phenomena that in some way determine the constitution of human communities. In this light, 
the gesture of separating “culture” and “politics” into opposed spheres has to do with two different 
and conflicting conceptions of the human being: conceived, on the one hand, as a self-sufficient 
being endowed with spirit or Geist and, on the other, as a being constrained by material needs of 
sheer subsistence. The former is seen as capable of autonomy and spontaneity; the latter is seen 
as, of necessity, determined by inescapable limitations of embodiment. Whereas one’s existence 
“dem Geiste nach” has one’s inner, infinite source of vitality at its sovereign disposal, material 
existence “dem Leibe nach” necessitates a struggle for the power to regulate and distribute 
externally located, finite resources for mere survival.1 On the most basic level, then, the tension 
between “culture” and “politics” appears to be rooted in the long-standing and persistent binary 
between essence and accident, spirit and matter, interiority and exteriority, infinity and finitude.  
The tension between something like “culture” and “politics” is a well-known topos in the 
field of German Studies. A brief overview of its complex history would be helpful at this point. 
As indicated above, this distinction is not so much a naturally given fact that has always already 
existed as it is rather a historically conditioned circumstance. Historically, German-speaking 
territories experienced cultural unification – in itself no “natural” occurrence – before political 
unification. That is, their common self-identification through religion and language preceded their 
unification under a common jurisdiction.2 The schism between culture and politics crystallized at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century: When it became clear that the subjects of the various 
German states would not be granted a say in policy-making, the realm of cultural achievement 
 
1 Friedrich Schiller’s letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, quoted in Wulf Köpke, “‘[...] das Werk einer glücklichen 
Konstellation’: Schillers ‘Horen’ und die deutsche Literaturgeschichte,” in Friedrich Schiller. Kunst, Humanität und 
Politik, ed. W. Wittkowski (Tübingen: Niemeyer 1982), 376. 
 
2 The following overview is based largely on Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton: 





emerged as a “noble substitute”3 for unavailable political participation. The unilaterally decreed 
insulation of politics, not without intellectual legitimation from precisely the cultural realm, 
promoted individual withdrawal into the private sphere – a sphere that could be cultivated within 
the limits of individual, autonomous intellect and creativity.4 In this binary split, “politics” 
acquired a negative reputation as a realm of ultimately self-serving and ephemeral power struggles. 
“Culture,” in contrast, was regarded positively as a retreat for reflective and creative activity 
unadulterated by ulterior motives.  
By the time of national German unification in 1871 after Prussia’s victory in the Franco-
Prussian war, “culture” saw itself incorporated under the aegis of the ever-stronger centralized 
state. Friedrich Nietzsche’s suspicion of an imminent regression of culture into a mouthpiece of 
politics – with “politics” understood specifically as macro-egoistic geopolitical strife – proved 
justified at the outbreak of the First World War when precisely German “culture,” Kultur, was put 
forward by leading figures in the intellectual and creative spheres as a rallying cry to mobilize 
patriotic mass self-sacrifice.5 The struggle between culture and politics saw itself take on the guise 
of yet another binary: the one between “culture” and “civilization,” such that the former carried 
positive and the latter negative connotations. “Culture” was supposed to embody the purportedly 
German and superior values, such as reflection, spiritual depth, introspection; “civilization,” on 
the other hand, represented such supposedly Western and degenerate phenomena as political 
 
3 Lepenies, Seduction of Culture in German History, 9. 
 
4 On the crucial connotation of “cultivating” in the barely noticeable metaphor of “culture,” see Katrin Kohl, “The 
Metaphor of Cultural Impact and the Cultural Impact of Metaphor,” in: Cultural Impact in the German Context: 
Studies in Transmission, Reception, and Influence, eds. R. Braun and L. Marven (Rochester: Camden House, 2010) 
19-35, esp. 21f.  
 
5 On this point, see Lepenies, Seduction of Culture in German History, 18; on the psychosis of patriotic fervor at the 






calculation, democratization, and materialism. At the core of the opposition between culture and 
civilization resided the deterministic theory of Germany’s special path, Sonderweg.6 The hitherto 
intranational divide between “culture” and “politics” now took on an international dimension. In 
this manner, culture thus saw itself emerge from the distant islands of detached reflection and 
autonomous creation onto the forefront of worldly affairs. It became a battle cry organizing human 
beings into opposing geopolitical camps. The coveted autonomy of spirit thus emerged as capable 
of animating containers quite a bit larger than the individual human body.  
It was culture, too, that developed into a central point of contention during the troubled 
period of the Weimar Republic.7 The devastating aftermath of World War I, crowned 
simultaneously with the diagnosis of doom in Oswald Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlandes and 
the prescription of passivity in Thomas Mann’s Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, propelled 
wide-ranging theorization of the immense socio-economic crises in terms of cultural decline. 
Politics was marginalized once again. The faltering project of political democratization, 
significantly inhibited by concurrent consolidation of economic power, proved utterly incapable 
of counteracting the concrete material challenges of the day.8 Conservative visions of various 
stripes professed knowledge of the remedies necessary to counteract the purported cultural decline 
and to foster cultural regeneration and renewal.9 With the National Socialists’ ascent to power in 
1933, culture once again emerged as a propeller of unification, this time on the basis of exclusion 
 
6 Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History, 9. 
 
7 On the innate problems of the Weimar Republic as a political project, see Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as 
Insider, 1-22.  
 
8 On the decimation of the working class in the Weimar Republic, see Eric D. Weitz, “State Power, Class 
Fragmentation, and the Shaping of German Communist Politics, 1890-1933,” The Journal of Modern History 62.2 
(1990): 253-297 
9 On the intimate connection between apoliticism and conservatism in German-speaking territories, see Fritz Stern, 






and expulsion: The overly enthusiastic patriotism and cultural chauvinism of the pre-World War I 
period morphed into full-blown racism during the reign of National Socialism.  
In the wake of the Second World War and the atrocities perpetrated by the National 
Socialist regime, the credibility of “German culture” had been profoundly shaken. The classical 
literary and intellectual legacy of the German-language canon became a fundamental point of 
contention. Together with a revision of “culture” came a revision of “politics.”10 Often, however, 
this revision reverted to the long-standing ideal of human reason as autonomous and sovereign in 
its innate purity: Envisioned as subsumable under the broader activity of thinking, politics was 
conceived as a common enterprise of intellectually reformed individuals. The long tradition of 
diminishing the purview of “politics” and subsuming it under the all-encompassing aegis of 
“culture” had apparently not clearly revealed itself as untenable through the recent geopolitical 
cataclysms.   
The aim of the individual investigations included in my dissertation is neither to advocate 
for nor to castigate a particular approach to intellectual activity or political engagement. The 
project’s initial impulse stems, rather, from the very fact of separation between the realm of so-
called “culture” and that of so-called “politics”: a separation ultimately inherent in the 
disengagement from public affairs as much as in the so-called “engaged” literature. Both stances 
draw a line of demarcation between intellectual activity and worldly action, dissociating or 
associating them according to the specific exigencies of the moment. I am thus less interested in 
individual definitions of “culture” and “politics” than in the very fact of distinction: in the fact that 
a distinction has historically been made and has resulted in a tension fraught with significant 
 
10 On the democratic projects of rethinking political participation, see Sean Forner, German Intellectuals and the 
Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics after 1945 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP, 2014); 





implications. For, if the culture/politics binary itself may appear quite innocuous on the surface, I 
contend that implicit in it are much more dangerous tendencies of separation, exclusion, and 
expulsion, and that this binary therefore calls for special attention and investigation. Without 
purporting to offer a comprehensive sociological explanation or systematic literary-historical 
interpretation of this tension, my project highlights several of its crucial manifestations, 
illuminating recurrent concerns and assumptions as well as critical revisions through close reading 
of specific texts.  
In Chapter 1, “Politics in Exile: Schiller’s Die Horen and Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten,” I begin with a close reading of the frame narrative from Goethe’s 
1794-1795 novella cycle Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. Illuminating its complex 
textual articulation, I relate this frame narrative’s apparent set-up of prescribed sociability via 
political abstinence to its larger context within Friedrich Schiller’s journal Die Horen, the central 
periodical publication of Weimar Classicism. Schiller’s project, issued in the wake of the 
momentous political event of the French Revolution, was an ambitious undertaking of intellectual 
and humanistic edification. The path to the latter was programmatically prescribed by Schiller 
through a prefatory program of abstinence from political discourse in favor of the purportedly 
universal human values of beauty and truth. Arguing that Goethe’s text experiences a 
programmatic codification in Schiller, I examine the latter’s publishing program within his broader 
project of an apolitically accomplished betterment of humanity through aesthetic education. 
Drawing upon Bonnie Honig’s consequential observation of political theory’s peculiar tendency 
to displace politics,11 I call into question the common apologia of Schiller’s project of aesthetic 
education –specifically, as it is concisely articulated in the poet’s preface to Die Horen – as an 
 





arguably metapolitical theory and thus politically relevant. This relevance notwithstanding, I insist 
on Schiller’s explicit expulsion of “politics” and its fateful implications.  
Almost a hundred and fifty years later, the question of the relationship between politics and 
culture – or politics and art more narrowly – resurfaced with renewed vigor during the Weimar 
Republic in Germany. Chapter 2, “Artistic Autonomy: Gottfried Benn’s Poetological Polemics,” 
is concerned with a key figure in this revival: physician and poet Gottfried Benn. Having acquired 
fame with his starkly innovative lyric poetry, Benn devoted himself to essayistic writing in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. In his highly idiosyncratic prose, the poet developed a theory of artistic 
autonomy, which he often propagated to a wide audience from the isolated podium of a radio 
studio. For Benn, true art sidestepped societal concerns and abstained from civic engagement. 
Defying the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment, his artistic theory focused on the force of the 
lone poetic psyche, even as it emerged within a socially embedded context of consequential socio-
literary polemics. Benn’s apolitical stance experienced an ostensible reversal in the pivotal year of 
1933, when the formation of a totalitarian regime in Germany abruptly annulled the possibility of 
an aestheticist literature voluntarily disinterested in politics. In two radio-broadcast addresses – 
“Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” (April 1933) and “Antwort an die literarischen 
Emigranten” (May 1933) – Benn not only declared allegiance to the Nazi regime but also 
rhetorically banished all dissent from discourse in and about Germany. Reflecting on the media-
theoretical implications of Benn’s radio addresses, I argue that, rather than representing a reversal 
of Benn’s pre-1933 position, this unexpectedly politicized stance proved to be a conversion of his 
earlier insistence on artistic autonomy into a deeply misguided aestheticization of the Nazi regime. 
The second part of my dissertation deals with two authors whose personal experience of 





events of the Shoah, the binary split between politics on the one hand and poetics on the other 
became deeply unsettled: both required a fundamental rethinking. Political theorist Hannah Arendt 
and poet Paul Celan recognized this indelible destabilization of formerly certain disciplinary 
divisions. In two occasional texts – Arendt’s 1959 Lessing Prize acceptance speech “Von der 
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten” and Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip 
Mandelstamms” – these two exiled thinkers reflected on their respective fields of inquiry not 
through a specialized jargon but rather through a fundamental rethinking of the human being’s 
relation to the world. By undertaking the difficult step of addressing German citizens in Germany, 
Arendt and Celan offered a critical revision of the post-war public sphere, often characterized by 
attitudes of complacency, facile reconciliation, and forgetting.12  
Chapter 3, “Hannah Arendt: Rethinking Humanity Politically,” is devoted to Hannah 
Arendt, who in the fall of 1933 emigrated from Germany, accepting the precarious status of a 
refugee for the next eighteen years – an experience that propelled her to an attitude of political 
engagement, both practically and theoretically. Examining Arendt’s 1949 article “Aftermath of 
Nazi Rule: Report from Germany,” I unfold some of the key elements of her political theory: a 
theory that fundamentally rethinks the meaning of politics. Rejecting the prewar dismissal of 
politics in the field of intellectual engagement just as much as the postwar enthusiasm for an 
idealized model of political participation through sociable discourse, Arendt proposed to rethink 
politics as an in-between space, a space between the irreducibly plural and diverse human beings 
who, as political beings, cannot be subsumed under the aegis of universal human reason. With her 
1949 “Aftermath of Nazi Rule” as well as 1959 acceptance speech “Von der Menschlichkeit in 
 
12 On the act of speaking publicly by exiled Jewish and German intellectuals after the Shoah and their critical revision 
of the postwar public sphere in Germany, see Sonja Boos, Speaking the Unspeakable in Postwar Germany (Ithaca: 





finsteren Zeiten,” Arendt offered inadvertent but poignantly relevant responses to Benn’s 1933 
banishment – both “dem Geiste nach” and “dem Leibe nach” – of critically minded intellectuals 
and emigrants from Germany. 
 In Chapter 4, “Poetic Address: Osip Mandelstam’s ‘About an Interlocutor’ and Paul 
Celan’s ‘Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms’,” I turn to two poets, Osip Mandelstam and Paul 
Celan, and their critical revision of what poetry might mean. With his 1913 essay “About an 
Interlocutor,” the Russian-Jewish Mandelstam raised a hitherto unheard-of question: Whom do 
poems address? No narrowly aesthetic consideration, this is a fundamentally ethical and ultimately 
political question insofar as it turns away from a self-contained lyrical I and toward someone or 
perhaps something outside it. By focusing on the accidental and providential character of poetic 
address – which Mandelstam’s essay dramatizes through the poignant metaphors of shipwreck and 
wandering – Mandelstam illuminates the in-between space inherent in, and created by, poetry. 
Highlighting this essay’s evasion of a narrowly programmatic function, I examine the world-
opening, political potential in its theory of the poetic interlocutor.   
 Persecuted into exile by the totalitarian Soviet state for failing to conform to the language 
and thought prescribed by it, Mandelstam and his poems were posthumously erased from the state-
sanctioned cultural discourse. In this light, Paul Celan’s 1960 radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip 
Mandelstamms” – in which Celan, himself a German-speaking Jewish emigrant living in France, 
introduced the Russian-Jewish poet and his poems to German speakers in Germany – is no 
perfunctory act of cultural transmission and translation. Significantly, some of this essay’s most 
pivotal poetological reflections reemerge in Celan’s prize acceptance address and central 
poetological statement “Der Meridian” just several months later. For Celan, the poetics of other-





turning toward the other is what poetry – as opposed to the autonomous Artistik in Benn’s sense – 
must do. Illuminating possible traces of Martin Heidegger’s language and their critical revision in 
Celan’s essay, I highlight its irreducibly occasional character as well as the tensions surrounding 
its ostensible project of introduction and familiarization. 
 Thus, while the parallel between the poet Friedrich Schiller and the poet Gottfried Benn 
has been extensively studied,13 my project productively interrogates this parallel and its political 
implications through the work of the political theorist Hannah Arendt. It is then also Arendt who 
offers a crucial lens through which to connect the work of Gottfried Benn and Paul Celan – another 
widely explored parallel. Finally, Arendt’s writings allow my project to illuminate the political 
implications of Osip Mandelstam’s theory of poetic address, thereby unfolding yet another widely 
studied connection – between Mandelstam and Celan – from a slightly different angle.  
As bound up with particular spatiotemporal coordinates as the socio-literary circumstances 
outlined above appear to be, they are no historical relics. Quite on the contrary, they define many 
of the urgent questions that inveterately animate our discourse to this day. As political decisions, 
electorally as well as governmentally, carry existential weight for the very survival of the 
language-endowed species, “politics” and political engagement can no longer be set aside as just 
one insular sphere of human life among others. The political crises we face today make it ever 
harder to engage in intellectual activity unperturbed, without further ado. In this light, providing 
an opportunity to examine the long tradition of separating off the question of politics from 
intellectual and creative pursuits, the considerations proposed in my dissertation begin to outline 
possible revisions of this long-standing tradition. They begin to imagine, too, what the gesture, 
 
13 Antje Büssgen made a groundbreaking contribution in this area with her book Glaubensverlust und Kunstautonomie. 













































Part I: Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten 
 
  
Genre, Form, and Text 
 
Originally published in 1795 as a contribution to the first two issues of Friedrich Schiller’s 
programmatically apolitical journal Die Horen, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten is often discussed in terms of its generic classification as a novella cycle, 
Novellenzyklus, and, indeed, as the very foundation of this genre in the history of German 
literature. This classification is often corroborated retrospectively, with a reference to Goethe’s 
later remark: “[...] denn was ist eine Novelle anders als eine sich ereignete unerhörte 
Begebenheit.”14 Although made specifically in reference to Goethe’s text titled “Novelle” and 
published in 1828, this remark is often extrapolated to the novella genre in general, under which 
Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are then classified: a “lehrreiches, nützliches und geselligkeitsstiftendes 
Gefäß für ein unerhörtes Ereignis, den merkwürdigen Fall, die seltsame Begebenheit und die 
wunderbare Geschichte.”15 As a novella cycle, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are often explored for 
 
14 Johann Peter Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens, ed. Christoph Michel (Berlin: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 2011), 221.  
 
15 Joachim Müller, “Zur Entstehung der deutschen Novelle,” in Gestaltungsgeschichte und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 
ed. Helmut Kreuzer (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlerische Buchhandlung, 1969) 152-175. On the generic significance of 
Goethe’s Unterhaltungen, see See Andreas Gailus, “Chance and Form,” in The Novel, ed. Franco Moretti (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2006) 739-776; Chenxi Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations and the Reinvention of the 
Novella,” Goethe Yearbook 19 (2012): 69-92; Müller, “Zur Entstehung der deutschen Novelle,” 173; Jocelyn Holland, 
“Singularität und ihre Verdopplung: Goethes Aufnahme französischer Literatur,” in Singularitäten, eds. Marianne 
Schuller, Elisabeth Strowick (Freiburg i.B.: Rombach Verlag, 2001), 345-360, here: 345. For a critique of this generic 
assumption, see Andreas Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag WINTER, 
2008), 67; Michael Saman, “A Discourse of a Different Kind: On Fabulation and Method in Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 






their fulfillment of the corresponding generic requirement to narrate an unprecedented occurrence 
that exceeds existing means of conceptualization.16 Thematically, the event of the French 
Revolution and its aftermath in the subsequent Coalition Wars has been interpreted as precisely 
such a novel occurrence, which Goethe’s text has arguably accommodated within its borders.17 In 
this light, Andreas Gailus identifies systemic vulnerability as a central concern of Goethe’s text, 
citing the memorable mention of a badly preserved gap, Lücke, in the opening of Goethe’s text: 
“In jenen unglücklichen Tagen, welche für Deutschland, für Europa, ja für die übrige Welt, die 
traurigsten Folgen hatte, als das Heer der Franken durch eine übelverwahrte Lücke in unser 
Vaterland einbrach [...]” (UdA, 995). Already at the level of genre, then, the question of borders 
and their transgression is at the forefront of the Unterhaltungen scholarship. 
Related to this generic premise is the formal emphasis on the framed structure of the 
Unterhaltungen as a set of tales contained within a narrative frame.18 This formal feature gives 
rise to a compelling interpretive logic. According to this framing, the cycle’s frame narrative 
thematizes a politically fueled communicative crisis; it then responds to that crisis by positing a 
theory of successful communication; finally, this framing theory is carried out by the framed 
narratives in a practice of interactively peaceful story-telling.19 In this light, then, Goethe’s text is 
 
16 See Andreas Gailus, The Passions of the Sign, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2006) 74-106, esp.76; Tang, 
“The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 69-92; Saman, “A Discourse of a Different Kind,” 465-484.  
 
17 Gailus, Passions of the Sign, 76 
 
18 See, for instance, Jane K. Brown, Goethe’s Cyclical Narratives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1975); Bernhard Gajek, “Sittlichkeit statt Revolution,” in Vielfalt der Perspektiven. Wissenschaft und Kunst in der 
Auseinandersetzing mit Goethes Werk, ed. Hans-Werner Eroms, (Passau: Passavia Universitätsverlag, 1984), 149-
163. For a discussion of this narrative frame as the defining feature of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen qua novellas, see 
Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 75ff.  
 
19 The literature on Goethe’s Unterhaltungen often takes the hierarchy between the framing text and the framed one 
as its point of departure. See Brown, Goethe’s Cyclical Narratives; Gajek, “Sittlichkeit statt Revolution”; Gerhard 
Fricke, “Zu Sinn und Form von Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten,” in Formenwandel. Festschrift 
zum 65. Geburtstag von Paul Böckmann, eds. W. Müller-Seidel and W. Preisendanz, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und 





seen as a poetic-therapeutic artifact: be it for the purpose of community-building20 or for the 
purpose of mending the contemporaneous crisis in international law.21  
While these formal and generic assumptions are undoubtedly illuminating, I would like to 
try to slightly loosen their conclusive grasp on the text which – or on the basis of which – they 
theorize. For, even as their generically definitional treatment of the unprecedented is emphasized, 
the textual uniqueness of the Unterhaltungen themselves is often minimized. Considered as an 
instantiation of a general class – the novella – this text is often underappreciated for its own textual 
complexity. I would like to propose that the Unterhaltungen can offer relevant and fruitful insights 
beyond the interpretive vehicles of genre and form. To support this claim, I will focus on the frame 
narrative itself and, specifically, on the border that separates the frame and the framed narratives 
– a kind of liminal space in this so-called “cyclical” text that often gets overlooked in genre-
oriented theorizations. Drawing upon the rich scholarship on the geographic and legal borders in 
the Unterhaltungen, I will call attention to the irreducible moments of tension and complexity in 
this text’s specifically textual border.22 As I will argue, these moments, by way of a peculiar 
resistance to programmaticity, can offer a productive challenge to efforts at interpretive closure as 
well as a unique response precisely to the political events addressed in Goethe’s text.  
Parallel to the manifest linguistic registers of theorization and interaction, a peculiarly 
spectral kind of Unterhaltung – a particularly polysemic notion23 – can be discerned in the 
 
20 J.W. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, ed. D. Borchmeyer (Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 1554. For a skeptical 
assessment of this text’s pedagogical success, see Bernd Bräutigam, “Die ästhetische Erziehung der deutschen 
Ausgewanderten” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 96 (November 1977): 508-539. 
 
21 Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 79. 
 
22 Gailus, The Passions of the Sign, 76; Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 79.  
 
23 For a discussion of the possible senses of “Unterhaltung,” see Rüdiger Campe, “To be Continued. Einige 
Beobachtungen zu Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten,” in Noch einmal anders. Zu einer Poetik des 





Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten, which is possibly hinted at in a prefatory statement 
by the character of the Old Man: “[...] und ich sage voraus: alles, was ich vorzubringen habe, hat 
keinen Wert an sich.”24 At first glance, this enigmatic statement seems to prescribe the treatment 
of the embedded narratives that will follow the framing set-up. However, upon closer inspection, 
this very principle appears to have been at work already in the language of the frame narrative 
itself. In a barely noticeable manner, the theory of absent intrinsic value – “keinen Wert an sich” 
– emerges at the border between the framing narrative and the framed ones: Here, in close 
proximity, there appear two almost identical formulations whose near-identity highlights their 
relation rather than individual value. The first formulation occurs when the Old Man excuses his 
refusal to contribute a story to the announced round of story-telling: “Wenn aber die Gesellschaft, 
nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit ausruhen [...] wenn sie sich [...] nach 
einem leichten Nachtische umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein [...]” (UdA, 1016, emphasis mine). 
To be sure, the Old Man’s postponement of his narrative can be explained as an instantiation of 
the common topos of humility.25 However, several lines later, the frame narrative seems to echo 
his words, introducing the first round of the announced story-telling in the following manner: 
“Abends nach Tische, als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr Zimmer gegangen war [...]” (UdA, 1016, 
emphasis mine). The narratively unmotivated resonance between the word “Nachtische” and the 
words “nach Tische” is a small enough detail, to be sure. However, located at the border between 
the framing and the framed narratives – two parts of the text that, according to its narrative logic, 
 
24 All citations of Goethe are from J.W. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Dieter Borchmeyer (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher 
Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 995-1114, here: 1016. Goethe’s Unterhaltungen will henceforth be cited within the text as 
UdA followed by the page number. 
 
25 Dietrich Jöns, “Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. Poetisch-poetologische Beobachtungen,” in: 
Korrespondenzen. Festschrift für Joachim W. Storck aus Anlaß seines 75. Geburtstages, eds. R. Schweikert and S. 





should be served separately – this textual detail could prove more significant than might appear at 
first glance.  
 
Laying Down the Law of Sociability   
 
I would now like to take a closer look at the circumstances under which the frame of the 
Unterhaltungen takes shape. In the plot of the opening narrative, a heated argument has just 
occurred between two members of the group of the German émigrés26: the young man Karl, an 
outspoken supporter of the French Revolution, and the Privy Councilor, its outspoken opponent. 
Although the character of Karl is often singled out as the perpetrator of this conflict,27 Goethe’s 
text uses quite similar vocabulary to characterize both Karl’s and the Privy Councilor’s unyielding 
adherence to their convictions. Karl is described as a passionate thinker and speaker – “[…] er 
hatte sich vielmehr von der blendenden Schönheit verführen lassen, die unter dem Namen Freiheit 
sich erst heimlich, dann öffentlich so viele Anbeter zu verschaffen wusste […]” (UdA, 1000). The 
Privy Councilor is likewise portrayed as argumentative: “[...] nicht zu leugnen war, dass er 
manches mit hypochondrischem Gemüte betrachtete und mit Leidenschaft beurteilte” (UdA, 
1000).28 In their verbal confrontation, both parties use vivid language of hope – a language that 
envisions a future actualization of their present allegiances. Referring to those supporting the 
French troops, the Privy Councilor declares, “[...] er hoffe sie alle gehangen zu sehen” (UdA, 
 
26 On the different valences of the terms “emigré,” “exile” and “refugee,” see Steffan Davies, “Weimar Classicism 
and Intellectual Exile: Schiller, Goethe, and Die Horen,” The Modern Language Review 114.4 (2019): 751-787, here: 
754. 
 
27 For an emphasis on the culpability of both parties in this conflict, see Sigrid Bauschinger, “Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten (1795),” in Goethes Erzählwerk, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler, (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Verlag 1985), 
134-167, here: 141. For an overview of the contemporary negative reactions to the Unterhaltungen as Goethe’s 
criticism of the Revolutionary forces, see Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, 55; Müller 157-8.  
 
28 For an emphasis on both parties’ responsibility for the unviability of their conversation, see Saman, “A Discourse 






1004). Karl, in turn, retorts, “[...] er hoffe, daß die Guillotine auch in Deutschland eine gesegnete 
Ernte finden und kein schuldiges Haupt verfehlen werde” (UdA, 1004).29 This battle of hopes30 
results in a dramatic exit of the Privy Councilor, causing a profound fissure – “Die traurigen 
Augenblicke des Loslösens und Scheidens” – within the group of the émigrés (UdA, 1004). It is 
then this linguistically induced division that motivates the project of conciliation by way of 
peaceful conversation, which emerges as the manifest theme of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten.  
 This crisis in communication is followed by a brief hiatus, in which the law of future 
Unterhaltung is laid down, its potential for manifesting as confrontation preemptively curbed. The 
Baroness, the group’s leader,31 deploys a pacifying maneuver of excluding from future 
communication any conversation on current events:  
Kommt her, ihr Kinder, rief die Baronesse: wir haben eine ernsthafte Unterredung gehabt, 
die, wie ich hoffe, Friede und Einigkeit unter uns herstellen, und den guten Ton, den wir 
eine Zeitlang vermissen, wieder unter uns einführen soll; vielleicht haben wir nie nötiger 
gehabt uns an einander zu schließen, und, wäre es auch nur wenige Stunden des Tages, uns 
zu zerstreuen. Laßt uns dahin übereinkommen, daß wir, wenn wir beisammen sind, 
gänzlich alle Unterhaltung über das Interesse des Tages verbannen? Wie lange haben wir 
belehrende und aufmunternde Gespräche entbehrt [...] (UdA, 1009) 
 
With this sovereign gesture of an enlightened monarch, the Baroness hopes to secure the group’s 
peaceful coexistence. The effort is noble enough, and the benevolently proposed censorship does 
not seem too high a price to pay if it should guarantee to the group its integrity in the future. 
However, the appeasing appearance of this proposal is at least somewhat unsettled by the 
 
29 For a discussion of this murderous language that leaves language behind to reach immediate action, see Gailus, 
Passions of the Sign, 91. 
 
30 On this gridlock in terms of the problematics of opinion, see Kirk Wetters, The Opinion System: Impasses of the 
Public Sphere from Hobbes to Habermas, (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), esp. 171-178. 
 
31 For a discussion of these émigrés’ fatherlessness, see Campe, “To be Continued,” 123; for a discussion of the 





Broness’s use of a word that has just prominently figured in the belligerent sparring between Karl 
and the Privy Councilor, which necessitated peace-making provisions in the first place. The 
Baroness, too, appeals to hope: “[...] wir haben eine ernsthafte Unterredung gehabt, die, wie ich 
hoffe, Friede und Einigkeit unter uns herstellen [...] soll” (UdA, 1009, my emphasis). Addressed to 
a narrowly circumscribed audience, her directive that future speech correspond to its presently 
articulated prescription has drawn a kind of circle, or frame, by divesting that future speech of the 
ability to respond to and alter the trajectory of that which has been said before.32 In this way, then, 
the Baroness appears to reproduce the future-prescribing gesture at the core of Karl’s and the Privy 
Councilor’s battling visions. The structural resemblance between the narration of conflict and the 
conciliatory frame posited by the Baroness disrupts the central line of demarcation between 
conflict and harmony that is often presented as the thematic backbone of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten.  
 Soliciting this future act of expulsion (verbannen) in a unilateral plea for agreement (“Laßt 
uns dahin übereinkommen”) – a performative rather than constative statement – the Baroness has 
simultaneously envisioned it as a homogenizing procedure: “Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel 
erwarten, in dem ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen zu einander fügen und sich angenehm 
unterhalten, indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” (UdA, 1007). Notably, the 
execution of this pleasantly monolingual Unterhaltung is imagined as a non-verbal act (im Stillen). 
Authorized by an originary, unwritten law, this exclusively inclusive conversation – a “literally 
repressive conception of sociability”33 – is grounded in silence and brings about silence.34 The 
 
32 On the historiographical implications in the Unterhaltungen, see Campe, “To be Continued,” 132-3.  
 
33 Wetters, The Opinion System, 174.  
 
34 On “society of excommunication” prescribed by the Baroness, see ibid., 173. For a discussion of this formulation 
as an epitome of eighteenth-century sociability and hence as the central concern of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen, see 





underlying temporality of this vision is that of conserved time.35 The impasse of homogeneous 
language that emerges at this crucial turning point of Goethe’s text strikes one as hardly compatible 
with its often-theorized generic feature – as a novella – of being confronted with and having to say 
something new.  
The Baroness is introduced in the following manner: “Nun musste sie sich als Führerin 
einer kleinen Caravane darstellen und wusste auch diese zu leiten, für sie zu sorgen und den guten 
Humor, wie er sich zeigte, in ihrem Kreise, auch mitten unter Bangigkeit und Not zu unterhalten” 
(UdA 995). What does it mean that the Baroness is said to have to present herself (“sich darstellen”) 
as the group’s leader? This emphasis on the act of presentation appears to subvert the natural 
givenness of her authority. It is also here, in this presentation of the authority figure, that a version 
of the titular word “Unterhaltungen” first appears. Here, of course, the sense of “to maintain” 
differs from the sense of “conversations” most apparently intended in the title. This irreducible 
polysemy undermines the ostensibly simple notion of Unterhaltung as a univocal procedure – both 
in terms of its own denotation and in terms of the process it denotes: an intersubjective interaction 
carried out by self-conscious subjects towards the harmoniously shared telos of sociability and 
conversation.  
The Baroness’s idealizing vision is premised upon a temporality of continuity which allows 
her to switch fluently from the present tense to the preterit in order to recite a mythical past and to 
call for its reproduction in the future:  
Überhaupt, fuhr die Baronesse fort: weiß ich nicht, wie wir geworden sind? wohin auf 
einmal jede gesellige Bildung verschwunden ist? Wie sehr hütete man sich sonst in der 
Gesellschaft irgend etwas zu berühren, was einem oder dem andern unangenehm sein 
 
35 On the media-theoretical implications of Goethe’s text and its resulting ability to exceed the program of peaceful 
conversation declared by the Baroness, see Campe, “To be Continued,” 135. On the constitutive implication of the 
reader in the transformation of the Unterhaltungen from the register of opinion to that of interpretation, see Wetters, 





konnte! [...] O laßt uns künftig, meine Kinder und Freunde, wieder zu jener Art zu sein 
zurückkehren! (UdA, 1008, my emphasis) 
 
“Gesellige Bildung,” whose recent disappearance is here lamented by the Baroness, can be 
understood both as education of sociable individuals but also as society formation more broadly: 
congregation of individuals in sociable coexistence. The Baroness casts her vision of ideal 
Unterhaltung in the form of a nostalgic invocation of an ideal past. In that past, one was careful 
not to offend one’s neighbor, yet not so much for the sake of that neighbor herself as rather for the 
sake of society, Gesellschaft, and capacity for society in the first place. Mutual politeness 
supposedly secured the ability of the precarious common project of society to be maintained. By 
appealing to her fellow emigrants (“O laßt uns [...]”), the Baroness moves from reminder to 
exhortation, attempting to reinstate her theory of sociable coexistence.  
 The Baroness proceeds by legislatively codifying the remedy against political discord in 
the following manner:  
Ist die Lust gänzlich verschwunden, mit der ihr, von euren Spaziergängen, einen 
merkwürdigen Stein, eine, uns wenigstens, unbekannte Pflanze, ein seltsames Insekt 
zurückbrachtet, und dadurch Gelegenheit gabt, über den großen Zusammenhang aller 
existierenden Geschöpfe wenigstens angenehm zu träumen? Laßt alle diese 
Unterhaltungen, die sich sonst so freiwillig darboten, durch eine Verabredung, durch 
Vorsatz, durch ein Gesetz wieder bei uns eintreten. (UdA, 1010) 
 
Progressing from a bilaterally arranged Verabredung to a somewhat less autonomously undertaken 
Vorsatz to an altogether heteronomously prescribed Gesetz, the Baroness arrives at her legislative 
proposal of Unterhaltung as edification. Its merit consists in the ability to counter conflict through 
unification. This unification is in turn established by way of an overarching epistemic cohesion: 
the cohesion of that which is cemented through its commonly shared cognition as a 





future discourse in her image, envisioning a direct lineage of narrators.36 Significantly, however, 
the Baroness is not the only character in Goethe’s tale who is presented as an authority on the 




Precisely the ideal of narrative and communicative continuity, prescribed by the Baroness, 
cannot be accommodated by the theory of Unterhaltung that, several passages later, is offered by 
the character of the Old Man, a kind of shadow authority figure. Unlike the Baroness, he does not 
speak of the future and its language in prescriptive terms of envisioning. Indeed, in his prefatory 
theorization, the future-indicating preposition and prefix nach is caught up in a movement of 
deferral, implicating with it the solemn notion of Unterhaltung:  
[...] und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an sich. Wenn 
aber die Gesellschaft, nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit ausruhen, 
wenn sie sich, von manchem Guten schon gesättigt, nach einem leichten Nachtische 
umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein, und wünsche daß das, was ich vorsetze, nicht 
unschmackhaft befunden werde. [...] (UdA, 1016, my emphasis).  
 
In the Old Man’s vision, Unterhaltung is figured as a supplemental afterthought – a light Nachtisch 
after the satiating main course, whose posteriority is further dispersed into two senses: temporal 
(“nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung”) as well as spatial (“nach einem leichten Nachtische 
umsieht”). The two respective objects of the preposition nach are thus inevitably associated: 
shadowed by einem leichten Nachtische, the ernsthaft[e] Unterhaltung suddenly turns less earnest, 
even as it simultaneously echoes the ernsthafte Unterredung invoked earlier by the Baroness. In 
this manner, the futurity at the core of the Old Man’s prediction (“und ich sage voraus”) emerges 
as quite different from that of the Baroness’s vision (“O laßt uns künftig [...]”). Contrary to the 
 
36 For a discussion of the progression in prominence from the Baroness, and by extension the narrator, to the Old Man 





latter’s holistically envisioned future, the Old Man uses internally heterogeneous vocabulary: The 
forward-looking verbs of speaking – voraussagen, vorsetzen, vorbringen – are syncopated by the 
backward-looking vocabulary formed around the preposition and prefix nach. Consequently, the 
likely interpretation of the Baroness’s speech about peaceful conversation as the theoretical 
manifesto of the Unterhaltungen37 becomes problematic in light of the counterpoint between this 
speech and its staging vis a vis the Old Man’s competing theorization.38  
Even though the Unterhaltung on the interest of the day (“über das Interesse des Tages”) 
has, with the Baroness’s legislative pronouncement, been banned, a residue of it remains, albeit in 
disguised terms. Namely, before the Baroness’s ideal of communicative homogeneity can be 
carried out in practice, an Unterhaltung on the topic of Unterhaltung – and thus precisely on the 
topic of the day’s interest – intervenes in the form of a brief polemic between Luise, the Baroness’s 
daughter, and the Old Man. Situated right at the border between the framing and framed narratives, 
this polemic has been interpreted as a peaceful dialogic alternative to the belligerent confrontation 
between Karl and the Privy Councilor.39 Granted, whereas that earlier polemic ended in a schism 
within the group, this one does manage to end with both of the interacting parties in the same room. 
Upon closer inspection, however, one will notice that this second polemic, too, is marked by 
absences.  
 After the Baroness has laid down the exclusionary law of Unterhaltung, we find out that 
the Old Man had not been in attendance during its pronouncement, an absence that is rarely 
 
37 See Bauschinger, “Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten (1795),” 140.  
 
38 See Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, 66; for an emphasis on the Old Man as the theoretical mouthpiece 
of Goethe’s text, see Jöns, “Poetisch-poetologische Beobachtungen,”174. 
 






emphasized in the secondary literature:40 “So waren Mutter und Tochter eine Zeitlang still neben 
einander geblieben, als der Geistliche herein trat, der von einem langen Spaziergange zurückkam, 
und von dem was in der Gesellschaft vorgekommen war nichts erfahren hatte” (UdA, 1010). 
Certainly, the stilles Nebeneinander, walked in on by the Old Man, could be interpreted as a 
fulfillment of the Baroness’s vision of peaceful communication im Stillen.41 However, by setting 
foot on this scene, the Old Man also inadvertently disturbs it. Namely, even though he has missed 
the Baroness’s recommendation of sharing one’s daily observations as a preferred mode of 
interaction, the Old Man wants to do just that – "Er legte Hut und Stock ab, ließ sich nieder und 
wollte eben etwas erzählen [...]” – when he is suddenly interrupted by another Unterhaltung: “[...] 
Fräulein Luise aber, als wenn sie ein angefangnes Gespräch mit ihrer Mutter fortsetzte, schnitt ihm 
die Rede mit folgenden Worten ab [...]” (UdA, 1010, my emphasis). Here, an Unterhaltung is 
somehow preemptively cut off not just by another Unterhaltung but by a mere semblance of one.42 
It appears, then, that the Baroness’s vision of sociability proves unprotected against disruption, 
subverted as it is by nothing like the kind of open confrontation against which it seemed to secure 
its borders with such prudence.  
 Likewise, after the Old Man, on the grounds of incomplete attendance, has turned down 
Luise’s request for a preliminary sample from his collection of stories,43 we are told, in passing, 
 
40 For an affirmative claim that the Baroness pronounces her program of future Unterhaltung “when all are present,” 
see Tang, “The Transformation of the Law of Nations,” 75. For a brief mention of the Old Man’s absence, yet only to 
detect in him the executive of the Baroness’s program, see Bauschinger, “Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten 
(1795),” 143. For a discussion of the Old Man’s absence as evidence against the claim that the program of sociable 
conversation is carried out in the course of the Unterhaltungen, see Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, 59.  
 
41 “Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel erwarten, in dem ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen zu einander fügen 
und sich angenehm unterhalten, indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” (UdA 1007, my emphasis). 
  
42 For a discussion of this discrepancy, see Beck, Geselliges Erzählen in Rahmenzyklen, 55. 
 
43 “Erlauben Sie, daß ich Ihnen hierin ungehorsam sein darf. Diese Unterhaltung wird für die versammelte Gesellschaft 






that the Baroness has left for the night: “Abends nach Tische als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr Zimmer 
gegangen war, blieben die übrigen beisammen, und sprachen über mancherlei Nachrichten, die 
eben einliefen, über Gerüchte, die sich verbreiteten” (UdA 1016-17).44 Seemingly nothing more 
than an inconsequential detail on the level of the plot, the phrase “nach Tische” interpolated here 
nonetheless carries with it some unexpected echoes. On the more obvious level, the table scene 
elliptically mentioned here echoes back to the Baroness’s conclusion of her constituent assembly, 
in which she envisioned precisely the act of gathering for a communal meal, presumably around a 
table, as the site of the newly legislated practice of Unterhaltung: “Und nun geht, es ist ein schöner 
Abend, genieße ihn jeder nach seiner Weise und laßt uns beim Nachtessen, seit langer Zeit zum 
erstenmal, die Früchte einer freundschaftlichen Unterhaltung genießen” (UdA, 1010, my 
emphasis). Less obviously, however, the phrase “nach Tische” echoes the Old Man’s vision of 
Unterhaltung as a Nachtisch. Whereas the Baroness envisioned the Unterhaltung as the main meal, 
the Old Man proposes Unterhaltung as a posterior supplement: as a Nachtisch – as Unterhaltung 
after Unterhaltung – and one that is, moreover, inadvertently echoed in the Baroness’s departure 
for the night, nach Tische. Notably, the semantic tension generated by this arguably accidental 
homonymy unsettles the very site of the communal meal – the “table” or “Tisch” – implicitly 
envisioned by the Baroness as the locus of social harmony. Evocative of gatherings of all kinds, 
not least those meant for political peace-making negotiations, this table is present only 
ambivalently in Goethe’s text.45 Ultimately, the narratively unmotivated Unterhaltung disrupts the 
 
44 Adelung defines “zeitig” as “was vor der gewöhnlichen Zeit ist, oder geschieht,” distinguishing it from “frühe” as 
“welches sich zunächst auf eine feste unbewegliche Zeit beziehet” (see Johann Christoff Adelung, “Zeitig,” Def.3. 
Grammatisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, http://woerterbuchnetz.de, Trier Center for Digital 
Humanities, 2010-2018. Web. 25 March 2018.) 
 
45 I thank Kirk Wetters for pointing out the potential religious connotations of this emphasis on the notions of table 
and communal meal. I thank Christian Kirchmeier for pointing out the significance of the table as an indispensable 






continuum between the Baroness’s forward vision of harmonious Unterhaltung and its 
actualization in the space of Goethe’s text. 
 The absences of the Baroness and the Old Man are especially odd given this text’s prevalent 
vocabulary of collecting (sammeln) and congregating (versammeln).46 Why did Goethe have to 
take the extra narrative step of specifying the barely noticeable absences of the Old Man and the 
Baroness instead of swiftly proceeding to orchestrate full attendance (Versammlung) at the two 
key moments at which the program of proper Unterhaltung is declared and inaugurated? In light 
of the dramatically thematized absence of the Privy Councilor – “Die traurigen Augenblicke des 
Loslösens und Scheidens wurden sehr lebhaft empfunden” – the absences of the Old Man before 
and of the Baroness after the momentous Unterhaltung about Unterhaltung seem entirely 
unmotivated, almost superfluous (UdA,1004). Yet they may speak to more than an accident of plot.  
For absent before and after this Unterhaltung are two structurally key figures, who in some 
way sanction the parameters of speech thematized and carried out in this text. The Old Man misses 
the Baroness’s announcement and vision of Unterhaltung as a culmination of being-together in a 
communal meal (Nachtessen), according to which the Baroness does in fact leave nach Tische. 
Yet the Unterhaltung as promised by the Old Man – Unterhaltung as Nachtisch – begins nach 
Tische, after this main course. In other words, the Old Man is absent at the critical moment when 
the Baroness lays down the law of future Unterhaltung; the Baroness, in turn, is absent when the 
law of Unterhaltung postulated by her is instantiated in the first round of stories initiated by the 
Old Man.47 In this way, the theory of Unterhaltung that is supposed to be taking place in Goethe’s 
 
46 “Diese Unterhaltung wird für die versammelte Gesellschaft aufgespart [...]” (UdA 1016, emphasis mine). As he 
gradually enters into the social contract of polite conversation articulated in his absence, the Old Man declares, “[...] 
indessen hab’ ich doch eine Sammlung gemacht, die vielleicht eben jetzt dieser Gesellschaft, wie sie gestimmt ist, 
manche angenehme Stunde verschaffen könnte” (UdA, 1013, emphasis mine). 
 
47 For a discussion of the Old Man and the Baroness as characters that in some way represent an authority and, more 





Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten appears to be affected by a kind of split at the outset. 
 What does it mean for the narrator of the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten to 
have as his proxies two figures who disappear at structurally crucial moments of narrative 
inauguration?48 Contrary to the Baroness’s vision of communicative homogeneity – “indem der 
eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” – precisely the two authorial figures, the Baroness 
and the Old Man, present no homogeneous group: Each one is absent during the other’s narrative 
spotlight, their visions of Unterhaltung at odds (UdA, 1007). Whereas the Baroness envisions that 
stories will be told and of what kind, the Old Man emphasizes the reception of those stories. The 
Baroness envisions the stories as a community-building tool, whereas the Old Man presents the 
stories themselves as an inextricable part of the community, one that not only does not guarantee 
its cohesion but may even contribute to its pluralization. 
Finally, the ambiguity of community is foregrounded when the Baroness’s early (zeitig) 
exit nach Tische is specified by one other recurring word: “[...] als die Baronesse zeitig in ihr 
Zimmer gegangen war, blieben die Übrigen beisammen” (UdA, 1016, my emphasis). Beisammen, 
namely, is precisely the configuration the Baroness herself had envisioned as the scope of her 
legislation: “Laßt uns dahin übereinkommen, daß wir, wenn wir beisammen sind, gänzlich alle 
Unterhaltung über das Interesse des Tages verbannen” (UdA, 1009, my emphasis). Having thus 
emerged as a decentralizing crossroads of crucial terms, the frame of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten can hardly be deemed capable of statically encircling an aggregate of 
texts. Beyond its own multiple senses, the notion of Unterhaltung thus appears to give rise to an 
irreducible polysemy around it, which comes through precisely at the narrative border of Goethe’s 
Novellenzyklus, namely, the text of its frame narrative. Perhaps, in spite of its future-oriented 
 
 





formulation, the Old Man’s remark that none of his stories has a value unto itself could be read not 
only in relation to the framed narratives that follow but, just as well, in relation to the narrative 
that has preceded this theoretical announcement. Driven thematically by a rupture between two 
linguistic subjects who fight with words as with fixed, established names,49 Goethe’s text is 
syncopated by a much less ostentatious rupture: namely, one between Nachtische and nach Tische, 
a hardly dramatic non-convergence within what is indisputably a collection of the same ten letters. 
The textual exhaust that remains in the wake of this non-convergence might offer an alternative to 
the language of posited names – language as “blendende Schönheit,” which is said to have seduced 
Karl, and which set off the narrative logic of this text in the first place.50  
Through a close reading of an admittedly small yet crucial part of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten, I have tried to demonstrate those tensions in it that exceed the thematic 
closure accomplished by an opposition of political convictions. In my interpretation, I have tried 
to suggest that the frame narrative is compromised not just at the level of the signified, as Andreas 
Gailus argues,51 but already at the level of the signifier. Compromised, that is, is not only that 
which is being narrated but also the narration itself. As I have tried to demonstrate, Goethe’s text 
allows barely noticeable ruptures to emerge within the structure of presence.52 Drawing upon a 
 
49 “[…] er hatte sich vielmehr von der blendenden Schönheit verführen lassen, die unter dem Namen Freiheit sich erst 
heimlich, dann öffentlich so viele Anbeter zu verschaffen wusste […]“ (UdA 997). For a critique of the language of 
names, see Derrida, Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972), 11, 28.  
 
50 The passionate speaker Karl is described in the following manner: “[…] er hatte sich vielmehr von der blendenden 
Schönheit verführen lassen, die unter dem Namen Freiheit sich erst heimlich, dann öffentlich so viele Anbeter zu 
verschaffen wusste […]” (UdA 1000). 
  
 
51 In Gailus’s interpretation, the frame narrative of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deals with sociable conversation being 
compromised by the influx of revolutionary news, which Gailus detects specifically in the character of Luise and her 
irrational reaction to incoming news.51 It is this compromise that, for Gailus, is then worked through the framed 
narratives of the Unterhaltungen (Gailus, Passions of the Sign, 79f.). 
 
52 I am specifically drawing upon Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in: Limited Inc., ed. Gerald Graff 





kind of movement of temporalization as it is articulated by Jacques Derrida in his theory of 
différance, I have discerned in this text a certain compatibility with a deconstructive reading. This 
has allowed me to illuminate in it a productive remainder that exceeds narrative and theoretical 
logics.53 Highlighting such an excess is particularly relevant in this text insofar as it deals with 
gestures of inauguration, foundation, and legislation, which are often deployed with the 
conservative goal of prescribing, containing, and regulating.  
The arguably peripheral details of textual articulation that I have highlighted in the frame 
of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen illuminate what I see as a productive tension in a text that is all too 
often considered in its instrumental functions of illustrating, exemplifying, or accompanying. 
Granted, the instrumental character of the Unterhaltungen is usually justifiably construed on the 
basis of its literary-historical context. The context in question is a journal project that, in retrospect, 
has been considered as a definitive moment of the literary-intellectual period known as Weimar 
Classicism. Lest my reading of the Unterhaltungen appear as too zealous an effort at a kind of 
critical autonomy, as it were, I will devote the remaining sections of this chapter to a discussion of 
this very moment and context. Given that the journal project in question has proved quite 
momentous for the subsequent development of the German letters, this should be a worthwhile 
undertaking.  
 
Part II: Schiller’s Die Horen 
 
 In December 1794, the poet, playwright, and philosopher Friedrich Schiller made an 
ambitious announcement to the world. Accompanied by illustrious collaborators – “die besten 
 






Köpfe der Nation”54 – he would undertake the publication of a new journal. In doing so, Schiller 
not only set out to compete in an already crowded field of periodical literature, in which 
“Almanache und Journale schossen wie Pilze aus der Erde,”55 but also did so in a highly polemical 
intellectual climate.56 Occasioning a close collaboration with Goethe, the new journal was to be 
titled Die Horen and issued monthly with a lofty goal: “wahre Humanität zu befördern.”57 
Schiller’s vision of the journal was novel:58 Rather than dealing with particular scholarly subjects, 
as had been common with Enlightenment periodicals, it was going to be a publication of broader 
scope, open to “sowohl philosophischen Untersuchungen als historischen und poetischen 
Darstellungen.”59 Accordingly, rather than appealing to specific groups of readers interested in its 
subject matter, the journal had the ambition of appealing to as wide a readership as possible.60 
Crucially, the positively articulated aim of Die Horen was left emphatically broad: “Sie wird sich 
über alles verbreiten, was mit Geschmack und philosophischem Geiste behandelt werden kann.”61 
 
54 Franz Schwarzbauer, Die Xenien. Studien zur Vorgeschichte der Weimarer Klassik, (Stuttgart: J.B.Metzler, 1993), 
58 
 
55 Peter-André Alt, Schiller. Leben-Werk-Zeit, vol.2 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004), 194. 
 
56 Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Bernd Leistner, “Von der ‘Gelehrtenrepublik’ zur ‘Guerre ouverte.’ Aspekte eines 
Dissoziationsprozesses,” in: Debatten und Kontroversen: Literarische Auseinandersetzungen in Deutschland am Ende 
des 18. Jahrhunderts  ̧eds. H.-D. Dahnke and B. Leistner (Berlin/Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1989), 13-38, here:27. 
 
57 Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 5, ed. Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G. Göpfert, (München: Carl Hanser 
Verlag, 1960), 871. Henceforth, quotes from this text by Schiller will appear in the main text as A followed by the 
page number.  
 
58 Wulf Köpke, “‘[...] das Werk einer glücklichen Konstellation’: Schillers ‘Horen’ und die deutsche 
Literaturgeschichte,” in Friedrich Schiller. Kunst, Humanität und Politik, ed. W. Wittkowski (Tübingen: Niemeyer 
1982), 366-386, here: 367. 
 
59 Friedrich Schiller, “Einladung zur Mitarbeit,” in: Günter Schulz, Schillers Horen. Politik und Erziehung. Analyse 
einer deutschen Zeitschrift (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960), 211.  
 
60 On this consequential anonymization and capitalization of the book marker at the end of the eighteenth century, see 
Christa Bürger, “Literarischer Markt und Öffentlichkeit am Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland,” in: 
Aufklärung und literarische Öffentlichkeit, eds. C. Bürger, P. Bürger, and J. Schulte-Sasse (Frankfurt am Main: 
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However, the path to its realization was determined more narrowly through a specific constraint – 
a strict abstention from political topics: “[...] vorzüglich aber und unbedingt wird sie sich alles 
verbieten, was sich auf Staatsreligion und politische Verfassung bezieht.”62 In this way, the 
ambition of Schiller’s undertaking consisted not only in having the audacity to bypass the highway 
of political discourse during a time of undeniable political upheaval but also to do so on a path to 
the ecumenical goal of forming the universal essence of humanity.  
 As Schiller declares in his announcement, Ankündigung, of Die Horen, this project is 
propelled by an aversion to conflict. The conflict in question is twofold: It comprises the 
contemporaneous geopolitical strife but also, and more significantly for Schiller, the polarization 
and pluralization of discourse about it. In fact, Schiller sees the “allverfolgenden Dämon der 
Staatskritik” as a discurisve outgrowth of the geopolitical conflicts that, as Schiller sees it, 
reinvigorates and perpetuates them: “Zu einer Zeit, wo das nahe Geräusch des Kriegs das 
Vaterland ängstiget, wo der Kampf politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in 
jedem Zirkel erneuert [...]” (A, 870). In an effort to will the geopolitical conflict out of existence, 
Schiller wants to eliminate the intellectual strife accompanying it. To that end, he prefaces his 
journal Die Horen with a programmatic statement that draws a clear boundary defined by what 
cannot be said in the projected publication. This preface imposes “ein strenges Stillschweigen” 
around the “Lieblingsthema des Tages,” prohibiting any discourse related to current political 
events. Programmatically turning away from politics understood as “politische Verfassung,” the 
journal proposes to interrogate history “über die vergangene Welt” and philosophy “über die 
kommende” (A, 870). Notably, however, Schiller’s noble intention to circumvent the struggle of 
political opinions and interests with his publishing project belies the inescapable struggle of 
 
 





interests this project itself is entangled in: As Christa Bürger argues, epochal shifts in the German 
book market at the end of the eighteenth century brought about not only a “Kampf rivalisierender 
literarischer Zirkel um Marktanteile und künstlerische Anerkennung” but also an 
“Auseinanderfallen des Publikums in eine Elite kompetenter Leser und eine Masse bloßer 
Literaturkonsumenten.”63 
 The central apolitical clause of Schiller’s program caused some consternation. The 
philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, one of the invited contributors to Die Horen, expressed 
skepticism precisely on this count: “‘Diese Einschränkung, im strengsten Sinne genommen, wäre 
zu hart für den Philosophen, der es in vollem Ernste ist; denn worauf kann dieser sich am Ende 
überall beziehen wollen, wenn nicht auf Staatsverfaßung und Religion?’.”64 Schiller offered the 
following explanation: 
Sie verlangen zu wissen, wie weit sich das Interdict erstrecke, das wir auf politische 
Gegenstände gelegt haben [...] Sie finden, daß wir dem philosophischen Geist keineswegs 
verbieten, diese Materie zu berühren: nur soll es in den jetzigen Welthändeln nicht Parthey 
nehmen, und sich jede bestimmte Beziehung auf irgend einen particulären Staat und eine 
bestimmte Zeitbegebenheit enthalten. Wir wollen, dem Leibe nach, Bürger unserer Zeit 
seyn und bleiben, weil es nicht anders seyn kann; sonst aber und dem Geiste nach ist es das 
Vorrecht und die Pflicht des Philosophen wie des Dichters, zu keinem Volk und zu keiner 
Zeit zu gehören, sondern im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes der Zeitgenosse aller Zeiten zu 
seyn.65  
 
As Schiller reassures his fellow man of letters, political discourse is not prohibited as such – it is 
only prohibited in its specific iteration as references to the specific world in which one finds oneself 
currently (“irgend einen particulären Staat und eine bestimmte Zeitbegebenheit”). However, 
Schiller reassures Jacobi, an excellent remedy for this restriction is available, and it resides in 
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philosophy: As a matter of philosophical discourse, politics is more than welcome in the new 
journal. In fact, the philosopher and the poet alike – both of them embodiments of the 
“philosophischen Geist” – are not really at home in the current, spatiotemporally particular 
circumstances anyway. In order to realize their innermost potential, both of them should, “dem 
Geiste nach,” extract themselves into the atemporal realm – an elevated form of exile, a kind of 
inner emigration avant la lettre.66   
 Notably, Die Horen – an “allgemeinbildende Zeitschrift”67 – was initially planned 
concurrently with a politically oriented periodical, to be titled Europäische Annalen. Later 
published as the Allgemeine Zeitung, the latter would go on to become one of the most significant 
political newspapers in the German-speaking territory. Both Die Horen and the Europäische 
Annalen were initially going to be published concurrently by Johann Friedrich Cotta, with Schiller 
at the editorial helm. Agreeing to edit the political journal only as a favor to Cotta, Schiller, soon 
after taking the initial steps of acquainting himself with the basics of political writing, withdrew 
from what he claimed to be too demanding a task.68 The poet and philosopher was now determined 
to focus entirely on his metapolitical project in Die Horen instead. 
 To be sure, the journal’s specific apolitical course was conditioned in part by circumstantial 
reasons. Originating around 1770, political journalism in the German-speaking territories was 
considerably impeded by the Religionsedikt of 1788 and the subsequent intensification of 
censorship.69 In this light, Schiller’s editorial decision to abstain from political statements may 
 
66 For a similar point, see Davies, “Weimar Classicism and Intellectual Exile,” 752. 
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have had a purely pragmatic motivation. Moreover, with the revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
events in France polarizing public opinion, the non-partisan, überpartheilich, course favoring 
neither the republicans nor the royalists also seemed to be the most sensible route so as not to 
alienate too many readers.70 
 More fundamentally, however, Schiller’s own political views were not unequivocal. 
Starting from 1792, he followed the revolutionary developments in France with keen interest, 
hoping that they could lead to a reform of monarchical rule away from absolutism and towards a 
more participatory system of government.71 Presented with an honorary French citizenship for his 
poetic accomplishments,72 the German poet even entertained the idea of traveling to France in 
order to try his hand at influencing the neighboring country’s political course.73 Certain authorities 
at home were not exactly supportive of these musings, and, by 1793, too, the situation in France 
had turned to terror, and so Schiller saw himself compelled to part with his ideals in the political 
realm.74 “Ja, ich bin so weit entfernt, an den Anfang einer Regeneration im Politischen zu 
glauben,” he wrote to his patron, Herzog von Augustenburg, “daß mir die Ereignisse der Zeit 
vielmehr alle Hoffnungen dazu auf Jahrhunderte benehmen.”75 Operating with the epistemic 
stances of faith and hope, the poet and philosopher thinks centuries ahead. Fencing off the 
problematic realm by nominalizing a broad adjective – “im Politischen” – Schiller gives up on this 
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region of human existence because of its apparent incapacity for regeneration. Used here in 
passing, this organic metaphor of rebirth, regeneration, and renewal in the realm of “das Politische” 
will, indeed, figure prominently in a future century’s fateful theorizations of political change.   
 Schiller’s verdict upon retiring from the realm of political affect, if not necessarily 
engagement, was that, given an opportune historical moment for political reform, humanity simply 
proved unprepared for it, which ultimately doomed the budding change to failure.76 The poet 
reoriented his focus accordingly: Rather than investing his intellectual efforts into a particular 
political course, he would devote them to the betterment of humanity. Significantly, however, 
Schiller’s was not simply an Enlightenment project in the sense of gradual improvement of human 
beings’ reason and morality. Rather, the poet and philosopher aimed at a more thorough education 
of the humankind: one that would reconcile rationality with nature. Disenchanted with political 
passion in the present moment, Schiller would now devote himself to “menschlich-ästhetische 
Wirksamkiet,”77 turning toward an indeterminate future that, in fact, would transcend the 
constraints of time and space: “[...] sonst aber und dem Geiste nach ist es das Vorrecht und die 
Pflicht des Philosophen wie des Dichters, zu keinem Volk und zu keiner Zeit zu gehören, sondern 
im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes der Zeitgenosse aller Zeiten zu seyn.”78 In this manner, Schiller 
arrived at his theory of aesthetic education as a metapolitical project – one that, bypassing political 
strife and struggle, nonetheless aimed to exert an influence on politics by reforming human beings 
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towards their capacity for freedom and thus political maturity in the first place.79 In this manner, 
Schiller’s Announcement was a kind of annunciation: at stake was not merely another journal, 
however loftily conceived. At stake was a fundamental reform of humanity. 
 The central editorial premise of Die Horen, its abstention from political topics, is of 
particular significance for my investigation. In order to examine the motivations, assumptions, and 
implications of this proscription, I will look more closely at the two documents delineating the 
journal’s program: Einladung zur Mitarbeit, sent out to the invited contributors on June 13, 1794, 
and the Ankündigung of the journal, disseminated to the public six months later, on December 10, 
1794 – both of these short texts “Reklameleistungen ersten Ranges.”80 The Ankündigung, in 
particular, can be read as a concise articulation of Schiller’s aesthetic theory, a theory to which I 
will refer in broad strokes, without, however, investigating it in detail.81 Of particular interest to 
me are not just the implications of Schiller’s aesthetics of autonomy but, more narrowly, the 
specific and explicit presentation of this aesthetics as a rejection of politics. As I focus on this 
narrow – merely annunciatory – moment in the history of the German letters, I contend that the 
following question posed by the literary scholar Günter Schulz in 1960, in the wake of an 
unprecedented political cataclysm, remains relevant today: “Ob diese einseitige Ausschließung 
des Politischen [...] nicht schwere Folgen für die inhaltliche Gestaltung der Horen und das 
Schicksal der deutschen Geistesgeschichte, ja der deutschen Geschichte gehabt hat, müssen wir 
 
79 On this point, see Köpke, “Schillers ‘Horen’ und die deutsche Literaturgeschichte,” 371. In this connection, one can 
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heute fragen.”82 In this light, Schiller’s Ankündigung may have proved programmatic not just for 
one specific journal but, more broadly, for the subsequent development of German literature. To 
be sure, given the particular inextricability of this literature from precisely the political trajectory 
of the relevant geographical territories,83 Schiller’s Ankündigung can be seen as an epochal 
statement with even broader implications. Before taking a closer look at the specific wording of 
Schiller’s apolitical aesthetic program for Die Horen, I would like to provide an overview of the 
journal’s brief career.   
 
An Overview of Die Horen: Expectations, Results, Implications 
 
 The project of associating education in taste with moral betterment had its roots in the 
ideals of Enlightenment, and the notion of ästhetische Erziehung had circulated since around 
1750.84 Moreover, the intellectual idea behind Die Horen of uniting reason and beauty had been 
contemplated by Schiller for some time and represented a culmination of his ventures in periodical 
publication. Since 1787, too, the poet had entertained the idea of a “herrschenden National-
Journal”85 – a symbiosis of political and aesthetic ambitions. By the time he signed the contract 
for Die Horen in June 1794, Schiller had already edited and published several periodicals, all of 
them quite short-lived: Wirtembergisches Repertorium der Litteratur (1782-1783), Rheinische 
Thalia (1785), Thalia (1785-1791), and Neue Thalia (1792-1795). Already in 1792, Schiller had 
 
82 Schulz, Schillers Horen, 10. 
 
83 On the political significance of the notion of “national literature” in the German-speaking lands, see Hinrich C. 
Seeba, “‘Germany: A Literary Concept’: The Myth of National Literature,” German Studies Review 17, no. 2 (1994): 
353-369.  
 
84 Manfred Misch, “Schillers Zeitschriften,” in Schiller-Handbuch, ed. H. Koopman (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 
2011), 743-757, here: 745. 
 






expressed his “alte Idee” of a collective and intellectually authoritative effort in the shape of an 
“allgemeine Zeitschrift” – which, as such, would suppress ideological bias.86 With Die Horen, 
then, Schiller finally had an opportunity not only to realize this creative idea but also to supersede 
the Enlightenment’s paradigm of gradual improvement of reason and morality through merely 
conceptual clarification. Schiller’s new project would accomplish a leap forward by bringing about 
a union between “gelehrte Welt” and “schöne Welt,” “sowohl spielend als ernsthaft” (A, 871).87  
 Just like its predecessors, the ambitiously conceived Die Horen made a rather brief 
appearance on the German-speaking cultural arena – but a noteworthy one nonetheless. In a letter 
from June 1794 to his friend Christian Gottfried Körner, Schiller assigned a truly grand task to his 
publishing undertaking: “Unser Journal soll ein Epoche machendes Werk seyn, und alles, was 
Geschmack haben will, muß uns kaufen und lesen.”88 Not only, then, did Schiller envision his 
journal as an influential authority in the present, but he also endowed it with a future-molding 
function. For, in Schiller’s vision, Die Horen would inaugurate nothing less than a new epoch – a 
break with the received past and an introduction of a novel, albeit unspecified, future. The novelty 
of this future would be closely regulated by the authority of taste, Geschmack: “[...] alles, was 
Geschmack haben will” would have to flock to the prophetically conceived journal in order to 
fulfill its aesthetic ambition or claim. In its wide field, the new journal would tolerate no 
competition. Its imperial goal was to conquer the space of periodical literature in Germany, forcing 
out any journals that had “das Unglück” to offer similar content.89  
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 To this end, Schiller was determined to bring together the most famous and influential 
German-speaking authors, an aspiration that can likely be linked to a general “Auratisierung der 
Dichterpersönlichkeit” in the last decade of the eighteenth-century German letters.90 To be sure, 
this emphasis on fame was motivated not least by the financial incentive to impress potential 
readers with the announced contributors’ established authority91 – this, too, indicative of what 
Christa Bürger has diagnosed as a contemporaneous capitalization of the literary market: “Die 
Tatsache [...], daß literarische Produkte wie andere Waren zu einem bestimmten Preis gehandelt 
werden, der sich nicht nach dem Wahrheitsgehalt der Aussage, sondern nach dem Tauschwert 
bekannter Namen richtet [...].”92 This was not a particularly difficult task in the 1794 Weimar – a 
small town that, through a chain of circumstances, had become a cultural center of the German-
speaking territories. With Goethe employed as a privy councilor in the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, 
the neighboring cities of Weimar and Jena had attracted a number of influential intellectuals.93 
Presented in the journal’s announcement as an “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft” and studiously 
listed in alphabetical order, the resulting roster of names had their fame in common but diverged 
greatly in terms of their intellectual provenance, which would ultimately detract from the journal’s 
long-term cohesion.94 Curiously, the offerings of the announced “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft” 
were to be published anonymously in the journal’s individual issues, the names of the contributors 
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not to be revealed until the end of each Jahrgang.95 It is as though the journal’s offerings, 
comprising pieces by several illustrious contributors at a time, were nonetheless meant to be 
presented as a kind of universal achievement of the human spirit in line with the journal’s 
underlying premise of “veredelt[e] Menschheit” (A, 870). The creators of the individual texts might 
be different, but their ultimate origin and intention was presented as unified under a single editorial 
and authorial premise. 
 Also worthy of attention is the announced journal’s title, the “ehrenvoll[e] Nam[e], den sie 
an ihrer Stirne führt” (A, 872). In a departure from Schiller’s invocation of the single mythological 
figure of Thalia, the muse of comedy, in his publishing undertakings prior to Die Horen, his new 
journal was given a plural name. Echoing the editor’s determination to bring together “die besten 
Köpfe der Nation” in a collective effort of intellectual exertion, this newly plural title 
communicates a sense of harmonious unity of several faculties and authorities. A classical Greek 
reference, “Die Horen” implicitly located the origin of autonomously defined aesthetics in an 
unreachably distant yet consonant mythological past. The announced, and thereby also summoned, 
patron muses of the journal, the mythological figures of the Horae themselves – the deities of the 
recurring seasons Eunomia (“order”), Dike (“justice”), Irene (“peace”) – were expected to endow 
the ambitious undertaking with lawfulness and order: “In diesen Göttergestalten verehrte der 
Grieche die welterhaltende Ordnung, aus dem alles Gute fließt, und die in dem gleichförmigen 
Rhythmus des Sonnenlaufs ihr treffendstes Sinnbild findet” (A, 871.) Already the name of the 
announced journal carried programmatic implications, heralding a harmonious union of the 
rational, the moral, and the beautiful. The harmony envisioned in and through “Die Horen” was 
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that of a transcendent union about to descend onto the conflict-ridden Babylonic human world.96 
In this manner, commensurate with the journal’s prophesied epoch-making significance – “Unser 
Journal soll ein Epoche machendes Werk seyn” – was its retrospective legitimation through a 
“welterhaltende Ordnung.” And precisely this mythological reference allows Schiller to articulate 
the novel project at the core of his journal’s program. Suddenly turning to the past tense, the poet 
briefly recites the origin myth of the Horae, to which he appends a philosophical lesson: “[...] eine 
reizende Dichtung, durch welche angedeutet wird, daß das Schöne schon in seiner Geburt sich 
unter Regeln fügen muß und nur durch Gesetzmäßigkeit würdig werden kann, einen Platz im 
Olymp, Unsterblichkeit und einen moralischen Wert zu erhalten” (A, 872). By thus reciting a 
mythical past, Schiller performs a key historiographic gesture: “an attempt to recover an imagined 
past so it can interact with the present needs.”97  
 Schiller’s fixation on harmony went beyond the thematic content of Die Horen. 
Apparently, the claim promulgated in the Ankündigung that Die Horen would strictly avoid the 
noise of politically provoked polemics also extended to the journal itself. Efforts were made to 
stifle criticism of the publication – arguably, so as to prevent it from becoming an object of 
polemic, debate, and contestation, and thus an object generative of politics. In order to steer the 
path of his journal’s popular resonance, Schiller arranged for those affiliated with it to publish 
positive reviews of individual issues,98 not an uncommon strategy “einer gezielten 
Rezensionspraxis” at that time.99 It seems that, having been announced as a visionary source of 
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wisdom in matters of intellectuality and taste, the journal had to preserve that same appearance of 
undisputed authority upon its actual release into the plural, and potentially dissenting, hands of the 
reading public.  
 Ultimately, however, the arranged positive reviews did little to ensure impeccably 
enthusiastic reception. Negative criticism prevailed. Notably, already the title of the journal 
provoked disapproval. One prominent critic argued that its title’s obscure classical reference was 
incomprehensible for most readers: The lofty name, “die an den Geist des Volks gerichtet seyn 
soll” was actually “ein unverständliches, fremdes, Ehrerbietung heischendes Wort,” in which “ein 
Ungelehrter durchaus nichts versteht”100 – an accusation that indirectly referenced the journal’s 
own contractually codified promise of broad comprehensibility.101 Furthermore, it was argued, Die 
Horen lacked editorial and thematic unity, combining demanding theoretical discourse with lighter 
material – in private correspondence, Goethe characterized the issue containing his Römische 
Elegien and Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe as a “Centaur.”102 The journal’s theoretical difficulty, 
too, was decried as an overwrought effort – one critic went so far as to demand that Schiller’s 
Briefe, the journal’s centerpiece and its program’s theoretical foundation, be translated into 
German.103 Still others criticized what they perceived as the journal’s politically conservative tone, 
arguing that Die Horen, despite its purportedly apolitical program, in reality promoted a counter-
revolutionary agenda.104 Ultimately, too, Schiller’s magnanimous gesture of aesthetically 
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educating the German public had its limits. Once the complaints from the unruly readership started 
coming in, the poet-editor declared himself pedagogically at a loss: “Wenn es Leser giebt, die 
lieber die Wassersuppen in anderen Journalen kosten als eine kräftige Speise in den Horen 
geniessen wollen [...] so ist dieses freylich sehr übel, aber zu helfen weiß ich nicht.”105 Beyond a 
somewhat humorously irascible capitulation by the poet vis a vis his discontented readers, 
Schiller’s dismissive statement also conveys an implicit prioritization of the author’s genius over 
the lowly demands of the reading public. This posture of prideful autonomy impervious to 
uneducated contestation certainly has implications quite a bit broader than Schiller’s particular 
character traits. Indeed, it is consonant with the very premise of the announced journal and the 
specific innovation accomplished by it: the articulation of literary autonomy.106  
 Schiller’s highly idealized presentation of his project as a peace-bringing authority stands 
in stark contrast with the various mundane conflicts that accompanied it behind the scenes.107 Soon 
after the project’s start, the ambitious editor did not see eye to eye with his collaborators – those 
“besten Köpfe der Nation” – and conflicts ensued. Prominent figures departed the 
“achtungswürdige Gesellschaft.”108 Pretty soon, the subscription numbers of Die Horen sank from 
the impressive initial 2,000 to about 1,000 pieces. Contrary to the bold expectations placed on it 
at the outset, the journal proved a “spektakulär[er] Mißerfolg.”109 By January 1796, only a year 
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after the journal’s start, Schiller had distanced himself from the project, having, as he claimed, 
“von der Theorie Abschied genommen.”110 In contrast to its inauguration with an ambitious and 
far-reaching announcement, Die Horen ultimately disappeared from the publishing market without 
so much as a public notification.111 Discontinued in January 1798 – with its last issue belatedly 
released in June 1798112 – this journal marked the end of Friedrich Schiller’s fourteen-year career 
in the field of periodical publication and thus also in the field of formation and reformation of the 
reading public’s intellectual and aesthetic foundations. 
 Despite its programmatic promise of harmony, the journal nevertheless ended up igniting 
an open conflict on the stage of literary politics in the German-speaking world.113 Schiller and 
Goethe fired back at the critics of their aesthetic crusade, publishing in Schiller’s Musenalmanach 
auf das Jahr 1797 a collection of satirical epigrams titled Xenien – here, as with Die Horen, a 
reference to the Greeks, albeit now with a sarcastic rather than noble inflection. Even if Schiller 
and Goethe themselves soon retreated, this “fürchterliche Affäre”114 had long-lasting 
consequences, hardening the positions of the various warring camps.115 Engendered by the 
programmatically nonpartisan Die Horen, Die Xenien gave an outlet to extreme partisanship, 
arguably helping to extinguish “allgemeine Bestrebungen der literarischen Welt in 
Deutschland.”116  
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 Retrospectively, Die Horen have been canonized as the central publishing organ of Weimar 
Classicism – indeed, as “das imponierende Dokument klassischen Denkens.”117 By initiating the 
consequential collaboration between Schiller and Goethe in the first place, Die Horen gave rise to 
much more than a temporary collaboration between two mortals: Brought together in creative 
alliance were two figures that, through a certain process of transmission and tradition, would 
morph into cultural symbols with wide-ranging, not least political, significance.118 The related 
gesture of canonizing this historical collaboration as a “Classicism” has created an image of an 
established cultural status quo advantageously propped up by a forum for propagating its well-
established ideas. In reality, however, the situation was likely much less defined and more 
precarious.119 The very period – or “local cultural phenomenon”120 – that has, post factum, 
circulated under the contested title of “Weimar Classicism”121 saw itself constituted, in part, 
around the program announced with Die Horen – but also around the wide-ranging polemics 
engendered by it. Indeed, even as he praises its formulation of aesthetic autonomy as a 
groundbreaking cultural achievement, T.J. Reed reconstructs the brief project of Weimar 
Classicism as one of intense opposition, arguing against the “Zerrbild der Klassik als einer 
mühelosen gesellschaftlichen Institution.”122As Steffan Davies underscores, Weimar Classicism, 
despite its canonical image of harmony, was “born out of crisis” – a time of massive sociopolitical 
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upheaval and displacement in the wake of the French Revolution.123 Consonant with these 
reconstructions is Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Bernd Leistner’s general overview of the 1780s and 
1790s as a period replete with intellectual polemics and generative of something like a 
Disassoziationsvorgang in the German-speaking literary and intellectual field.124 As Christa 
Bürger argues, the Xenien controversy, and by extension the project of Die Horen, was a significant 
event in what she diagnoses as a “Zerfall der Einheit der literarischen Öffentlichkeit” – a process 
that was felt to result not least from political polarization in the wake of the French Revolution, 
i.e., precisely the kind of politically induced polarization Schiller’s apolitical program in Die 
Horen had intended to forestall. 125   
 
Aesthetics of Autonomy  
 
 I would now like to take a closer look at the journal’s announcement, Ankündigung, in 
which Schiller’s editorial ambition found a worthy expression. Despite its merely annunciatory 
status, this missive lavishly deployed brilliant rhetoric and has been distinguished not only in the 
context of its author’s oeuvre as a “Kabinettstück Schillerscher Prosa”126 but also as a “herrliches 
Stück Prosa” more generally.127 Already at the time of its publication, the Ankündigung was 
praised for its own artistic worth: “vielleicht eines der ersten Avertissements, die einen Kunstwerth 
haben.”128 Indeed, beyond its immediate task of announcing future writing, this preliminary prose 
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anticipated Schiller’s poetological ideal of “schöne Diktion” – namely, diction that is not merely 
mechanical but “ein organisches Produkt” – an idea that the poet would develop in his 1795 essay 
“Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen.”129 Already the new journal’s 
announcement, then, foreshadowed its aesthetically programmatic ambition of ennobling intellect 
through beauty. With its program of political abstinence and concomitant claim to aesthetic 
autonomy, Schiller’s announcement of Die Horen was received as a “kulturpolitisches Manifest” 
already by its contemporaries.130   
 As mentioned above, the incomprehensibility of the journal’s “‘philosophisch seyn 
sollender Abhandlungen’” was a frequent theme in the contemporary criticism.131 This 
circumstance may seem trivial, but it actually touches on a more fundamental point, namely, the 
conflict between the Enlightenment’s instrumental idea of art and the ideal of autonomous art 
developed by Schiller prior to and concurrently with Die Horen.132 Implied by the allegation of 
incomprehensibility was the sin of non-utility:133 If, that is, readers had difficulty accessing the 
lofty texts offered by Die Horen, how was the latter supposed to serve as an instrument of 
edification for the former? Prominent among the critics of Die Horen, the old guard of the 
Enlightenment lamented the journal’s inability to publish intellectual and literary discourse that 
would propel its audience to independent thought and moral betterment.134 For Schiller, however, 
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precisely the Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason was too short-sighted. The poet was interested, 
rather, in mediating between reason and sensuousness by way of art. By 1794, too, Schiller had 
come to see art as a sui generis realm that, as he thought, nonetheless had profound sociopolitical 
implications.  
 As several scholars have argued, it is precisely in its departure from the Enlightenment 
ideal that the journal’s epochal significance resided. Steffan Davies, for instance, has called into 
question the frequent reference to this project’s famous failure, arguing that Schiller’s Weimar 
journal embarked, rather, on “the most important question put to culture by the age”: “how could 
the artist respond as artist – how might art respond as art – to the challenges of the day?”135 Indeed, 
Davies and others argue,136 Schiller was able to overcome the Enlightenment’s instrumental 
conception of art in favor of a more advanced stance: that of aesthetic autonomy. Since Schiller’s 
aesthetic program for Die Horen was no creation ex nihilo, I would now like to sketch out a brief 
overview of this idea’s background in Schiller’s intellectual biography.  
 The development of Schiller’s aesthetics did not follow a smooth path. Preoccupied with 
the question of art’s legitimation early on,137 the poet started out by polemizing against the 
Enlightenment’s instrumental conception of art as a means to human betterment,138 yet he soon 
shifted his outlook, defending the idea of a national theater on the basis of its indirect civic 
significance.139 Not yet in possession of a theory that could justify art without at the same time 
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instrumentalizing it, Schiller would reach the next stage of his aesthetic preoccupations in 1788, 
when his poem “Die Götter Griechenlands” incited an intense polemic, having been accused of 
supplanting Christianity with pagan deities from Greek mythology and thereby failing to dutifully 
affirm Christian revelation as the true basis for all poetry. Polemically provoked in this manner, 
Schiller began to articulate a theory of autonomy as essential to all art and poetry.140 Subsequently 
envisioning art, as opposed to Lessing’s religion, as the path to humanity’s education in his poem 
“Die Künstler,”141 Schiller eventually crystallized his nascent hypothesis that the lyric poet’s task 
consisted in unifying what had been fragmented: “ ‘den ganzen Menschen in uns.’”142 That is, it 
was the poet’s duty to make man as such the subject matter of his poetizing. For Schiller, then, the 
specific value of art consisted in its unique ability to access human beings in their essential, 
universal integrity, as human beings. Famously influenced by Kant’s 1791 Kritik der Urteilskraft 
and its emancipation of aesthetic judgment from externally imposed regulations, Schiller 
nonetheless intended to revise Kant’s explicit separation between art and morality143 by searching 
for art’s moral and thus civic significance: Avoiding a mere instrumentalization of art for moral 
ends, Schiller sought a more organic connection.144  
 Schiller’s mature theory of aesthetic autonomy was, in practice, not quite autonomous, 
made possible as it was by a stipend from his patron, the liberally minded Prince Friedrich 
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Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg.145 In a 1793 series of letters to the 
Danish prince, Schiller formulated what would, a year later, be revised into his central contribution 
to Die Horen: the epistolary treatise titled Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer 
Reihe von Briefen. It was now precisely the principle of aesthetic autonomy that was envisioned 
to have a crucial political effect: It would illuminate the human being’s capacity for freedom as 
such. It is important to highlight the specific concept of aesthetics at the core of Schiller’s 1794 
epochal project. No merely local matter of improving his compatriots’ sense of taste, aesthetics, 
for Schiller, is a realm privileged with an enviable access to the very essence of humanity. Through 
his theory of aesthetic education, Schiller has in mind the formation, Erziehung, of the human 
being as human being. In other words, in his project of aesthetic education, Schiller is concerned 
with the human being as a speculative ideal of humanity or humankind. Taking its point of 
departure from the universal concept of Menschheit, Schiller’s aesthetic-theoretical undertaking is 
emphatically not concerned with particular human beings in their plural existence. 
 While the concept of “autonomy” is not explicitly implemented by Schiller in his 
Ästhetische Briefe,146 it is generally utilized in the Schiller scholarship to refer to the novel project 
of Schiller’s aesthetics. The thesis that Schiller accomplished an epochal rethinking of art on its 
own terms and for its own sake is consistent across interpretations. Its apparent familiarity 
notwithstanding, “Autonomie” is a term with its own history and presuppositions, emerging in 
German literature in the second half of the eighteenth century – particularly, as Katrin Kohl has 
argued, in the wake of Kant’s conceptualization of Dichtung as art in his Kritik der Urteilskraft 
and his assignment of schöne Kunst to the purview of genius as opposed to externally imposed 
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rules. Kohl emphasizes the metaphorical character of the term “autonomy,” highlighting its various 
connotations of liberation: among them, geopolitical liberation from other national traditions as 
well as disciplinary liberation from theology, rhetoric, and eventually philosophy.147 With the 
discovery of something like artistic and literary autonomy, then, a lot was at stake. According to 
some, the program of aesthetic autonomy in Die Horen offers a “radical” alternative to the 
destruction perpetrated by political discourse.148 Some have even highlighted this episode in the 
German tradition as a kind of civilizing moment in the midst of intellectual backwardness: “als 
epochemachendes Geschenk an die europäische Kultur und als Fortführung des aufklärerischen 
Prinzips der freien Meinungsäußerung.”149 Others, however, insist that this novel program of 
autonomous art was indicative of a broad and, ultimately, destructive shift: “von einer bürgerlich-
aufklärerischen zu einer bürgerlich-autonomen Institutionalisierung der Literatur” and thus 
indicative of broader tendencies of socio-political atomization.150  
 
“Displacement of Politics”: Goethe’s Unterhaltungen and Schiller’s Ankündigung 
 
 In light of the Schillerian program outlined above, the status of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten is anything but uncontroversial. Already at the time of its publication 
in partial installments in Die Horen, the text was hardly met with enthusiasm. Charlotte von Stein, 
a sophisticated reader and member of Weimar’s conservative cultural elite, lamented, “Dem 
Goethe scheint's gar nicht mehr Ernst um's Schreiben zu sein [...].”151 Wilhelm von Humboldt, one 
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of Schiller’s original collaborators on Die Horen, summarized, “Die Unterhaltungen misfallen 
durchaus und total.”152 Most importantly, Schiller, too, registered his disappointment in a 
December 5, 1794 letter to Körner: “Von ihm [Goethe] findest Du in dem ersten Stück noch den 
Anfang einer Reyhe von Erzählungen, aber dieser Anfang, der zur Einleitung dienen soll, hat 
meine Erwartung keinswegs befriedigt. Leider trifft dieses Unglück schon das erste Stück, aber es 
war nicht mehr zu ändern.”153 As Schiller indicates here, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen are perceived 
as unsatisfactory specifically in their introductory or inaugural function. With Goethe himself 
admitting to the contingent status of this piece of writing,154 its initial dismissal and minimization 
likely influenced subsequent reception.  
 Overlooked for a long time as a subpar product by the canonized maestro, Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten has been rediscovered with great interpretive vigor. The text has given 
rise to various, often mutually exclusive readings. Of course, precisely this interpretive crossroads 
is predicted by the text’s own poetological premises discussed at the beginning of this chapter: 
After all, the character of the Old Man does warn the emigrants, “alles was ich vorzubringen habe, 
hat keinen Wert an sich” (UdA, 1016). In this light, Michael Saman convincingly emphasizes the 
epistemological significance of Goethe’s text, suggesting that “Whether we choose to view the 
Unterhaltungen [...] as a messy textual inkblot or as a pristine poetic unity – what comes to the 
foreground either way is the process of judgment by which the reader goes about determining 
meaning or unity in them.”155 That is, Goethe’s text – at least in the way in which it confronts its 
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readers, if not necessarily in the way it may have been conceived or expected within broader 
theoretical frameworks – confronts these readers first and foremost with the problem of its own 
interpretation. Similarly, Kirk Wetters has highlighted the text’s specifically “literary 
circumvention” of the “egocentric political exchange” and its gradual transformation from a 
“community of belief” into a “community of interpretation.”156  
 This insight into the specific sui generis character of Goethe’s puzzling text has not always 
been acknowledged by the scholarly consensus. Rather, the interpretability of the Unterhaltungen 
has mostly been discussed in conjunction with Schiller’s editorial program in Die Horen. To be 
sure, the exact logic of the relationship between Goethe’s and Schiller’s respective contributions 
to Die Horen is a contentious matter. Some claim, “Der ästhetische Theoretiker führte, und der 
Erzähler folgte ihm nach, indem er seine Sache nach und nach entwickelte.”157 Others argue, 
“Goethe’s emigrants were not just a response to Schiller’s programme, but formed it.”158 Thus, 
Goethe’s contribution has been variously declared an outright subversion of that program, an 
unconditional fulfillment of it, or an inextricable part of its very formation.159 Common to all of 
these strains of interpretation, however, is the assumption that Goethe’s text is largely exhausted 
when accommodated within the aesthetic vision and program underlying Schiller’s theoretical and 
editorial project.  
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 The confusion likely stems not least from the close collaboration and exchange between 
Schiller and Goethe during the planning stages of Die Horen in the autumn and winter of 1794, 
which Goethe authorized with the following verdict: “Wir wissen nun [...] daß wir in Prinzipien 
einig sind und daß die Kreise unseres Empfindens, Denkens und Wirkens teils koinzidieren, teils 
sich berühren.”160 Yet, from a purely chronological lens, the two authors’ collaboration was 
preceded by Schiller’s Einladung zur Mitarbeit, in which he had already formulated some of the 
main principles of his nascent project. This means that Goethe, before agreeing to contribute to 
Die Horen or writing any part of the Unterhaltungen, had to have acquainted himself with the 
project’s direction and, specifically, its programmatic abstention from political discourse. Having 
received the first nine of Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe on the 20th of October and communicated 
his enthusiastic approval, Goethe sent Schiller the first installment of his Unterhaltungen on the 
27th of November. Schiller, in turn, responded on the 29th of November, noting his intention to 
write an Ankündigung for the journal, in which he would apprise the reading public of the journal’s 
apolitical program. The promised Ankündigung was sent to Goethe on the 6th of December. As this 
chronological outline suggests, Goethe’s framing narrative for the Unterhaltungen, while aware 
of Schiller’s editorial intention, nonetheless preceded Schiller’s composition of the Ankündigung, 
this “herrliches Stück Prosa.” In order to trace Schiller’s rendition of a theme articulated by 
Goethe, it would be instructive to juxtapose their respective texts.  
 Schiller’s Ankündigung opens with the vocabulary of imminent war and its negative effects 
on society’s intellectual development. In response, he proposes a preemptively censored discourse 
that would avoid polarizing topics – i.e., topics that trigger disagreement by inviting a variety of 
interpretations in accordance with the interpreters’ particular personal interests and corresponding 
 





political affiliations. He forestalls this unavoidable perspectival variety with a preemptively 
speculative gesture, counteracting the conflict-inducing minutia of material circumstances with a 
universal, and thus conciliatory, viewpoint: 
Zu einer Zeit, wo das nahe Geräusch des Krieges das Vaterland ängstiget, wo der Kampf 
politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in jedem Zirkel erneuert und 
nur allzuoft Musen und Grazien daraus verscheucht, wo weder in den Gesprächen noch in 
den Schriften des Tages vor diesem allverfolgenden Dämon der Staatskritik Rettung ist, 
möchte es ebenso gewagt als verdienstlich sein, den so sehr zerstreuten Leser zu einer 
Unterhaltung von ganz entgegengesetzter Art einzuladen. In der Tat scheinen die 
Zeitumstände einer Schrift wenig Glück zu versprechen, die sich über das Lieblingsthema 
des Tages ein strenges Stillschweigen auferlegen und ihren Ruhm darin suchen wird, durch 
etwas anderes zu gefallen, als wodurch jetzt alles gefällt. Aber je mehr das beschränkte 
Interesse der Gegenwart die Gemüter in Spannung setzt, einengt und unterjocht, desto 
dringender wird das Bedürfnis, durch ein allgemeines und höheres Interesse an dem, was 
rein menschlich und über allen Einfluß der Zeiten erhaben ist, sie wieder in Freiheit zu 
setzen und die politisch geteilte Welt unter der Fahne der Wahrheit und Schönheit wieder 
zu vereinigen. (A, 870, Schiller’s emphasis) 
 
 Without defining what exactly “politisch” might mean, Schiller envisions it as a phenomenon of 
division – the world is divided insofar as it is politically divided (“politisch geteilte Welt”) – and 
one rooted in the temporally determined strife (“das beschränkte Interesse der Gegenwart”). In 
response to this division, Schiller seeks unity predicated upon speculative, universal, and 
atemporal principles, “über allen Einfluss der Zeiten erhaben.” Striving to supersede the 
multifaceted constraints of time, Schiller plans to distil the atemporal human (“rein menschlich”) 
essence. In this memorable opening paragraph of Schiller’s Ankündigung, a number of 
formulations will ring familiar to the reader of Goethe’s Unterhaltungen. By imposing silence, 
Stillschweigen, on the favorite topic of the day, Schiller foreshadows the vision of conversation im 
Stillen as proposed by Goethe’s Baroness: “Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel erwarten, in dem 
ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen zu einander fügen und sich angenehm unterhalten, 
indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere schon denkt” (UdA, 1007, my emphasis). 





Gesetz of pleasant Unterhaltung, Schiller promises that his journal – an “Unterhaltung von ganz 
entgegengesetzter Art” – is going to set free (“in Freiheit zu setzen”) the socio-intellectually 
distracted reading public (A, 870, my emphasis). Announced as a remedy for “den so sehr 
zerstreuten Leser,” this Unterhaltung is nonetheless also figured in terms of distraction:  
Dies ist der Gesichtspunkt, aus welchem die Verfasser dieser Zeitschrift dieselbe betrachtet 
wissen möchten. Einer heitern und leidenschaftfreien Unterhaltung soll sie gewidmet sein, 
und dem Geist und Herzen des Lesers, den der Anblick der Zeitbegebenheiten bald 
entrüstet, bald niederschlägt, eine fröhliche Zerstreuung gewähren. (A, 870, my emphasis) 
 
In a subtle play on the two possible senses of the same word, Schiller heralds his journal as that 
correctively edifying mechanism through which the reader will find her way to the distraction of 
the proper kind. By curtailing the potentially uncontrollable polysemy of his words, the editor 
preemptively authorizes the correct usage by censoring the excessive kind of distraction (“so sehr 
zerstreuten”) and specifying what kind of “Zerstreuung” is allowed (“fröhliche Zerstreuung”). In 
this manner, the noise of war is corrected by the harmony of the editor’s prescription.161 
Reminiscent of the Baroness’s prescriptive language, this externally imposed semantic purification 
– by way of censoring one kind of Unterhaltung and authorizing another – nonetheless stands in 
stark contrast with the reverberation in the word Unterhaltung as it is announced by Goethe’s Old 
Man:  
Diese Unterhaltung wird für die versammelte Gesellschaft aufgespart. Wir dürfen ihr 
nichts entziehen, und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an 
sich. Wenn aber die Gesellschaft, nach einer ernsthaften Unterhaltung, auf eine kurze Zeit 
ausruhen, wenn sie sich, von manchem Guten schon gesättigt, nach einem leichten 
Nachtische umsieht, alsdann werd ich bereit sein, und wünsche daß das, was ich vorsetze, 
nicht unschmackhaft befunden werde. (UdA, 1016, emphasis mine). 
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theoretical move to preemptively make sure that there is “no dissemination escaping the horizon of the unity of 
meaning” and that the performatives he theorizes “are reined in by an ‘exhaustively determinable context [that] implies 
teleologically that no remainder escapes the present totalization’” (Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the 





Here, the Old Man uses the crucial word Unterhaltung twice, yet in two incompatible senses. 
Whereas the first instance of this word (“Diese Unterhaltung wird fur die versammelte Gesellschaft 
aufgespart [...]”) is used to refer to the stories that are about to be shared, the second one refers to 
the serious conversation (“ernsthafte Unterhaltung”), which should precede that other – possible 
but not necessary – Unterhaltung. Sandwiched between these two incompatible senses of the word 
Unterhaltung is the Old Man’s relativizing warning against seeking a value unto itself in any one 
of his utterances: “[...] und ich sage voraus: alles was ich vorzubringen habe, hat keinen Wert an 
sich” (UdA, 1016). Differently from Schiller’s proposal to purify “Zerstreuung” through an 
“Unterhaltung von ganz entgegengesetzer Art,” Goethe’s Old Man moves from “Unterhaltung” to 
“Unterhaltung” with no advance notice. Similarly, whereas Schiller on behalf of his fellow 
Verfasser, prescribes the light in which their journal is to be read – “Dies ist der Gesichtspunkt, 
aus welchem die Verfasser dieser Zeitschrift dieselbe betrachtet wissen möchten” – Goethe’s Old 
Man leaves the question of interpretive lighting open: “[...] es kommt freilich vieles auf den 
Beobachter an und was für eine Seite man den Sachen abzugewinnen weiß [...]” (A, 870; UdA, 
1015).  
 The poetological tonality – prescribed in Schiller and left open in Goethe – has important 
implications for the two texts’ respective conceptions of community as a fundamentally ambiguous 
mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Reminiscent of the law proposed by Goethe’s Baroness – 
“Aber das kann ich von dem Zirkel erwarten, in dem ich lebe, daß Gleichgesinnte sich im Stillen 
zu einander fügen und sich angenehm unterhalten, indem der eine dasjenige sagt, was der andere 
schon denkt” – Schiller’s vision of his project hinges on the transformation of the community into 
a prescribed circle (“Zirkel”). Hitherto pluralized by conflict – “Zu einer Zeit [...] wo der Kampf 





circle is to be supplanted “mitten in diesem politischen Tumult” by “einen engen vertraulichen 
Zirkel” by way of prescriptively abstinent Unterhaltung (UdA, 1007, my emphasis; A, 870, my 
emphasis). However, whereas this circular togetherness represents the ultimate aim of Schiller’s 
vision, it is revised and displaced in Goethe’s text. There, precisely the pivotal figure of the 
Verfasser, on whose – collective – behalf Schiller speaks about future speech, is pluralized in a 
dissonant manner, split into the Baroness and the Old man, no longer able to prescribe univocally: 
The complex interaction between their respective Ankündigungen in Goethe’s text calls the very 
potential of program fulfillment into question. The Old Man’s theorization emerges as a kind of 
remainder that escapes the totalization of the Baroness’s foundational gesture. 
 Regardless of the exact lineage of the apolitical program of Die Horen, is it fair to argue, 
as Hartmut Reinhardt does, that Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten is a 
“Begleitwerk zu Schillers Ästhetik und nichts anderes”?162 I do not wish either to affirm or dispute 
that Goethe may have been in agreement with Schiller’s apolitically formulated aesthetic project. 
Rather, I am interested in highlighting the specific difference between the manner in which Goethe 
ended up framing his Unterhaltungen and Schiller’s articulation of his own program. To this end, 
I have tried to shed light on what I see as an irreducible undecidability within Goethe’s text – 
specifically, in contrast to the rhetorical brilliance of Schiller’s Ankündigung.163  
 Another source of controversy surrounding Goethe’s Unterhaltungen has to do with the 
political stance translated through it. Didn’t it communicate an indisputably conservative rejection 
of the revolutionary developments in France – and thus tacit support for the system of the ancien 
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régime? This was already the dominant reception at the time of the text’s first publication in Die 
Horen. Not only, it was argued, did the Unterhaltungen, at first anonymously authored, support 
the politically illiberal status quo but also did so under the guise of apoliticism, thereby naturalizing 
that which surely had its specific spatiotemporal prerequisites and was thus reformable. As the 
historical record shows, Goethe’s political affinities certainly did not reside with the revolution, 
although his specific rejection of the revolutionary events in France are anything but simple. 
Moreover, the poet’s own political activity in his role as Privy Councilor to the Duke of Saxe-
Weimar often proved suppressive of sociopolitical reform.164 As W. Daniel Wilson argues, “In the 
end, of course, he worked both as a writer and as a privy councilor against stirrings of resistance 
to absolutism in Germany. In doing so, he gave the lie to the notion – persistent even to this day – 
that Weimar Classicism represents a ‘disengagement’ from politics. Goethe and Schiller both 
mobilized literature against the forces of revolution.”165 
 In this light, the issue I take with the dominant tenor of the secondary literature on Goethe’s 
Unterhaltungen is the ease with which this scholarship often packages the text under various 
labels, deploying it as a programmatic foundation for, or illustration of, other theories or motives. 
This theoretical stance on my part may appear to appeal to precisely the ideal of autonomous art – 
and perhaps something like an autonomous criticism, blind to the text’s specific historical context. 
That is not my intention, however. Instead, I propose to look in a slightly different direction. I am 
less interested in what Goethe really meant to say based on his actual convictions: which political 
side – the revolutionaries or the royalists – he supported personally and for which party he offered 
support in his Unterhaltungen. As I have indicated above, the difficulty with his text – as perhaps, 
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more generally, with those literary texts whose complexity of articulation somehow overshadows 
their presumed message – is that it contains plenty of quotes that, if extracted on their own, would 
serve to corroborate the claim of political partisanship, perhaps “a common phenomenon for a 
writer who seldom conveyed an unalloyed political message in his complex works.”166 Without 
overlooking Goethe’s own illiberal politics, one can nonetheless look at his Unterhaltungen and 
find oneself puzzled by its specifically textual complexity. Whatever its program might have been, 
Goethe’s text does not easily lend itself to a univocal, autonomous message. Its multiple voices 
are, as I have tried to show, not always consonant. Significantly, this non-consonance goes beyond 
the level of narrated opinions – of the royalists and or of the republicans. Rather, it also affects 
their narration as well. I have attempted to demonstrate this by illuminating the tension between 
the Baroness’s and the Old Man’s respective prescriptions for future Unterhaltung. Perhaps against 
Goethe’s personal political convictions, the text he ends up putting to paper is at least not quite 
controllable in a programmatic manner.  
 Finally, of particular interest for my investigation more broadly is the inextricable 
connection of Schiller’s theory of aesthetic autonomy to his banishment of political topics 
prefacing this theory as it was formulated and published in Die Horen. To be sure, as many scholars 
have convincingly argued, Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe – contrary to the appearance created by 
their ostensible flight from the realm of politics into that of aesthetics – belong to political 
philosophy.167 Indeed, Schiller himself seems to have implied as much in a letter to Goethe: “Ich 
habe den politischen Jammer noch nie einer Feder angesetzt, und was ich in [den Ästhetischen 
Briefen] davon sagte, geschah bloß, um in alle Ewigkeit nichts mehr davon zu sagen; aber ich 
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glaube, daß das Bekenntnis, das ich darin ablege, nicht ganz überflüssig ist.”168 Crucially, 
Schiller’s admission of having spoken on a political topic is succeeded by a decisive refusal to 
utter another word on the matter. It is not my intention to dispute the political relevance of 
Schiller’s aesthetic theory in its mature version articulated in 1794 and 1795. Indeed, this chapter 
has largely avoided an explicit engagement with that theory. Rather, I have tried to call attention 
to the gesture of banishing political discourse as an inextricably concomitant phenomenon of this 
theory and its articulation. For, in the end, Schiller’s political – or perhaps metapolitical – 
engagement is accompanied by an explicit rejection of “politics.” In calling into question Schiller’s 
metapolitical project of political abstinence, I have drawn upon Bonnie Honig’s discernment of a 
“mysterious phenomenon”: “the displacement of politics in political theory” – an aspiration within 
the field of political theory and philosophy to makes politics (ostensibly, the field’s very subject 
matter) superfluous.169 Envisioning themselves as solutions to problems, these theories envision 
“politics” as that which needs to be regulated and ultimately reformed out of the equation. 
 The situation that outlines itself in Schiller’s Die Horen program is that “politics” is 
banished from a discourse whose ultimate aim is, in fact, to educate the human being – den 
Menschen – to a capacity for politics in the first place. Schiller’s propaedeutic is such that it instates 
a positive thematic ban at the outset in order to enhance the human being’s – des Menschen – 
broadly cognitive apparatus for a future receptivity to the propaedeutically banned realm.170 The 
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170 In this light, Schiller’s pedagogical project may appear somewhat akin to Kant’s critical-philosophical one in the 
sense that it, too, abstains from something in order to make room for it in the future. To be sure, Kant’s negative 
approach in his critical philosophy as a propaedeutic for a coming positive metaphysics does not so much banish any 
specific topic of discourse as, rather, requires that the very faculty of cognition – of that topic or any other – be 
examined with a view to its structural limits and ability to speak on that topic – or any other one – in the first place. 





key point, of course, is that this very realm – “politics” – would acquire a reformed shape in organic 
tandem with the aesthetically reformed human being, den Menschen, himself. As so many 
individual instantiations of the universal and universally reformed Mensch, human beings would 
be attuned to a coexistence and cooperation to which discord and contestation would be 
definitionally foreign. With his editorial program for Die Horen, Schiller inaugurates his aesthetics 





















some future point. The question, for Kant, is, rather, how much one can say, i.e., know, about certain topics, given the 







Artistic Autonomy: Gottfried Benn’s Poetological Polemics  
 
 
Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung, im Besuchszimmer eines der neuen preußischen 
Ministerien sei ein Schild folgenden Inhalts angeschlagen: “Man kommt nicht in eigener 
Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat aufgebaut wird.” Ausgezeichnet! Das soll heißen, wo die 
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen 
Staatsidee.171 
 
Durch Zeitungsnotizen müßten Sie erfahren, daß ich mich dem neuen Staat zur Verfügung 
hielte, öffentlich für ihn eintrete. [...] Ich muß Ihnen zunächst sagen, daß ich auf Grund 
vieler Erfahrungen in den letzten Wochen die Überzeugung gewonnen habe, daß man über 
die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb Deutschlands 
selbst erlebten. Nur die, die durch die Spannungen der letzten Monate hindurchgegangen 
sind, die von Stunde zu Stunde, von Zeitung zu Zeitung, von Umzug zu Umzug, von 
Rundfunkübertragung zu Rundfunkübertragung alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer 
Nähe miterlebten, Tag und Nacht mit ihm rangen, selbst die, die das alles nicht jubelnd 
begrüßten, sondern es mehr erlitten, mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den 
Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland reisten, kann man es nicht.172  
 
Inhibition of speech is at the forefront of both of these excerpts and is central to their source texts, 
two radio broadcasts composed by the German poet Gottfried Benn in the wake of the National 
Socialists’ accession to power: “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” (April 1933) and “Antwort 
an die literarischen Emigranten” (May 1933). With these two public statements, the venerated poet 
“rocked the foundations of an entire intellectual class in Germany” by declaring allegiance to the 
Nazi regime.173 In doing so, Benn appeared to renege on his long-held conviction of artistic 
autonomy, which he had defended in his essayistic output in the late twenties and early thirties.  
 Both of Benn’s statements from the spring of 1933 posit borders – around the ideal of the 
state and of the homeland – and thereby delimit the realm of transmissibility. Both of them, too, 
 
171 Gottfried Benn, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Gerhart Schuster, 7 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986), 4:12-20, here: 12. 
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emphasize the medial aspect. Thus, while the April speech opens with a matter-of-fact reference 
to something read in a newspaper (“Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung [...]”), the May statement not 
only expects a similarly fluent referencing of the media from its addressees – “Durch 
Zeitungsnotizen müßten Sie erfahren, daß ich mich dem neuen Staat zur Verfügung hielte, 
öffentlich für ihn eintrete” – but also elevates it into a prerequisite for speaking in the first place: 
“Nur die, die [...] von Zeitung zu Zeitung [...] alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer Nähe 
miterlebten [...] mit diesen allen kann man reden [...].” Crucially, broadcast on the radio as well as 
circulated in newspapers, Benn’s fateful 1933 speeches are inextricably bound up with the role of 
mass media. Significant is thus not merely their particular content but also the mode of their 
transmission as well as the question of transmissibility in general. 
In both of these radio speeches, Benn does not simply offer a positive enunciation of his 
newfound political allegiance. Rather, he frames it as a negation of someone else’s language. This 
someone else is identified as the “intellectuals” in the first radio speech and is further othered into 
“literary emigrants” in the second one. If Benn opens his April 1933 statement by quoting a state-
sanctioned prohibition – “‘Man kommt nicht in eigener Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat 
aufgebaut wird’” – by the time of his May 1933 speech, he has internalized this official formula 
and translated it into a personal conviction: “[...] daß ich [...] die Überzeugung gewonnen habe, 
daß man über die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb 
Deutschlands selbst erlebten.” Significantly, both of the poet’s pivotal radio addresses from the 
spring of 1933 carry an undeniable programmatic weight. It is in this feature of a programmatic 
ban on dissenting – political – speech that a notable affinity between Gottfried Benn and Friedrich 





Schiller and Benn are two literary figures whose commonalities have been extensively 
explored.174 Both of them physicians by profession, they find fame in the literary field. Both start 
out as poets and go on to develop ardent aesthetic theories – all the more ardent because of their 
sweeping anthropological dimension – that, as Antje Büssgen demonstrates, are crucially 
conditioned by a crisis of faith.175 It is then also not so much Benn’s poetry as, rather, his essayistic 
writing, concerned mainly with questions of aesthetics, that illuminates his similarity with 
Schiller.176 What I would specifically like to focus on in my reading is the striking echo between 
the two poets’ respective gestures of speech censorship, which, to be sure, are closely connected 
to their notions of aesthetic or artistic autonomy respectively. In 1794, Schiller bans political 
speech in a programmatic announcement of his new publishing project with the pre-political goal 
of aesthetically educating the humankind – or at least its German-speaking segment – to a capacity 
for politics in the first place. In 1933, Benn bans political speech from all discourse about 
Germany, envisioning the contemporaneous political moment in his home country as a pinnacle 
of historical creativeness, immune to mere speech about it. It is noteworthy that both Schiller and 
Benn promulgate their rejection of the public’s language in a public, circulated manner: via an 
announcement in Schiller’s case and via radio broadcasts in Benn’s. In this way, both poets cast 
an exclusionary circle around acceptable speech and acceptable speakers. In Schiller and Benn 
 
174 For a groundbreaking study of the philosophical underpinnings of Schiller’s and Benn’s respective poetics, see 
Antje Büssgen, Glaubensverlust und Kunstautonomie. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen bei Friedrich 
Schiller und Gottfried Benn (Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1996).  
 
175 See Antje Büssgen, “ ‘Die Transzendenz der schöpferischen Lust: Säkularisierungserfahrung und Kunst-
Metaphysik bei Gottfried Benn,” in Ästhetik – Religion – Säkularisierung, eds. Silvio Vietta and Stephan Porombka 
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009) 167-195.   
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alike, this regulatory gesture vis a vis language revolves around the hardly self-evident notion of 
“politics,” which, for both of them, has to do with the realm of current affairs. Whereas Schiller 
dismisses this transient realm as a distraction from questions of eternal significance, Benn 
monumentalizes it as an expression of metaphysical concerns. Ultimately, however, Schiller’s 
depoliticization of aesthetics reemerges in a slightly different guise in Benn’s extreme, even if 
brief, repoliticization of it.177 
 
Biographical Overview: From Poet to Essayist 
 
Surely, thoughts about poetry’s impact on the world must preoccupy any poet interested in 
attaining more than locally generic significance. This question is particularly pronounced in the 
case of Gottfried Benn, a practicing medical doctor and ambitious writer. Pivotal moments in 
Benn’s literary career emerge from controversies around the question of literature’s social role. 
Even as Benn’s conviction changes from adamant insistence on the artist’s autonomy to fervent 
subordination of art to sociopolitical ends, his preoccupation with poetological apologetics remains 
constant throughout his literary career.   
Born in 1886 into the family of a Protestant pastor, Benn highlighted the significance of 
his upbringing and its influence on his worldview. In a “Selbstdarstellung” from 1934, Benn 
praises the households of German pastors for their historical achievement of producing “ein[en] 
enorm[en] Teil der gesamten geistig produktiven, kulturschaffenden Macht des deutschen 
Volkes.” 178 Going to great genealogical lengths to disprove allegations of Jewish heritage in his 
 
177 On the role of literature in the crystallization of the National Socialist ideology, see Klaus Vondung, Völkisch-
nationale und nationalsozialistische Literaturtheorie (Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1973) 8 ff.  
 
178 Gottfried Benn, “Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten,” Gesammelte Werke in vier Bänden, ed. Dieter Wellershoff, 4 
vols. (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1961) 4:24. On the role of Benn’s parental home in his crisis of faith and subsequent 
transvaluation of religion into art, see Antje Büssgen, “‘Die Transzendenz der schöpferischen Lust’: 
Säkularisierungserfahrung und Kunst-Metaphysik bei Gottfried Benn,” Ästhetik – Religion – Säkularisierung. Band 





pedigree, Benn locates his origins not simply in the German “Volk” but, more specifically, in its 
allegedly distinctive prerogative: that of creating culture, “Kultur.” Only after studying evangelical 
theology and German philology at his father’s behest did the young Benn follow his own calling 
with a study of medicine at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Akademie für das militärärztliche 
Bildungswesen.179 In 1912, Benn received his medical degree and permission to practice as a 
physician, a life-long profession he performed mostly from a private practice for skin and venereal 
diseases with intermittent appointments in the military as recompense for his state-sponsored 
medical schooling. Retrospectively, Benn would judge his training in medicine and biology as 
decisive elements of his intellectual development, which he credited with instilling in him a “Kälte 
des Denkens, Nüchternheit, letzte Schärfe des Begriffs.”180 Admittedly, to what extent the 
discipline of sober thinking can be traced in Benn’s prose is debatable. 
In 1912, the publication of Benn’s debut volume of expressionistic poetry titled Morgue 
und andere Gedichte brought him his first literary recognition – albeit from a narrow circle of 
readers already predisposed to appreciate the Expressionist break with artistic norms.181 Surely not 
without influence from his medical and anatomical studies,182 the young poet was able to fascinate 
with an unperturbed handling of tabooed topics, such as bodily functions and ailments – a 
confrontation with regions of reality hitherto discarded by literature and thus a radicalization of 
 
179 Benn, “Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten,” 27.  
 
180 “Rückblickend scheint mir meine Existenz ohne diese Wendung zur Medizin und Biologie völlig undenkbar. Es 
sammelte sich noch einmal in diesen Jahren die ganze Summe der induktiven Epoche, ihre Methoden, Gesinnungen, 
ihr Jargon, alles stand in vollster Blüte, es waren die Jahre ihres höchsten Triumphes [...] ihrer wahrhaft olympischen 
Größe. Und eines lehrte sie die Jugend [...]: Kälte des Denkens, Nüchternheit, letzte Schärfe des Begriffs [...] 
unerbittliche Kritik, Selbstkritik [...]” (“Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten,” 28).   
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the longstanding debate about literature’s realist potential.183 In the following years, Benn 
published several more books of poems as well as experimental prose. After the appearance of his 
Gesammelte Gedichte in 1927, the poet definitively entered Berlin’s literary scene and began to 
expand his readership, although no longer via lyric poetry, which he would not write again until 
1933. 
Late 1920s and early 1930s saw a proliferation of poetological essays in Benn’s output. 
“Poetological,” however, is perhaps too narrow a term to characterize the specific niche of this 
self-consciously idiosyncratic prose. An avid reader of scientific and medical literature, Benn did 
not so much treat these topics thematically in his essays as assimilated them in a process of extreme 
“Verdichtung.”184 And yet, for all of their manifest idiosyncrasy, Benn’s essays were also quite 
representative of certain prominent cultural currents of the time. Informed by genealogical 
constructions of the Western civilization and its gradual cultural decline, Benn’s interpretation of 
history rejected the notions of progress and rationality, situating him among the representatives of 
the so-called Conservative Revolution. Composed of diverse reactionary responses to the troubles 
of modernity, this multifaceted cultural phenomenon was characterized by a longing for the mythic 
ideals of totality and unity – of the specifically nationalist variety – as well as an appeal to such 
transpersonal values as Volk, ritual, and overcoming of utilitarian and materialist reality.185 In line 
 
183 On the emergence of something like medical poetry in the epoch of expressionism, and specifically in the work of 
Gottfried Benn, as well as, more broadly, the phenomenon of “pathography” in German modernism, see Walter 
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with the Conservative Revolution’s apolitical and vatic conception of the poet’s role in the 
world,186 art, for Benn, belonged to the realm of the irrational and was thus to be sharply 
distinguished from the goal-oriented rationality and functionality of the sociopolitical sphere.  
Benn’s efforts to gain socio-literary influence paid off. In April of 1932, at the height of 
his professional recognition, he was elected to the Prussian Academy of Arts, the Weimar 
Republic’s highest literary honor, one that Benn would not tire of highlighting.187 Less than a year 
later, after the National Socialists had come to power in the March 1933 elections, Benn was 
temporarily promoted as a head of the Academy’s Dichtersektion – following Heinrich Mann’s 
resignation in protest188 – and proved instrumental to this institution’s political reconfiguration. 
With a member of the NSDAP now presiding over the Academy and with half of the academy’s 
members having been expelled, Benn was tasked with drafting the declaration of loyalty to the 
new regime, which led to further departures from the academy and concurrent acceptance of 
conservative and regime-friendly writers.189  
In this socially distinguished position of writing the law for poets and poetry – and not just 
any law, but a performative oath of allegiance – Benn found himself compromising the artistic 
autonomy he had so vehemently advocated for in his theoretical – but also, crucially, 
performatively charged – writings of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The change in the artist’s 
personal stance – from non-involvement to enthusiasm with respect to political matters – came to 
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the fore in  April and May of 1933, when Benn intensified his hitherto merely pro forma statement 
of institutional loyalty into an ardent declaration of personal and artistic allegiance to the new 
regime with two consecutive speeches, both of them broadcast on national radio and circulated in 
national newspapers: “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” in April and “Die Antwort an die 
literarischen Emigranten” in May of 1933. In both of these politico-artistic decrees, Benn 
articulated a policy of exclusion, positing a rigid border around the realm of possible speech and 
possible speakers. Specifically, the poet banned the so-called “intellectuals” and then, more 
narrowly, the “literary emigrants” from participating in the discourse about Germany’s 
sociopolitical affairs. With this fateful turn in his thinking, Benn undoubtedly contributed to the 
legitimization of the Nazi regime and its ideology190 – a brief contribution with a long-term effect. 
In addition, however, Benn’s short-term support for the Nazi regime also brought to a head some 
of the key questions at the core of his previous preoccupation with the status and mission of art 
and artist, which I will discuss in this chapter.  
As early as 1934, Benn, too, would become a victim of censorship and exclusion. The 
reality of the National Socialist regime failed to correspond to Benn’s idealized vision of it. 
Promptly defamed as a former Expressionist and therefore harmful to the integrity of the new 
state’s Weltanschauung, Benn was forced to recede, by the end of 1936, from the propagandistic 
spotlight into so-called inner emigration,191 deciding to remain in Germany while withdrawing 
 
190 On literature’s contribution to the Nazi ideology and its stabilization after 1933, see Klaus Vondung, Völkisch-
nationale und nationalsozialistische Literaturtheorie (München: List, 1973). Notably, Vondung confronts the field of 
Germanistik for its insufficient willingness to deal with the tedium of NS-friendly literature and its fateful complicity 
after 1933. In so doing, Vondung warns, Germanistik risks ignoring critical lessons from its history – a situation 
strongly reminiscent of the tension between literature and politics running through Gottfried Benn’s career.  
 
191 A vicious attack against expressionism in the regime-friendly writer and Benn’s nemesis Börries Freiherr von 
Münchhausen’s October 1933 essay “Die neue Dichtung” provoked Benn to challenge the author to a duel (See 
Cuomo, “Purging an ‘Art-Bolshevist,’” 88). This quite extreme reaction on Benn’s part, now embattled from the right, 
is of particular interest in the context of his various polemics vis a vis the left wing of the political spectrum in the 





from its public life and abstaining from either explicitly affirming or rebuking its political 
developments.192 Finally, in 1938, the Nazi regime definitively banned his books and forbade him 
to publish any further. In this manner, the poet, too, was met with a prohibition on speech – not 
unlike those intellectuals and literary emigrants whose right to speak he had resolutely denied just 
a few years earlier in his two pivotal public addresses. 
 
A Voice from the Ether: The Radio in Benn’s Career 
Although Benn had made his name as a lyric poet, his essayistic output was not simply 
ancillary to his lyric production, propelled as it was by his desire to propagate his views on art and 
poetry.193 Indeed, the poet wrote many of his essays specifically with a view to their capacity for 
mass reception and transmission. Significantly, Benn’s venture into the essay genre was bound up 
with his strategic use of the radio: His first radio-broadcast poetry reading took place on June 7, 
1927, which coincidentally marked a temporary end to his lyric production.194 Starting from the 
early days of the radio as a new mass medium in the Weimar Republic, Benn availed himself of 
opportunities to disseminate his views to a spatially scattered yet temporally gathered audience of 
his contemporaries. The poet cultivated a special posture and tone for these occasions – not 
surprisingly, quite in line with the contemporary mystification around the novel medium and its 
 
 
192 On the concept of inner emigration, see John Klapper, Nonconformist Writing in Nazi Germany: The Literature of 
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193 For a thorough discussion of Benn’s essayistic writing, its thematic significance, and its idiosyncratic use of 
language, see Schärf, Der Unberührbare, 162-189.  
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invisible, ethereal workings.195 In fact, the specific kind of speech produced by the radio196  
afforded Benn the ability to intervene in the contemporary discourse in such a way as to propagate 
his wisdom while at the same time holding on to his privileged and self-stylized position as an 
outsider aesthete.197 From this lens, it becomes harder to separate Benn the poet from Benn the 
litigator of poets’ and poetry’s role in the world. Bertolt Brecht, a critic of a traditionally rhetorical 
and oratorical use of the radio, made the following remark about the poet Gottfried Benn’s radio-
broadcast appearances: “When radio was invented and lectures on rabbit-breeding or marine-life 
research soon proved to be well paid, our poet was taken over by a strong urge to teach. He 
produced some dark theories for the radio about humanity, about the fall of tradition, etc. that one 
best reads in the old, beautiful fashion.”198 With these witty words, Brecht nonetheless pinpointed 
an inextricable connection between the content and performance of Benn’s essayistic prose.  
 As Anke Gilleir and Sascha Bru have highlighted, modernist authors’ practice of public 
address has largely been overlooked in the scholarship.199 While many of these authors thematized 
self-consciously avantgarde poetics, they often resorted to traditional rhetorical and oratorical 
conventions when making use of public speaking. One notable exception to this practice was the 
 
195 On the mystification of the early radio through theories of the ether, see Ottmann, Im Anfang war das Experiment, 
161f; on the notion of the “ether” as well as “medium,” a peculiar borrowing from the linguistic concept of a verbal 
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playwright Bertolt Brecht, who considered the effect of estrangement, Verfremdungseffekt, to be a 
necessary intervention not only between the theater stage and its gathered spectators but also 
between the radio studio and its scattered listeners.200 Recognizing the irresistible power of 
effective public speaking and presciently attributing to it the success of the Nazi Party201 – this 
“Rednerpartei”202 – Brecht advocated for non-totalizing forms of public address. Rather than 
appealing to the listeners’ empathic and syllogistic sensibility, the orator would have to decouple 
himself from his message,203 illuminating the context of the speaking occasion instead – “attention 
had to be drawn to the artifice of the public address itself.”204 Insisting on the novelty of the radio 
as a medium, Brecht did not only speak through it but also reflected about it.205  
In his 1932 address “Der Rundfunk als Kommunikationsapparat. Rede über die Funktion 
des Rundfunks,” Brecht gives a speech about giving speeches, challenging the hitherto uncritically 
accepted univocity and unidirectionality of the radio: “Aber ganz abgesehen von seiner 
zweifelhaften Funktion [...] hat der Rundfunk eine Seite, wo er zwei haben müßte. Er ist ein reiner 
Distributionsapparat, er teilt lediglich zu.”206 Recognizing the multiplicative novelty of the radio 
– “Man hatte plötzlich die Möglichkeit, allen alles zu sagen” – Brecht takes the extra step to 
interrogate this specific multiplicity accessible to the radio: “Und wer waren alle?” (RKA, 129, 
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202 Cornelia Epping-Jäger, “Stimmräume. Die phonozentrische Organisation der Macht im NS,” in: Politiken der 
Medien, eds. D. Gethmann and M. Stauff (Zürich/Berlin: diaphanes, 2005), 341-358, here: 341. 
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emphasis in the original). In thus bringing the revolution full circle, as it were, Brecht asks about 
the novelty, if any, of the new medium’s recipients, thereby following up on his provocative 
opening claim that “[n]icht die Öffentlichkeit hatte auf den Rundfunk gewartet, sondern der 
Rundfunk wartete auf die Öffentlichkeit [...]” (RKA, 128). In this manner, Brecht illuminates a 
peculiarly paradoxical character of the radio: on the one hand, its sheer untimeliness, perceptible 
in its non-synchronicity with the public’s unawareness of its specific novelty; on the other hand, 
however, its malleability to the kind of reception it experiences from the outdated public. In other 
words, Brecht seems to suggest, the radio is no self-evidently enlightening phenomenon, lending 
itself just as well to uncritical use qua instrument of mystification. Admittedly, given a non-
obsolete use on the part of the public, Brecht argues, the radio could become a medium of public 
communication, “ein ungeheures Kanalsystem” – “das heißt,” Brecht interrupts, “er wäre es, wenn 
er es verstünde, nicht nur auszusenden, sondern auch zu empfangen, also den Zuhörer nicht nur 
hören, sondern auch sprechen zu machen und ihn nicht zu isolieren, sondern ihn in Beziehung zu 
setzen” (RKA, 130). Crucially, arguing against the atomizing effect of the radio implemented as a 
mystifying ether-voice, Brecht underscores its relational, pluralizing capacity, thereby illuminating 
the radio’s ability not only to impart information to a community of listeners but also, significantly, 
to affect the very constitution of that community. In short, then, the genuinely novel potential of 
the radio will remain unlocked if no corresponding critical innovation of its users – specifically, 
of their capacity for relating to one another – were to occur. This finding, of course, has political 
implications, and Brecht spells them out: “[Der Rundfunk] hat überdies hinaus [...] die Berichte 
der Regierenden in Antworten auf die Fragen der Regierten zu verwandeln. Der Rundfunk muß 
den Austausch ermöglichen. Er allein kann die großen Gespräche [...] veranstalten, die Debatten 





speech of which radio is capable, Brecht decries a certain “Folgenlosigkeit” of current public 
institutions, among which, as he sees it, is “eine folgenlose Literatur”: a literature that, intent “ihre 
Leser zu neutralisieren, indem sie alle Dinge und Zustände ohne ihre Folgen darstellt,” partakes of 
the general tendency of “alle unsere ideologiebildenden Institutionen” to essentialize the content 
of specific ideologies as naturally given truths (RKA, 130). With this, Brecht offers a decisive 
critique of “Kultur,” critiquing not merely any particular cultural phenomena but rather a specific 
concept of culture: a concept “nach dem due Bildung der Kultur bereits abgeschlossen ist und 
Kultur keiner fortgesetzten Bemühung bedarf” (RKA, 130). Against the prevailing conception of 
the radio as a didactically centralizing medium of mass control,207 Brecht cautions that “das 
Publikum nicht nur belehrt werden, sondern auch belehren muß” (RKA, 131, emphasis in the 
original). Contrary to Friedrich Schiller’s project of human education, then, the one proposed by 
Brecht is characterized by a peculiar reciprocity. Running through Brecht’s address, too, is an 
emphasis on the urgency of change. Notably, however, this insistence on rethinking and revising 
is distinct from the contemporary and often radio-propagated calls for regeneration of all kinds: to 
use Brecht’s formulation, “Also für Neuerungen, gegen Erneuerung!” (RKA, 133).  
With this speech, Brecht critiques the practice of oratorical, declamatory speaking on the 
radio, of which Gottfried Benn made ample use from the outset. For precisely the urgent need to 
recognize the radio’s specific, novel capacity for non-unidirectionality and non-univocity was 
something that Benn acknowledged neither in the 1920s and early 1930s nor in 1933. Instead, the 
poet resorted to the radio’s oracular potential, positioning himself as a mouthpiece of profound 
 
207 On early German radio’s political function of centralization, see Solveig Ottmann, Im Anfang war das Experiment. 






insight, be it of poetological or historiographical nature – an invisible yet overpowering, 
unidirectional voice that could conceive of no interruption or response.208  
 
Artistic Autonomy through Poetological Polemics 
 
Its scandalous effect notwithstanding, Benn’s rebuke, in the spring of 1933, of intellectuals 
and literary emigrants is hardly an isolated incident of poetological polemics in this author’s 
literary career, which he nonetheless stylized around a consciously constructed self-image as a 
fierce advocate of autonomous authorship.209 Significantly, however, this stance was not exactly 
timely and provoked controversy as the issue of literature’s social responsibility gained in 
relevance during the socioeconomically turbulent post-war years in Germany under the 
parliamentary government of the Weimar Republic.210  
Among the drastic social changes brought about by Germany’s accelerated 
industrialization were rapid urbanization and ensuing displacement of large masses of people. The 
resulting socioeconomic uncertainty created a fertile ground for the propagation of so-called 
völkisch theories and fantasies of national community crucially based on scapegoating and 
othering. The devastating consequences of World War I, a cataclysm that would prove decisive 
for the disintegration of the Weimar Republic,211 only exacerbated this situation, further propelling 
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Uecker, “Können Dichter die Welt ändern?,” in Gottfried Benn (1886-1956). Studien zum Werk, eds. Walter Delabar 
and Ursula Kocher (Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag, 2007), 159-180.  
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the emergence of various neoconservative networks throughout Germany.212 A crucial feature of 
German civil society since the 1850s, energetic associational activity attained heightened levels of 
proliferation during the Weimar Republic.213 Yet, this active civil engagement and association on 
the part of the populace did not find a sufficiently energetic match in the post-war political 
institutions.214 The self-determination theoretically made possible by the Weimar experiment of 
parliamentary democracy was not sufficiently undergirded by material improvements for the 
electorate. Further fragmentation emerged on the economic front, as Germany’s working class saw 
itself systematically undermined by widespread managerial practices of economic rationalization: 
Profoundly undermining workers’ power to negotiate favorable working conditions, these policies 
ousted the nascent practice of electoral democracy from the workplace.215 The democratically 
elected and representative parliamentary government proved unable to provide an adequate 
response to the economic crises of the 1920s, which resulted in an increasing fragmentation of the 
German civil society. With large numbers of people disillusioned by democratic institutions of the 
Weimar Republic, nostalgic visions of authoritarian rule gained prominence and support.216  
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Under these turbulent circumstances, artistically motivated sociopolitical neutrality was 
not an easily excused luxury.217 Starting from the 1920s, a new creative and literary style, Neue 
Sachlichkeit, called for a different vision of the relationship between literature and its subject 
matter. Even if it shared some of the key features with pre-war literary theories, this self-
consciously novel methodology emphatically claimed to break with all tradition.218 As its thing- 
or matter-oriented name might suggest, Neue Sachlichkeit was characterized by decentralization 
and de-essentialization on several levels. To begin with, it lacked a systematic theorization, its 
principles articulated largely in numerous and diverse occasional texts. Secondly, hard to classify 
as a strictly intra-literary phenomenon, Neue Sachlichkeit aimed to engage with discourses outside 
of literature, among its main features being an emphasis on documentary practices. Finally, in 
contrast to the ideals of nationalism and heroism propagated by the contemporaneous 
neoconservative currents, this new creative approach not only declined a self-definition based on 
an idealized notion of Germanness, indeed welcoming foreign influences, but also crucially 
deemphasized the role of the author as a unique creative genius in the first place.219 
Against this particular wind of the times, Gottfried Benn felt compelled to defend the 
autonomy of art and artist. Expressly antagonistic toward the democratizing tendencies of the 
Weimar Republic and thereby quite aligned with the times’ other winds, Benn nonetheless 
appeared to have no clear political allegiance.220 While not of the nationalist völkisch ilk, he was 
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also neither in the camp of the uncompromising leftists nor in that of more “moderate” social 
democrats. Yet contrary to his carefully cultivated self-presentation as an outsider in the 
institutionalized literary scene, the poet’s unpopular and untimely insistence on artistic autonomy 
often emerged in a not quite autonomous manner: as polemical responses to socially entangled 
situations.221 Indeed, Benn’s reactive-polemic posture and underlying aspiration to intervene into 
the literary scene and its politics has been productively traced through  Benn’s essayistic 
writings,222 and I would like to offer a brief overview and commentary of it.  
Even if one can speak of no direct causal link, the poet’s early reflections on the 
sociopolitical status of art at least coincided with an experience of being rejected by the Weimar 
state: his application, in 1927, for the position of a salaried physician was turned down. De facto, 
however, the object of rejection was Benn’s artistic aspirations, since a guaranteed source of 
income would have afforded him the free time for regular literary production. Plausibly motivated 
by personal ressentiment,223 Benn offered a rebuke of the state, titled “Kunst und Staat,” in which 
he distinguished between such sociologically rooted phenomena as culture and civilization and the 
“isolated” and “monomaniacal” phenomenon of art.224 It is in the nature of the state as such, Benn 
argued, to ignore the latter: “[...] der Staat hat nie etwas für die Kunst getan. Kein Staat.”225  
The next episode of Benn’s outspoken insistence on artistic autonomy was centered around 
a polarizing review of his Gesammelte Prosa and would prove crucial in the trajectory of the 
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author’s stance on this topic, conceptually as well as performatively. Authored by writer Max 
Hermann-Neiße, the review appeared in a July 1929 edition of Neue Bücherschau, a generally left-
leaning publication that focused on material of documentary and political nature.226 Neiße’s 
portrayal of Benn as a “überlegenen und unabhängigen Welt-Dichters”227 superior to politically 
engaged, mostly leftist writers provoked two of the latter – Johannes R. Becher and Egon Erwin 
Kisch – to resign from the editorial board of Neue Bücherschau. The ensuing polemic around 
Neiße’s review, which quickly moved away from the particular “Welt-Dichter” Benn to the 
concept of authorship as such,228 was exemplary of the contemporary reckoning with a neu 
sachliche instrumental approach to literary language.229 By elevating Benn as an independent and 
superior “Dichter” above the “Lieferanten politischen Propagandamaterials,”230 Hermann-Neiße 
explicitly challenged the neu sachliche demystification of the authorial function from a creative 
genius to an objective reporter of quotidian realities.  
Incited by this controversy, Benn, too, contributed his reflections on the poet’s vocation in 
an essay titled “Über die Rolle des Schriftstellers in dieser Zeit,” which appeared in the October 
1929 issue of the Neue Bücherschau. Even if its title promises to offer what sounds like general 
reflections on the role of the writer (“Schriftsteller”), this essay is polemically and situationally 
entangled through and through. Indeed, Benn frames it as an intervention into a correspondence 
between two others: as an open letter to the editor of the Neue Bücherschau Gerhart Pohl but one 
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that, in fact, responds to and attacks Kisch’s own earlier open letter to Pohl. Anxious to correct the 
record on his sociopolitical and poetological position, Benn distinguishes between Stellungnahme 
and Schilderung. All he does in his writing, Benn argues, is offer a clear-eyed depiction 
(Schilderung) of the times; taking sides (Stellungnahme) would be futile and therefore dishonest. 
Against Kisch’s accusations of aristocracy, Benn cites from his own work to show that, while his 
politics lean “antizivilisatorisch, antikapitalistisch,” his poetics oppose “Verschleuderer des 
Worts.”231 With this, Benn posits an image of the writer as a sober truthteller who candidly 
communicates his recognition of the senselessness of history – which Benn dubs as “der Schulfall 
des Fragmentarischen” – and therefore its impermeability to ameliorative or progress-oriented 
actions or words:  
Wer Geld hat, wird gesund, wer Macht hat, schwört richtig, wer Gewalt hat, schafft das 
Recht. Die Geschichte ist ohne Sinn, keine Aufwärtsbewegung, keine 
Menschheitsdämmerung; keine Illusionen mehr darüber, kein Bluff. [...] Diese Lehre 
scheint mir weit radikaler, weit erkenntnistiefer und seelisch folgenreicher zu sein als die 
Glücksverheißungen der politischen Parteien.232 
 
In the socioeconomically pivotal year of 1929, Benn’s expectedly pointed reference to “this time” 
– the writer’s role in which he appears to negotiate – amounts rather to a turning away from time 
as “this” time. For Benn, the writer’s uniquely vatic function consists not in any sociopolitical 
clairvoyance but rather in an ability to see through and beyond the minutia of contemporary world-
historical developments. In addition to propelling Benn to the center of the contemporary public 
discourse on the writer’s role in society, this episode of provoked poetics proved decisive for his 
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own aesthetic theory, motivating him to begin work on an essay titled “Zur Problematik des 
Dichterischen,”233 in which he would formulate his definitive formulation of artistic autonomy.  
 Published in April 1930, Benn’s “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” occupies a key 
position in his essayistic output and poetics more generally. The opening statement of Benn’s essay 
declares the distinction between “Schriftsteller” and “Dichter” to be the central problem of 
contemporary poetics: “Das Thema vom Dichter und Schriftsteller, ihrem Wesen, ihrer Lage und 
ihren Beziehungen zueinander, ist in letzter Zeit wiederholt Gegenstand literarischer Unterhaltung 
gewesen, und zwar immer in dem Sinne, daß die Zeit für den Dichter vorüber sei, an seinen Platz 
sei eine andere Erscheinung getreten.”234 As Wolf Lepenies argues, the gesture of distinguishing 
Dichtung not only from Wissenschaft but also from Literatur was characteristic of the German-
speaking realm at the time.235 Underlying this seemingly local distinction was a corresponding 
distinction between language as a social phenomenon and language as a natural phenomenon: 
While the former was allegedly used instrumentally in Literatur, the latter had an originary outlet 
in Dichtung. According to this vision, Dichtung was thus endowed with an eminent 
anthropological dimension: The human being, prior to being socialized, was distinguished with a 
primary capacity for Dichtung – “Kennzeichen und Auszeichnung des Menschengeschlechts” – 
which then presumably was gradually erased in the process of daily survival in society.236 No 
merely secondary phenomenon, Dichtung was envisioned, rather, as a primordial, natural force 
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with regenerative potential.237 Notably, Lepenies underscores the political implications of the 
Dichtung-Literatur dichotomy, arguing that it was coextensive with the polarized attitude toward 
the very project of the Weimar Republic.238  
 Already its weighty title – “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” – signals the essay’s 
ambition: namely, to intervene – supposedly with a solution – in a problem or a set of problems 
(Problematik) and one, moreover, designated with the nebulously overarching notion (das 
Dichterische).239 However, instead of merely contributing to an established topic of this so-called 
“poetic,” Benn’s essay frames itself as a polemical response to the contemporary literary debates, 
which he cites explicitly and rejects as sociological in nature: concerned primarily with something 
as pedestrian as literature’s capacity for adequate representation and advancement of socio-
political and thus extra-literary issues.240 Benn, for his part, is set on salvaging the poetic. A 
tempting syntactic possibility of the German language, the nominalized adjective das Dichterische 
simultaneously narrows down (by creating a noun and thus a concept) but also widens the range 
of the subject matter it includes into its borders (by collecting under one abstract notion the diverse 
inflections and connotations a given adjectival modifier might carry in different contexts vis a vis 
different nouns). Precisely this uneasy combination of conceptual ambition and vagueness is at the 
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Instead of countering the purportedly impure – sociological – approach with a reflection 
on narrowly literary questions (e.g., form or prosody), Benn frames das Dichterische – and art 
more generally – as a biological phenomenon241 with primordial roots in the human psyche and 
decidedly independent from the leveling tendencies of rationalization and conceptualization. 
Citing the French sociologist Levy-Bruhl, Benn relativizes such rationalization as only a slim layer 
of human history, waging an anaphoric attack on the word “Aufklärung” through a series of 
syntactically dense paragraphs that are characterized by a baffling mixture of extreme hypotaxis 
and fragmentation. Uncoupling thinking, das Denken, from its superficial association with logic 
and rationality, Benn locates it, rather, in the “dunklen Kreis organischer Belange [...] der 
Herkunftseinäugigkeiten, der Schöpfungspolyphemien.”242 He then goes on to supersede atomized 
rationality with a more profound cognitive register: that of dreaming and hallucination. This, in 
turn, leads him to perform an archeology of the I, through which he arrives at das Dichterische – 
“Das archaisch erweiterte, hyperämisch sich entladende Ich, dem scheint das Dichterische ganz 
verbunden”243 – which he ultimately explicates as a “Theorie von reinem Nihilismus” and 
“hyperämische Theorie des Dichterischen.”244 Benn’s aim is to isolate the figure of der Einsame, 
the poet – conceived more ambitiously than in the local sense of “lyric poet” – as profoundly 
incompatible with humans qua beings capable of plurality and co-existence: “Es gibt nur den 
Einsamen und seine Bilder [...] Seine sozialen Voraussetzungen kümmern ihn nicht [...] Eine 
dunkle, eine unverbrüchliche Gestalt [...].”245 In this way, presenting the poetic as a profoundly 
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biological phenomenon, Benn absolves it of historical efficacy. For Benn, das Dichterische is 
definitionally autonomous from social or political affairs.246   
It is at this juncture that the specific significance of Benn’s intervention in the “Problematik 
des Dichterischen” emerges. More than the thematic argument of Benn’s essay, it is rather its 
language and rhetorical mode that aspires to intervene in “the poetic.” “Zur Problematik des 
Dichterischen” aptly exemplifies Benn’s highly idiosyncratic essayistic – albeit hardly 
traditionally theoretical – prose. For an author whose early fiction thematized variations of 
language crisis,247 the essay’s unabashed eloquence may take one aback. Replete with premises 
and conclusions that are far from self-evident, it does less to elucidate them than to overwhelm the 
reader through rhetorical means. What it neglects in terms of clarity, the essay compensates 
performatively. Rhythmically impactful and syntactically striking sequences of anaphoric, 
hyperbolic, highly hypotactic formulations abound.248 Benn offers here a kind of Dionysian vision 
that, in its very articulation, is no less characteristic of their author as a “Magier des Wortes”249 
than his 1912 debut poems on scandalously non-poetic topics. In this essay, then, Benn’s approach 
to “the poetic” does not simply revise it as a concept; rather, it performs a thorough revaluation of 
“the poetic” by revamping the cognitive and linguistic path to it. In describing the specificity of 
 
246 In this essay, Benn still entertains a pejorative view of history as a process, “unmotiviert und sinnlos” (Benn, 
Sämtliche Werke, 3:239).  
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Benn’s essayistic style and use of the essay form, Christian Schärf highlights its performative 
character: “Das ‘faszinierende’ Montieren von sprachlichen Versatzstücken, von dem Benn 
verschiedentlich spricht, ist kein postmodernes Spiel, sondern schamanische Beschwörung.”250 At 
stake, that is, is not “the poetic” as a delimited conceptual realm but rather the manner of 
approaching it in the first place. In an emphatically contrarian manner, Benn vigorously takes on 
“the poetic” while sidestepping the contemporary poetological discourse. 
Two years later, another notable episode of Benn’s not quite autonomous poetics emerged 
around his “Rede auf Heinrich Mann,” delivered on the occasion of the latter’s sixtieth birthday in 
March of 1931. With quasi-Nietzschean pathos, Benn presents Mann as a pioneer on the German 
literary scene, who has liberated art – Kunst, but Benn also uses the word “das Dichterische”251 – 
from its secondary role of a mere means (to the socially venerable end of Bildung) to an 
autonomous status of “absolute Kunst”: “Da kamen um 1900 die Brüder Mann und 
phosphoreszierten. Lehrten einer literarischen Generation das Gefährliche, das Rauschnahe, den 
Verfall, der notorisch zu den Dingen der Kunst gehört [...].”252 For Benn, this “Kunst an sich,” 
attributed by him to the artistic credo of sociopolitical autonomy or “Artistik,” which he in turn 
traces back to Nietzsche, is organized by an intrinsic principle that, regardless of its conceptual 
content, would allow this Kunst to be great.253 A page-long question constructed through a toppling 
series of if-clauses culminates in a call for a revaluation of positivism among the Volk: 
Könnte sich nicht vielleicht an ihnen ein Volk zur Klarheit erziehen, an dem Goldenen und 
Kalten, das um die Dinge liegt, die sich vollendet haben, könnte nicht ein Volk beginnen, 
zu diesem Positivismus der erarbeiteten, harten und absoluten Dinge aufzublicken mehr 
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als zu jenem Positivismus der anonymen Wahrheit, des amorphen Wissens, der 
fluktuierenden Formeln der wissenschaftlichen Relativität? Könnte dann nicht ein 
perspektivistisch so verändertes Volk, dachte wohl Nietzsche, auch die Kunst anders sehn, 
die Kunst, die eigentliche Aufgabe des Lebens, die letzte Transzendenz innerhalb des 
großen europäischen Nichts [...]254 
 
The question continues in this manner for quite a while. Easily carried away by the essay’s oracular 
pathos, one almost forgets that it is actually meant to fulfill a quite mundane function of honoring 
a mere mortal. What’s more, the mortal in question is the famously socially and politically engaged 
honoree Heinrich Mann, to whom Benn controversially attributes the fundamentally asocial 
attitude of Artistik.255 Benn’s enthusiastic portrait of Mann did not go unnoticed, provoking an 
extended polemic.256 In his provocative essay “Heinrich Mann? Hitler? Gottfried Benn? Goethe?,” 
the architect Werner Hegemann rebuked Benn’s misplaced representation of the older Mann 
brother, sharply criticizing his own conception of socio-politically inefficacious and autonomous 
art. Deriding Benn’s “verwirrende Begeisterung,” Hegemann alleged the poet’s affinity with the 
fascists through a series of alternating quotes from Benn and Hitler, hardly distinguishable in their 
consonance.257 With these two controversies – the one around the left-leaning Neue Rundschau 
and the other around the venerable liberal figure of Heinrich Mann – Benn thoroughly antagonized 
both of Weimar Republic’s anti-fascist circles.258 Quite contrary, then, to his self-stylization as a 
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contemporary literary enterprise, Benn was, rather, one of its active participants.259 As this brief 
overview has suggested, he was no stranger to taking up unpopular positions at the center of 
contentious cultural debates. It should thus come as no surprise that, with the National Socialists’ 
rise to power in March of 1933, Benn would not shy away from a public statement about literary 
policy.  
Shortly before the Nazis’ seizure of power, Benn’s stance underwent a notable shift. 
Written at the height of Benn’s literary recognition in October 1932, Benn’s essay “Nach dem 
Nihilismus” marks an important turning point in his poetics. Here, just as in “Zur Problematik des 
Dichterischen,” Benn identifies deep-seated ills in humanity’s cultural development, once again 
distinguishing art as a privileged realm. However, as the 1932 essay’s future-pointing title 
suggests,260 Benn is no longer interested in simply diagnosing; he now proposes a remedy.261 
Moving beyond his firmly held belief in the autonomy of art, Benn begins to subordinate it to a 
larger socio-political framework. The essay concludes with the poet declaring his readiness to 
work – as an artist – on the overcoming not only of the contemporary crises but also the apathy 
about them. “Nach dem Nihilismus” is thus doubly programmatic: both in the sense that it 
prescribes a certain program for poetry as well as in the sense, novel for Benn, that this program 
is supposed to serve extra-poetic ends. This crucial step in Benn’s poetological thinking paves the 
way for his spring 1933 statements of allegiance to the Nazi regime. 
Right at the outset, the essay, and the essay collection introduced by it, poses a grand 
question:  
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See also Müller, “Gottfried Benns paradoxer Antihistorismus,” 186.  
 





Haben wir noch die Kraft, so fragt der Verfasser, dem wissenschaftlich determinierenden 
Weltbild gegenüber ein Ich schöpferischer Freiheit zu behaupten, haben wir noch die Kraft, 
nicht aus ökonomischen Chiliasmen und politischen Mythologemen, sondern aus der 
Macht des alten abendländischen Denkens heraus die materialistisch-mechanische 
Formwelt zu durchstoßen und aus sich selbst setzenden Idealität und in einem sich selbst 
zügelnden Maß die Bilder tieferer Welten zu entwerfen? (NdN 394) 
 
With a characteristically anaphoric maneuver, Benn lends a performative quality to his question, 
forcing the readers to mine for its gist just as deeply as they presumably would for the object in 
question.262 To be noted right away is the foregrounding of the I – the autonomous “Ich 
schöpferischer Freiheit” – where Benn locates the answer to the evils of modernity: progressive 
“cerebration” and nihilism. Notably, he elevates this creative autonomy above the realm of politics, 
glossed as “politische Mythologemen” and thus exposed as superficial – presumably, because of 
its “logos” character, whereas Benn’s own essay strives for a more primordial layer of the mythic: 
“die Bilder tieferer Welten.” At stake for Benn is not simply the alleged mechanization of the 
world but also a concomitant anthropological crisis: from the mechanization of the world there 
emerged a new type of the human being, which Benn calls “materialistisch organisierte[r] 
Gebrauschstyp” (NdN 397). It is this pernicious development that Benn now prepares to combat 
with artistic means.263  
In his two fateful speeches from the spring of 1933 – “Der neue Staat und die 
Intellektuellen” and “Die Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” – Gottfried Benn’s concerted 
effort to let his peculiar brand of conservative cultural critique reach a broader audience attained a 
high point, transitioning from essay to speech: from an ambivalent and yet suggestive stance of an 
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outsider to a frontally oriented posture of a populace-addressing orator. Both of the 1933 speeches 
revolve around the right to speak. The juxtaposition dramatized by each of these two public 
statements – the new state versus the intellectuals, literary emigrants versus their responder – 
carries out no dialogue but performs, rather, an othering. Insofar as both speeches are transmitted 
to the German people through the national radio, they stage a peculiarly triangular drama – 
someone speaking to someone about someone else – whereby the coordinates of the direct and 
indirect objects of this speech are somewhat fluid: the “someone else” spoken about is also 
inadvertently among those being addressed.  
  
From Theory to Practice: Preparing to Speak 
Whereas in his 1932 essay “Nach dem Nihilismus” Benn had still only hinted at an 
imminent implementation of art as a means to socio-political ends, his radio speech “Der neue 
Staat und die Intellektuellen” followed through on that promise. Yet, if this speech marked a 
reversal in Benn’s thinking – from insistence on literary autonomy to insistence on literary 
purposiveness – the nature of that purposiveness was more complex and troubled than might 
appear at first sight. In this speech, Benn not only promulgated his praise of the new political 
regime but also attributed to it an elemental creative potential, thereby forging a link between the 
artistic realm and the contemporaneous political moment. Broadcast in the “Berliner Funk-Stunde” 
on the evening of April 24, 1933 under the title “Welt in der Wende. Gottfried Benn spricht über 
‘Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen’” and circulated the following day in the Berliner Börsen-
Zeitung,264 this speech contained Benn’s first public statement about the new political regime in 
 






Germany, recited only a month after the emergence of the “new state” through the Enabling Act 
of 1933. 
Benn’s declaration of allegiance was quite timely and was not overlooked. Provoking 
expected condemnation from many of Benn’s former fellow Dichter and Schriftsteller, it was also 
acclaimed by the German press and several conservative writers in Germany. Especially praised 
was Benn’s intuitive sense for the eruption of a novel epoch and a correspondingly originary, 
regenerative idiom presented as a synaesthetic union between pain, effort, and thought: “Hier ist 
die Wandlung des Zeitalters unter Schmerz und Mühe erlebt, gedacht und errungen an jenem 
innersten Ort, wo die Begriffe und Werte geschmiedet werden, mit denen eine Zeit dem Leben 
gegenübertritt, wo sie ausgewechselt werden, wo sie aufblühen, verblassen und vergehen.”265 
Moreover, the significance of this speech was not exhausted by its performative weight as a 
declaration of political allegiance. It also fulfilled the retrospectively programmatic function of 
prefacing Benn’s eponymously titled essay collection, which was published in July and October 
of 1933 and collected some of Benn’s most prominent essays from 1930 to 1933. In his prologue, 
Benn highlighted the continuity between his April 1933 speech and his earlier writings:266 the 
implausible continuity, that is, between the poet’s novel insistence on the political role of artistic 
creativity and his earlier exclusion of politics from artistic pursuits. For even if the reversal in 
Benn’s stance was not straightforward, it was nevertheless an undeniable shift: The self-stylized 
pariah of the late 1920s would have hardly mounted a podium to address the masses about the 
cultural glory of the state.   
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This reversal in Benn’s stance was quite sudden. As late as February 20, 1933, Benn 
continued to press for a separation between literature and politics.267 At a meeting of the Prussian 
Academy of Arts, he condemned Heinrich Mann, who had recently resigned from his position as 
the head of the Academy’s Dichtersektion, for his repeated and, according to Benn, counter-
constitutional attempts to bring about a political union of various left-oriented groups against the 
imminent danger of the Nazi victory in the March 5 elections.268 Conceiving of the Academy as 
“die einzige Stätte zur literarischen Traditionsbildung und zur künstlerischen Repräsentation,” 
Benn adamantly called for its strict nonpartisanship in political matters.269  
In a letter from the 27th of February – incidentally, the date of the Reichstag fire, which 
would set off a chain of events transforming the new regime from apprehension-inspiring to 
totalitarian – Benn derides the general mood of anxiety in the literary circles. In his view, the very 
facticity of the novel historical circumstances renders any attempt to criticize them superfluous: 
“Die Revolution ist da und die Geschichte spricht. Wer das nicht sieht, ist schwachsinnig [...] Dies 
ist die neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins, über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden ist läppisch, 
sie ist da [...].”270 Declaring the primacy of datum over verbum, Benn reduces language (“reden”) 
to evaluative commentary a posteriori (“über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden”). A similarly 
phrased idea of historical givenness reappears in one of Benn’s unpublished theses on history from 
March 5, 1933: “[...] Geschichtliche Bewegungen,” he notes, “sind nie erlernbar u. ableitbar. Sie 
sind da.”271 With this pronouncement, Benn insists on the elemental character of history and, 
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consequently, its impermeability to intellectual comprehension and rationalization. As he 
privileges the sheer facticity of historical circumstances – presumably motivated by some force 
insofar as movements, Bewegungen – Benn denies the human being any historical efficacy. Of 
course, this position had already been formulated by Benn as early as his October 1929 reflections 
on the role of the writer in this time: the role of not only wisely recognizing the futility of trying 
to influence the course of history but also of mustering the courage to do so precisely in this socio-
politically senseless time.   
And then, at the end of April 1933, after several months of silence – Benn’s last publication, 
the anthology Nach dem Nihilismus, had appeared in October 1932 – the poet finally made a public 
statement. Prompted by no external request to do so,272 the April 1933 radio talk “Der neue Staat 
und die Intellektuellen” extolled the state – in stark contrast to the poet’s 1927 indictment of the 
state with a similarly contrastive title, “Kunst und Staat.” 273 This effusive event of public and 
politically partisan speech, however, did not originate ex nihilo, having been gestated privately in 
the course of several months.274 It would then also initiate a publication phase that, lasting until 
October 1933 and including essays on such topical questions as breeding and hereditary 
transmission, attested to Benn’s desire to assert himself on the newly reconfigured literary scene.275  
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To be sure, Benn’s new stance may have been at least partly prompted by his heightened 
institutional standing and ambition.276 After all, as the temporary head of the poetry section for the 
Prussian Academy of Arts, he no longer spoke merely for himself when he decided to step forward 
as an ardent supporter of the new state.277 On March 13, 1933, Benn proposed and drafted a 
declaration of loyalty to be signed by his fellow members of the Dichtersektion. The question he 
posed was unequivocal:  
Sind Sie bereit, unter Anerkennung der veränderten geschichtlichen Lage weiter Ihre 
Person der Preußischen Akademie der Künste zur Verfügung zu stellen? Eine Bejahung 
dieser Frage schließt die öffentliche politische Betätigung gegen die Regierung aus und 
verpflichtet Sie zu einer loyalen Mitarbeit an den satzungsgemäß der Akademie 
zufallenden Aufgaben der Nation. 278  
 
Formulated as an ultimatum, Benn’s inquiry presented the alternatives as mutually exclusive. 
Having hitherto only privately scoffed at Heinrich Mann’s activist efforts against the Nazi party, 
Benn now publicly expelled such efforts from the Academy and did so on behalf of the Nazi state. 
Since an affirmative answer to the poet’s question was not forthcoming from most of his 
Dichtersektion colleagues, drastic changes in the Academy’s make-up ensued. At the same time, 
Benn’s cooperative teamwork in the academy inadvertently contributed to his own eventual 
expulsion. The influx of regime-friendly and völkisch writers did not bode well for Benn’s own 
standing in the Academy in the long run. The self-appointed warrior and guardian of the poetic 
word would ultimately be forced out after the Academy’s official reconfiguration in June of 
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1933.279 However, in the spring of 1933, Benn apparently still entertained hopes of exercising 
influence over the new state’s literary institutions.  
In excess of merely institutional duty, Benn penned and disseminated an effusive personal 
commendation of the Nazi state. This transformation of his pre-1933 unwavering non-partisanship 
into enthusiastic support for “die neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins” – i.e., the Nazi rule in 
Germany – did not stem from the poet’s sudden reneging on his conviction that “über ihren Wert 
oder Unwert zu reden” is pointless. For, just as Benn had previously derided disapproval of the 
new regime, his own support also did not consist in a mere positive value judgment about it. Not 
only did Benn’s statement forgo anything as facile as positive evaluation, it also framed itself 
precisely as a rebuke of petty intellectual judgment.  
This anti-intellectual stance is predicated on Benn’s aforementioned conception of history 
as an elemental, non-rationalizable force. Indeed, the notion of history emerges as a central 
category in the poet’s April 1933 statement of allegiance to the new political regime. There, Benn 
pits the mere intellectuals (Intellektuelle), whom he locates in the Schillerian privileging of 
universal reason over the fatherland, against authentic thinkers (Denkende), i.e., those who follow 
the presumably Nietzschean privileging of typological novelty: 
[...] [wir stehen] heute vor der Tatsache eines vollkommenen, geschichtlich logischen, von 
echten menschlichen Substanzen ernährten Sieges der nationalen Idee [...] Für den 
Denkenden gibt es seit Nietzsche nur einen Maßstab für das geschichtlich Echte: sein 
Erscheinen als die neue typologische Variante, als die reale konstitutionelle Novität, also 
kurz gesagt als der neue Typ, und der, muß man sagen, ist da. Die typologische Majorität 
– wer könnte bezweifeln, daß sie vorhanden, auf seiten des neuen Staates vorhanden ist?” 
(NSI, 15).  
 
Insistently appealing to a positivist vocabulary of substance, fact, and presence – “vor der 
Tatsache,” “Substanzen,” “Erscheinen,” “real,” “ist da,” “vorhanden” – Benn casts all intellectual 
 





doubt aside and posits the new state as indisputable in its thereness and visibility. As I will discuss 
below, this “new state” itself acquires creative potential in Benn’s 1933 vision, emerging as an 
iteration of Benn’s pre-1933 visions of creativeness.  
 
Silence: History Is Speaking Through the Poet  
 
About a month after the National Socialist regime’s accession to power in Germany, this 
“new state” enters the stage in Benn’s radio talk “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” not 
through any solemn formalities but rather via the mundane act of reading a newspaper:  
Ich las kürzlich in einer Zeitung, im Besuchszimmer eines der neuen preußischen 
Ministerien sei ein Schild folgenden Inhalts angeschlagen: “Man kommt nicht in eigener 
Sache dorthin, wo ein neuer Staat aufgebaut wird.” Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte 
spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen Staatsidee. 
(NSI, 12) 
 
This matter-of-fact introduction of the “new state” foreshadows the poet’s introduction of Lyrik – 
a matter quite a bit less consequential – in yet another public address (his 1951 lecture Probleme 
der Lyrik), several years after the “new state’s” collapse: 
Meine Damen und Herren, wenn Sie am Sonntag morgen Ihre Zeitung aufschlagen, und 
manchmal sogar auch mitten in der Woche, finden Sie in einer Beilage meistens rechts 
oder links unten etwas, das durch gesperrten Druck und besondere Umrahmung auffällt, es 
ist ein Gedicht.”280  
 
The offhand reference to the quotidian habit of skimming through daily news thus emerges as a 
frame repeatedly used by Benn to approach matters of drastically disparate thematic content. State 
and poem alike, the object of Benn’s interest is legibly formatted and enclosed for ready access 
and easy communication – in “einem Schild folgenden Inhalts” or “durch gesperrten Druck und 
besondere Umrahmung.” In both instances, Benn bases his address to his respective audience on 
a fundamental appeal to a transpersonal reality of commonly shared gestures and habits. 
 





Undoubtedly, each of the subject matters in question – whether state or poetry – is of great 
significance to Benn. However, it is precisely by framing them as barely noticeable, and thus 
ingrained, facts of daily life that he underscores their significance: the significance of something 
that is already there, ist da – as indisputable as the perfunctory motion of flipping through the 
pages of a newspaper.  
As he translates the quoted slogan – “‘Man kommt nicht in eigener Sache dorthin, wo ein 
neuer Staat aufgebaut wird’” – into his own words, Benn locates the novelty of the new state in its 
inextricable connection with history: “Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die 
Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen Staatsidee.” According to Benn, this 
“konkrete Formel” reveals the conflict at the heart of his dramatic address.281 “History,” emerging 
as a key dramatis persona in Benn’s radio talk, dictates the terms of interaction between the two 
figures announced in the talk’s title – the “new state” and the “intellectuals.” Speaking through 
vast upheavals, history renders mere human speech irrelevant. In a gesture reminiscent of 
Schiller’s censorious editorial program in Die Horen, Benn inaugurates a new “epoch” by 
imposing a silence. Admittedly, with this categorical distinction between speaking “history” and 
speechless “persons,” the status of Benn’s own perspective and voice in this radio talk is far from 
self-evident. Namely, what is the role of the voice behind the loudspeaker of the radio studio? 
What relationship does it entertain to history? And how does it relate to the presumably mute 
Personen at whom it is directed?  
Some light is shed on these questions towards the end of Benn’s radio talk. If the “concrete 
formula” of the new state – “Das soll heißen, wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu 
 





schweigen” – is posited by Benn at the beginning of his speech in a somewhat obscure manner, it 
ultimately culminates into a clear-cut series of questions:  
Gedankenfreiheit, Pressefreiheit, Lehrfreiheit in einem Sechzigmillionenvolk, von dem 
jeder einzelne den Staat für seine Unbeschädigtheit verantwortlich macht, – ist da der Staat 
nicht aus Rechtsbewußtsein verpflichtet, diese Freiheit aufs Speziellste zu überwachen? 
Das Wort ist aber der stärkste physiologische Reiz, sagt Pawlow, den das Organische 
kennt, auch der unabsehbarste, muß man hinzufügen. Läßt sich da überhaupt ein Argument 
gegen einen Staat finden, der erklärt, die öffentliche Meinungsäußerung nur denen zu 
gestatten, die auch die öffentliche Staatsverantwortung tragen? (NSI, 18) 
 
In this passage, Benn – the voice carried by radio waves to reach millions of ears and to merge 
them in this moment of communal listening – attacks a key intellectual capacity: the freedom to 
articulate independent thoughts and to make them public. Benn traces his argument against these 
speech-related freedoms to the theory, extracted from behavioral sciences, of the physiological 
efficacy – and, notably, unpredictability – of language. If, Benn argues, the state is responsible for 
each of its constituents’ safety, and if speech is a direct cause of potentially dangerous action, then 
the state is of necessity responsible for surveilling and limiting its constituents’ speech – for their 
own protection. Crucially, too, when Benn speaks of the unpredictability of language, he means 
not merely the possible effect of language on someone else (as a matter of persuasion or influence) 
but, more importantly, the organic nature of language, language as the speaker’s biological 
function.282 In a display of rhetorical prowess, the orator puts forth a decisive anaphoric attack on, 
and through, the word “Geistesfreiheit”:  
Geistesfreiheit –: weil 1841 die Massenherstellung von Druckerschwärze begann und im 
Laufe des Jahrhunderts die Rotations- und Setzmaschinen hinzukamen, das wäre bei 3812 
Tageszeitungen in Deutschland und 4309 Wochenschriften zuviel historischer Sinn. 
Geistesfreiheit –: daß an sie überhaupt die Entstehung der Kultur gebunden sei, ist eine 
gänzlich erkenntnislose Betrachtung: alles, was das Abendland berühmt gemacht hat [...] 
entstand, um es einmal ganz klar auszudrücken, in Sklavenstaaten [...] die Geschichte ist 
reich an Kombinationen von pharaonischer Machtausübung und Kultur; das Lied darüber 
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ist drehend wie das Sterngewölbe; der Vers von heute lautet: Geistesfreiheit, um sie für 
wen aufzugeben? Antwort: für den Staat! (NSI, 18, my emphasis) 
 
In this sweeping historical retrospective, Benn methodically delegitimizes the idea of intellectual 
freedom in order to subordinate it to the concept of the state. As though to demonstrate the 
Pavlovian theory he has just cited, Benn invokes the word Geistesfreiheit several times in an almost 
incantatory manner. This compulsive repetition belies the semantic content of the word at stake: 
There is nothing “free,” Benn seems to suggest, about an intellectual freedom that can be reduced 
to a refrain that is then also immediately cut short. Refusing to incorporate the word 
“Geistesfreiheit” into his main train of thought, the orator punctuates off each of its three iterations 
away from the respective denunciative clause that follows. In this manner, the ear is bombarded 
with a montage-like sequence of images that gradually reduce the opening caesura “Geistesfreiheit 
–: [...]” to the closing teleological exclamation “[...] für den Staat!” In this almost parodical 
performance, Benn denounces the concept by foregrounding the word and reducing it to a mere 
echo. For, if the word has material efficacy, Benn seems to suggest, then it can be combatted with 
similarly efficacious methods.  
Benn begins his attack on “Geistesfreiheit” by summarily locating its origins in an 
accidental byproduct of technological innovation and thus far away from the necessity of anything 
as elevated as “Geist.” Then, correcting a purportedly misguided intellectual legacy, the militant 
historiographer proceeds to relieve intellectual freedom of any significance for the West, 
“Abendland,” whose origins, in turn, he locates in the very opposite of free thought or action: in 
slave labor, labor coerced to realize the projects thought up not by some idealized and abstract 
notion of human Geist but specifically by the concrete Geister in power. Proceeding in this manner, 
Benn swiftly closes his seemingly open question – “[...] ist da der Staat nicht aus Rechtsbewußtsein 





“Geistesfreiheit, um sie für wen aufzugeben? Antwort: für den Staat!” With this decisive 
performative triumph over the word “Geistesfreiheit,” Benn crystallizes the central purpose of his 
radio talk: the discreditation not simply of certain subversive thinkers or specific subversive 
thoughts, but of thinking as a fundamentally subversive and therefore condemnable practice in the 
first place.  
In lieu of the feeble, because plurally distributed, “Gedankenfreiheit,” Benn posits the 
cryptically nominalized and collectivized figure of “der Gedanke” as the basis for his speech in 
this address:  
Von diesen Intellektuellen und in ihrem Namen spreche ich nicht. / Ich spreche im Namen 
des Gedankens und derer, die sich ihm beugen. Wie sieht der Gedanke die heutige Lage 
an? Nicht der klägliche Gedanke, der lange genug im geschichtlichen Erbe als dem Nährgut 
der Nation herumschnüffelte, wo er einen Helden schwach und ein Opfer niedrig zeichnen 
könnte, sondern der notwendige Gedanke, diese überirdischste Macht der Welt, mächtiger 
als das Eisen, mächtiger als das Licht, immer in der Rufweite der Größe und im 
Flügelschlagen einer transzendenten Tat, wie sieht er die heutige Geschichte an? (NSI, 13). 
 
By distancing himself from the intellectuals, Benn rejects thinking conceived verbally: thinking as 
a practice, carried out individually, incompletely, and thus imperfectly. Rejected here is the kind 
of intellectuality that, with its propensity for critique and analysis, breaks down and apart, calls 
into question, doubts.283 Benn’s antidote to this destabilizing enterprise is a heroically hypostatized 
conception of thinking through the figure of “the thought,” Gedanke. Two months before his radio 
talk, in a January 27 letter to his epistolary friend Friedrich Wilhelm Oelze, Benn invokes this 
“Gedanke,” contrasting its virility with the fearful “Wissenschaft [...] staatsgeschützt, 
pensionsberechtigt”:  
Das wahre Denken aber ist immer gefährdet u gefährlich. Der Gedanke u das Wort kam ja 
nicht in die Welt, um die Wissenschaft u. den Sozialismus u. die Krankenkassen zu 
rechtfertigen, sondern als die furchtbarste Waffe, die grausamste Schneide, der blutigste 
 







Morgenstern dem waffenlosen Menschen in der grausamsten aller Welten zu helfen. Davon 
ein Rest blieb dem Gedanken, der wirklich denkt, der nicht wissenschaftlich denkt, sondern 
visionär, zwanghaft unter eingeborenen Ideen. Davon ein Rest blieb in der Kunst, im 
halluzinatorischen Denken, im Ausdrucksdenken. Das ist tiefes, von weither 
zwangsmässiges Denken.284 
 
Scientific reason is here rejected in favor of real – visionary and forceful – thinking that is not 
superficially produced through individual thinkers’ socially constrained interpretation of empirical 
data, but emanates rather from the depths of (physiologically) inherited, transpersonal ideas. In 
lieu of flawed thinking by imperfect thinkers, Benn posits an idealized heroic image of a necessary, 
transcendent thought, presenting himself as its mouthpiece. In a matter of two months, Benn’s tone 
has left behind nostalgic longing and assumed the posture of future-oriented declamation.  
While certainly in line with the National Socialists’ homegrown campaign against 
“intellectualism,”285 Benn’s denigration of intellectuals in his declaration of allegiance to the Nazi 
regime has extensive precedent in the author’s work. A critique of intellectuality, dubbed by Benn 
as “progressive Zerebration,”286 runs through much of his writing, fictional and essayistic alike.287 
As for many Expressionist writers, Nietzsche serves as a major influence – specifically, his critique 
of the dominant philosophical tradition, its privileging of abstract reason, and ultimately the 
instrumentalization of reason in the natural sciences.288 In his early fictional prose centered around 
 
284 Gottfried Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1932-1945, eds. Harald Steinhagen and Jürgen Schröder (Wiesbaden: Limes 
Verlag, 1977), 28. 
 
285 Ansel, “Zwischen Anpassung und künstlerischer Selbstbehauptung,” 46. On the primacy, in the thought of the 
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aestheticization of the former, see Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 12ff. 
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287 On the central role of Erkenntniskritik in Benn’s writing, see Silvio Vietta, “Gottfried Benns Subjektkritik und sein 
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the protagonist Rönne, Benn explores the dissociative dynamic at the core of human perception 
and consciousness. In a similar vein, in his essays from the late 1920s and early 1930s – most 
characteristically, in the pivotal “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen” and “Nach dem Nihilismus” 
discussed above – Benn often constructs the genealogy of the modern human subject as a trajectory 
of spiritual decline and gradual instrumentalization – in order to then accentuate the liberating 
potential of art and poetry as realms fundamentally autonomous from the merely rational logic.   
In this context, then, Benn’s choice of the “intellectuals” as the figure of the other in April 
1933 is no random casting decision, as it were. Still, Benn does transmute some of his long-
standing convictions into an unexpected potion. Holding on to his denunciation of positivist and 
instrumental intellectuality, Benn nonetheless reverses course on his previous rejection of the 
political realm as a similarly positivist phenomenon, incompatible with artistic creativity. 
Misguidedly enough, he envisions the political moment of April 1933 not as just another 
bureaucratically sustained hierarchical construct but rather as a creative phenomenon transcending 
quotidian reality and rationalist thinking.289 It is precisely as an exemplification of such positivist-
mechanistic thinking that Benn conceives of the German political system preceding the advent of 
the Nazi regime. And, just as he previously advocated for a rejection of the positivist intellectual 
heritage in the spiritual and artistic realm, he now, in April 1933, envisions the Nazi regime as 
capable of discarding the feeble sociopolitical legacy of the Weimar Republic.290  
Yet, against the backdrop of the 1933 transformation in Benn’s conception of history, a 
crucial aspect does remain constant. The verbosity of Benn’s radio talk – belying its manifest 
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emphasis on speech limitation – characterizes Benn’s essayistic prose well before 1933. 
Unabashedly supplanting measured argumentation, Benn’s verbal outbursts in the form of myriad 
rhetorical devices unmistakably aspire to evoke a strong reaction in the reader and, given Benn’s 
proclivity for radio transmission, listener.291 The Pavlovian theory of linguistic efficacy cited by 
Benn as a justification for state censorship of speech is at play in his own language. Indeed, this 
compositional strategy corresponds to Benn’s conception of the word as a channel to primordial 
psychic resources and thus creatively productive. The consistently unbridled eloquence of his 
prose stands out as a unifying factor between his seemingly diametrically opposed stances before 
and in 1933: between his pre-1933 strict artistic autonomy from the sociopolitical sphere versus 
the 1933 conception of art in the service of the state.   
Having been introduced in the very opening of Benn’s radio talk, the notion of “history” 
assumes a central place in its argumentation, with some variation of the word Geschichte appearing 
with remarkable frequency in the course of the text.292 This emphasis on “history” in the 1933 
speech marks a significant turn in Benn’s understanding of this concept: from its dismissal as 
irrelevant to the artist’s historically inefficacious existence to its lionization as a locus of eminent 
creativeness.293 When declaring allegiance to the Nazi state in April 1933, Benn sees this state not 
merely as a political successor to the Weimar Republic on a neutral historical timeline but rather 
 
291 On the “magische Blendung durch das Wort” in Benn’s essayistic writing as well as Benn’s notion of words’ 
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as a qualitatively different phenomenon: in lieu of a chronological succession, “unabsehbare 
geschichtliche Verwandlung.”294 
Benn’s emphasis on history goes hand in hand with an erasure of the speaking subject.295 
Commencing from the first-person point of view, the radio talk quickly claims to speak on behalf 
of someone or something else – “Ich spreche im Namen des Gedankens und derer, die sich ihm 
beugen” – after which the first-person singular pronoun disappears from Benn’s address to the 
German nation (NSI, 12). This disappearance of the singular voice aptly illustrates the distinctive 
quality of the new community as it is envisioned by Benn – namely, "[...] ih[r] große[s] Gefühl für 
Opferbereitschaft und Verlust des Ich an das Totale, den Staat, die Rasse, das Immanente” (NSI, 
12). Likewise, in a peculiar oscillation between active and passive voice, Benn attributes agency 
not to human subjects, thoroughly limited as they are, but to inanimate and trans-generational 
categories such as “history” and “century”:  
Im Grunde hat immer nur die Geschichte gedacht. Gedacht wurde auf dem Sinai [...]; 
gedacht haben die Meilensteine [...]; gedacht hat das jetzige neue Jahrhundert, als es das 
werdende Gesetz formte: der totale Staat. Immer prägte die Geschichte den Stil, immer war 
dieser Stil die Verwirklichung eines neuen historischen Seins. (NSI, 17) 
 
By resorting to the narrative simple past, Benn casts his musings on the contemporary and 
contingent moment into a timeless guise of transcendent necessity. His historiographic voiceover 
renders the singular human voice entirely irrelevant to the course of history. The act of thinking – 
i.e., the central concern of Benn’s reflection on the contemporary historical moment – is taken 
away from the individual subject and attributed to the historical process. No longer a passive object 
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of intellectual cognition, history turns into a thinking agent and, crucially, a creative phenomenon 
itself.296  
In a disavowal of merely conceptual language, Benn depicts the emergence of this new 
historical movement – neither bad nor good, as he stresses, but rather undeniable in its thereness 
– as besieged by a feeble polyphony of echoes: “die Kultur ist bedroht, die Ideale sind bedroht, 
das Recht, die Menschheit ist bedroht” (NSI, 15). Whereas the “national idea” is, for Benn, 
nourished by “echten menschlichen Substanzen,” the “international idea” subsists on nothing but 
echo – i.e., not living substances, but mere shells of past ideals and institutions. Audible in the 
nominalizing repetition of the definite article – “die Kultur ... die Ideale ... das Recht... die 
Menschheit” – this linguistic echo performs the echo-like character of language and ultimately 
abandons it for a dazzling performance of rhythm and rhyme: “[...] es klingt wie Echo: aus der 
Lombardei, aus Ungarn, aus Versailles, als die Gallier kamen, die Goten, die Sansculotten, klang 
es schon so” (NSI, 15). The rhyming union of disparate terms – “Lombardei” and “Versailles” as 
well as “Goten” and “Sansculotten” – is exposed as futile in a yet another rhyme: “[...] es klingt 
wie Echo” is echoed in “[...] klang es schon so” (NSI, 15). With this definitive performance, Benn 
indicts the emptiness of language. Given its potential for such frivolity, language, Benn seems to 
suggest, must be rejected and, with it, a certain politics which takes place through it: a polyvocal 
politics – a politics of multiple speakers. 
Indeed, Benn positions “history” against “democracy.” Whereas democracy allows for 
participatory speech, “history” has no place for it:  
Eine echte neue geschichtliche Bewegung ist vorhanden, ihr Ausdruck, ihre Sprache, ihr 
Recht beginnst sich zu entfalten, sie ist typologisch weder gut noch böse, sie beginnt ihr 
Sein. Sie beginnt ihr Sein, und alles Feine, Abgestimmte, zu was Gelangte wirft sich ihr 
entgegen; aber es ist die Geschichte selber, die diese Angriffe entkräftet, ihr Wesen, das 
 





nicht abgestimmt und demokratisch verfährt. Die Geschichte verfährt nicht demokratisch, 
sondern elementar, an ihren Wendepunkten immer elementar. (NSI, 16) 
 
In Benn’s mythologizing vision, history represents a peculiar amalgam of creative agency and 
elementary material of formation and creation. With this idealization of “history,” Benn moves 
away from the individual subject and toward the mythical and the collective: 
Welch sonderbarer Sinn und welche sonderbare Geschichte, Lohnfragen als den Inhalt aller 
menschlichen Kämpfe anzusehen. Welch intellektueller Defekt, welch moralisches Manko 
[...] nicht in dem Blick der Gegenseite über die kulturelle Leistung hinaus, nicht in ihrem 
großen Gefühl für Opferbereitschaft und Verlust des Ich an das Totale, den Staat, die Rasse, 
das Immanente, nicht in ihrer Wendung vom ökonomischen zum Kollektiv, in diesem 
allem nicht das anthropologisch Tiefere zu sehen! (NSI, 12) 
 
Benn’s vision of community is one of totality; its unifying principle is grounded not in economics 
(i.e., the quotidian and mechanical wage-based separation) but in myth (i.e., a non-verifiable pre-
historic origin).297 Ultimately, Benn’s own “Über Rolle des Schriftstellers in dieser Zeit” discerns 
in the historical moment of the year 1933 an actualization of his mythogenic musings during the 
final years of the Weimar Republic.298 
Benn’s lionization of history and a concurrent move away from the individual subject 
culminates in a series of imperatives: 
[Die Geschichte] läßt nicht abstimmen, sondern sie schickt den neuen biologischen Typ 
vor, sie hat keine andere Methode, hier ist er, nun handele und leide, baue die Idee deiner 
Generation und deiner Art in den Stoff der Zeit, weiche nicht, handele und leide, wie das 
Gesetz des Lebens es befiehlt. (NSI, 16)  
 
Fittingly, too, the closing line of Benn’ s manifesto of political creativity is an imperative – i.e., 
language as a transition to action and away from its merely representational function. Addressing 
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Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Nazi Myth,” Critical Inquiry 16.2 (1990): 291-312.  
 





the new youth, whose emergence Benn has just depicted in the narrative past tense, the poet 
commands, “Halte dich nicht auf mit Widerlegungen und Worten, habe Mangel an Versöhnung, 
schließe die Tore, baue den Staat!” (NSI, 20). To the poet-commander, words represent a delay. In 
fact, the voice issuing this command to assume the decisive, non-compromising, closed-off stance 
of heroic self-sacrifice for the sake of state-building is styled as itself the voice of history: “wo die 
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen. Es ist die konkrete Formel der neuen 
Staatsidee” (NSI, 12). Through this transition to the imperative capacity of language, Benn 
performs his coveted transition of das Dichterische and its primordial potential into the present 
moment.  
 
Writing Back: Benn’s Crusade against the Literary Emigrants 
 
Benn’s first foray into politically engaged speech was not an isolated occurrence. Prompted 
by no apparent outside pressure, he decided to double down on his excommunication of the 
intellectuals from the new state, and did so with a public response to a private letter. On May 9, 
1933, Klaus Mann – a fellow writer, admirer of Benn’s work, and now an emigrant in France – 
writes to Benn in order to express his own and his fellow German emigrants’ consternation at the 
poet’s decision to support the Nazi state, most evident in his active role in purging the Prussian 
Academy’s section for poetry. For his part, Benn declines to answer in a reciprocally private 
manner and opts instead for another public address. With a Chandos Letter of his own, Benn 
reckons with his illustrious past, flaunting his newly acquired fluency of the present. 
Just two weeks after the momentous event of cleansing that was the Nazi book burning on 
the 10th of May, Benn’s response, “Die Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten,” is broadcast on 





for that day’s program – and is circulated in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung the following day.299 
The newspaper publication of the address is prefaced by an editorial note that is simultaneously 
incorrect and yet overly precise: Even as it misleadingly introduces Benn’s Antwort as a response 
to letters from multiple – as opposed to one – former literary colleagues, it also specifies that the 
concerned parties are not of Jewish heritage, presumably to indicate that the conflict in question is 
not contaminated by any dubious outside influences.300 Perhaps in order to stoke patriotic 
indignation in the Volksgemeinschaft of the newspaper’s readers, its editors identify Benn’s 
allegiance to the new state as the cause for the emigrants’ resentment.301 In this manner, the state 
– an invisible and yet all-seeing principle of all relation and communication – emerges as a central, 
albeit unspoken, participant in this epistolary drama.  
In contrast to the incensed tone of Benn’s “Answer,” the message it answers does not 
exactly invade its recipient’s private space. Indeed, Klaus Mann prefaces his letter with duly 
apologetic rhetoric, acknowledging the impropriety of reaching out to his addressee with no 
apparent right and putting himself at an emphatically respectful remove from Benn: 
Lieber und verehrter Herr Doktor Benn, erlauben Sie einem leidenschaftlichen und treuen 
Bewunderer Ihrer Schriften mit einer Frage zu Ihnen zu kommen, zu der ihn an sich nichts 
berechtigt, als eben seine starke Anteilnahme an Ihrer geistigen Existenz? Ich schreibe 
diese Zeilen nur in der Hoffnung, dass Sie mich als verständnisvollen Leser Ihrer Arbeiten 
etwas legitimiert finden eine offene Frage an Sie zu richten.302  
 
Mann’s pronounced rhetorical caution highlights the incommensurability of Benn’s response – 
one that, as an open letter, not only refuses to accord its correspondent reciprocal discretion but 
 












also overlooks Mann as a singular addressee in the first place. In lieu of a private, handwritten 
response, Benn forwards Mann a newspaper copy of his speech, thus rendering him one of the 
many anonymous literary emigrants to whom it is addressed. In this mediated manner, Mann 
receives an answer not so much from Benn as from the media-controlling state, to which Benn has 
declared unconditional allegiance and he, Mann, has turned away from and exited.  
In this manner, the state has intervened into the relationship between Benn and Mann, a 
relationship hitherto consciously oblivious of state matters. In his post-war memoirs, Klaus Mann 
remembers his acquaintance with Benn in the following manner: “Dann wurde über Literatur 
gesprochen. Wir verstanden uns, in literarischen Fragen.”303 No idle mark, the comma following 
the statement of mutual understanding emphasizes the unbridgeable limits of its scope; beyond 
questions of literature, this social harmony lapsed, “[...] sowie es um politische Probleme ging, die 
wir allerdings nur selten in unserer Unterhaltung berührten.” Politics emerges here as a topic 
prohibitive of conversation conceived as Unterhaltung: non-committal social relation 
characterized by lightness and non-partisanship. Ironically, then, even as they avoid the heavy, 
partisan matter of politics in their Weimar-period interactions, Benn and Mann find themselves 
irreversibly on the opposite sides of the central geo-political divide with the National Socialists’ 
ascent to power in the spring of 1933. 
As its title conveys, Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” is a response, yet 
one that flouts the rules of responding. Having been privately addressed by Mann as a specific – 
indeed, singularly important – author (“[...] der uns der Inbegriff des höchsten Niveaus und einer 









totalization of his interlocutor. Opening his Antwort with the ambiguous pronoun Sie – “Sie 
schreiben mir einen Brief aus der Nähe von Marseille [...]” – Benn never unveils the referent 
behind this pronoun (ALE, 24). The formally neutral pronoun Sie renders undecidable so much as 
the grammatical number of the noun substituted by it. 
With Benn’s inaugurally political radio speech “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” in 
the recent background, the open letter’s author – an erstwhile proponent of literature’s 
unconditional right to autonomy – now positions himself as a mouthpiece of the state, greatly 
amplified by being broadcast on the national radio and circulated in the national press. As though 
having relinquished his willingness or even ability to speak for himself and to a singular other, 
Benn endows his response with paradigmatic dimensions. In this similarly juxtaposing set-up, 
Benn now metonymically assumes the role of the “new state,” to which he has declared 
unconditional loyalty, his language now state property, as it were. Likewise, the “intellectuals” 
from the previous speech are now made to assume the role of “literary emigrants.”         
It is certainly noteworthy that Benn chooses the geopolitical characteristic of the emigrant 
status – of being outside of one’s homeland’s borders – as definitive of his addressees. Indeed, 
with hardly veiled contempt, Benn presents them as Flüchtlinge, a highly ambiguous 
characterization: “[...] mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland 
reisten, kann man es nicht” (ALE, 24). While, at the most superficial level, Flüchtlinge are those 
who – in contrast to the more neutral “emigrants” – have not had the privilege of leaving their 
native country with deliberation, this word can also connote “deserters” or “fugitives,” thereby 
casting Benn’s titular addressees in a morally inferior light. If “Der neue Staat und die 
Intellektuellen” still only stated the undesirability of the addressed other, the second installment of 





intellectuals have turned into emigrants, refugees, deserters, and fugitives. Unsurprisingly, too, 
Benn seems to retain this censorious attitude to the emigrant status well into the post-war years. 
While he ultimately does recant his ill-advised declaration of allegiance to the Nazi state, Benn 
unapologetically stands by his conviction that the decision to remain in Germany was a necessary 
condition for obtaining the right to judge and speak about Germany and its affairs: “Wer über 
Deutschland reden u. richten will, muss hier geblieben sein.”305 Unrepentant for his dubious 
vocabulary of Flüchtlinge from 1933, Benn continues to avail himself of it as late as 1950, in his 
autobiographical and thus retrospective text Doppelleben, endowing it with biblical legitimacy: 
“‘Wer glaubt, der flieht nicht.’”306   
Furthermore, Benn’s characterization of his addressees as “literary” emigrants underlines 
the significance of language – and, specifically, literary language – in this conflict. The temporary 
head of the Prussian Academy’s poetry section may use the same German idiom to reach those 
outside of Germany’s borders as he uses to reach those within its borders. However, they are not 
uniformly reachable. Whatever mutual understanding between Benn and the emigrants this 
communication is still able to accomplish is minimal. Already in the second paragraph of his 
response, Benn refuses his addressees the right to speak with him: “Ich muß Ihnen zunächst sagen, 
dass ich auf Grund vieler Erfahrungen in den letzten Wochen die Überzeugung gewonnen habe, 
daß man über die deutschen Vorgänge nur mit denen sprechen kann, die sie auch innerhalb 
Deutschlands erlebten” (ALE, 24). From the outset, too, Benn bars the possibility of mutual 
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comprehension (“Schon aus diesem Grunde werden wir uns kaum verstehen [...]”) and underscores 
his own inability to understand his interlocutors (“[...] ich weiß zwar gar nicht, was Sie mit diesen 
Ausdrücken eigentlich sagen wollen”) (ALE, 25, 29). This inaugural rejection of the other’s speech 
renders Benn’s “answer” monologic from the outset: a final verdict that bars the possibility of a 
response or appeal. Just about sufficient as a means of mere notification, the German language no 
longer guarantees the full transmission of the substance being communicated. Language has been 
externalized as a mere shell of full-fledged interaction. And yet, Benn’s letter demonstrates an 
unapologetic effusion of words. 
Promoted to the status of explicit addressees in the radio talk’s title (“Antwort an die 
literarischen Emigranten”), the former German-speaking “intellectuals” are simultaneously 
expelled from the realm of addressability. A peculiar dynamic emerges: Even as the immediate 
addressees of this letter are barred from understanding it, the letter is an open one and therefore 
meant to be received and understood – if only by the bystanders. Even more than “Der neue Staat 
und die Intellektuellen,” Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” is bifurcated in its 
direction. The text’s dissemination through the German state media belies its title’s apparent 
intention of being directed at those outside of Germany. Broadcast on the German national radio 
and printed in a national newspaper, Benn’s message is meant to be heard by the Germans in 
Germany just as much, if not more, as the German-speaking emigrants outside of Germany’s 
borders. Because effortless reception is granted to those who are precisely not emigrants and whose 
access to the message – both its literal content as well as metaphysical significance – is guaranteed 
simply by virtue of their immediate location on the German soil, the explicitly mentioned emigrant 





Similarly, the epithet “literary,” used by Benn to demarcate his absent addressees, signals 
that “literature” has been ejected from the realm of loyalty as something foreign and undesirable: 
What remains within German borders is not mere “literature” but an idyllic union between 
language and Volk, language and state. Marked in Benn’s title as a non-assimilable other (literary 
emigrants), literature has been excised from the formerly contentious question about the 
relationship between literature and politics. The momentous conflict hitherto preoccupying Benn 
as a poet and custodian of poetry’s place in the world has been resolved. 
In Edward Said’s terms, when Benn pronounces the emigrants to be “literary” emigrants, 
he is committing a tautology, for the very notion of “literary,” in Said’s view, already presupposes 
a certain exile, being-outside, dissent.307 For Benn’s rhetorical purposes, however, the peculiarly 
pleonastic structure of his address “an die literarischen Emigranten” is of course the point, even if 
not deliberately so. The point is to purify – language, literature, culture, state. Benn, the self-
declared poet of the German Volk, deploys his native tongue with unparalleled virtuosity to 
exorcise it of the other: to render the other an emigrant, a foreigner, and thus rightless in the poet’s 
and his compatriots’ rightful home that is the German language, literature, state, fatherland. One 
can thus read Benn’s 1933 diatribes as literature’s attempt at self-mastery: an attempt at 
appropriating its own, proper, language.  
In both of his 1933 statements, Benn does not merely refute the accuracy or even legitimacy 
of the other’s views. Rather, he refuses this other the right to speak in the first place. In fact, by 
positioning the “new state” against the “intellectuals” in his April 1933 speech, Benn expels not 
so much an undesirable thought content as rather the very act or practice of thinking. A similarly 
fundamental expulsion takes place in his May 1933 speech. There, by essentializing the 
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contemporary sociopolitical developments in Germany with the characteristic of nationality (“die 
deutschen Vorgänge”), Benn implicitly defines spatiotemporal contemporaneity with these 
“German” events as a kind of native tongue. That is, the area delimited by Germany’s geopolitical 
borders has turned into a unique medium that alone can transmit – meaningful – speech. Language, 
as grammatically and semantically German as it may be, has been demoted from its traditional role 
of transmission or communication: it no longer grants access to communicable speech. Enunciated 
outside of the borders of transmissibility, it loses its functionality, becomes mere noise. The critical 
distance afforded by language – the ability to reflectively process the immediacy of experience – 
has been annulled. Instead, unmediated and continuous presence – finding oneself on Germany’s 
grounds – has become a guarantor of intelligibility and communicability and a prerequisite for the 
right to speak. Having transgressed Germany’s borders, the intellectuals turned emigrants have 
been rendered mute; they have lost their ability to speak or be spoken to, to hear or be heard, to 




















 Gottfried Benn’s April 1933 radio-broadcast admonition to German intellectuals about the 
unprecedented novelty of their political situation was directly relevant for an intellectual who will 
be discussed in this chapter: Hannah Arendt. The 1920s, when the staunchly apolitical Benn began 
to emerge as an author of psycho-archaeological essayistic visions, was also the time when Arendt, 
one of the twentieth century’s most prominent political theorists, received her intellectual training 
at German universities. Overshadowed by Arendt’s post-war recognition outside of Germany for 
her unprecedented engagement with post-1933 political phenomena are her intellectual roots in 
the Weimar Republic. In this period of scholarly no less then sociopolitical upheaval, a variety of 
paths emerged. Although deliberately idiosyncratic in its articulation, Benn’s apolitical stance was 
certainly not unique. Indeed, the Weimar Republic witnessed many variations of this turn away 
from public affairs. In addition to Thomas Mann’s 1918 programmatic Betrachtungen eines 
Unpolitischen, one could recall the aestheticism of the George Circle or the rejection of worldly 
affairs in Franz Rosenzweig’s articulation of the “theologico-political predicament.”308 Although 
educated in this intellectual climate,309 Arendt took a slightly different path. Thus, for instance, 
Arendt’s signature notion of the in-between as the political space par excellence – crucial to her 
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post-war theory of the human condition – can be traced back to the thinker’s pre-war, Weimar-era 
interest in the figure of the neighbor, which she first explored in her 1928 doctoral dissertation on 
the concept of love in Saint Augustine. Already at the beginning of her intellectual career, then, 
Arendt reflected on the phenomena of relationality and plurality. Whereas Gottfried Benn’s theory 
of artistic autonomy could be said to conform to a long-standing distinction between culture and 
politics – between illumination and obscurity, interior and exterior, essence and accident – Arendt 
would offer a challenge to this marginalization of politics by insisting rather on its inextricability 
from human life insofar as human.   
 Born into an assimilated Jewish family in Hannover – where, incidentally, Benn would be 
stationed, in what he called an “aristokratische Form der Emigration,” in 1935 as an Oberstabsarzt 
for the Wehrmacht310 – Hannah Arendt, according to her own self-understanding, came from 
philosophy’s particularly illustrious abode in the German tradition: “Wenn ich überhaupt aus etwas 
‘hervorgegangen’ bin, so aus der deutschen Philosophie.”311 Philosophy, however, would not 
remain her life-long habitat. A self-described “political theorist,”312 Arendt did not simply theorize 
about this or that aspect of politics as something unquestionably given. Rather, the notion of 
politics was, for Arendt, a question worthy of exploration and interrogation in the first place. Her 
approach to her eventual subject matter emerged through multifaceted investigations into that 
which is given – or, perhaps more accurately, has been given – and experienced. A glimpse into 
Arendt’s thinking about politics emerges when, in her 1954 lecture “Philosophy and Politics,” she 
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articulates the following prerequisite for the oxymoron that would be a political philosopher: “If 
philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of human affairs, were 
ever to arrive at a true political philosophy they would have to make the plurality of man, out of 
which arises the whole realm of human affairs – in its grandeur and misery – the object of their 
thaumadzein.”313 Canonically, the properly philosophical disposition originates from the affect of 
wonder, thaumadzein. However, since philosophers have canonically been concerned with the 
human being as such, in the singular, Arendt transports the traditionally philosophical wonder onto 
the contingent and irreducibly plural realm of human affairs or politics. Through this 
preoccupation with the public realm, Arendt’s work indirectly calls into question Benn’s, but also 
Schiller’s, credo of artistic or aesthetic autonomy. By insisting on the irreducibly political character 
of human existence, too, Arendt also indirectly challenges Schiller’s project of educating the 
human being as human being via a preliminary expulsion of politics from his pedagogy. Moreover, 
in contrast to Benn’s sovereign dismissal of the literary emigrants, Arendt personally experienced 
flight and statelessness, an experience that proved pivotal for her not just on a personal level but 
also as a key intellectual impetus. Indeed, this experience – no experience among others – emerged 
as a circumstantial limit to the intellectual content of her thought.  
 
Introduction: The Beginnings of an Intellectual  
 Arendt had considered emigration as early as in 1932, having presciently discerned Hitler’s 
future rise in German politics already in 1929 – the year, incidentally, that she published her 
doctoral dissertation and thus acquired official credentials for entry into the realm of 
scholarship.314 The philosopher Karl Jaspers, Arendt’s intellectual mentor, whose most cherished 
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value was allegedly clarity,315 could not – even after Hitler’s ascension to power in January 1933 
– clearly see the necessity for Arendt’s, a Jew’s, possible need to leave Germany and thus “separate 
herself from the Germans.”316 In her 1964 interview with the journalist Günter Gaus, Arendt 
discussed her break with Germany’s intellectual milieu in 1933, and specifically with the 
intellectuals of Benn’s ilk, “denen zu Hitler ‘was eingefallen war’” – those, that is, who, perhaps 
not especially malicious, were nonetheless perspicacious enough to discern a creative potential in 
the brute event of the Nazis’ Machtergreifung.317 Much like Benn in 1933, although for entirely 
different reasons, Arendt was apprehensive of intellectuals who failed to recognize the novel 
political circumstances after January 1933. Indeed, Arendt experienced this recognition in the form 
of a shock: the Reichstag Fire on that year’s 27th of February.   
 While this immediately consequential event of ignition was met by Benn with a calm 
historiographical note about the unassailable thereness of history (“Dies ist die neue Epoche des 
geschichtlichen Seins, über ihren Wert oder Unwert zu reden ist läppisch, sie ist da [...]”),318 it 
elicited a much more frantic reaction from many other Berliners. With her husband, leftist author 
Günther Stern, compelled to flee immediately,319 Arendt found herself preoccupied with efforts to 
secretly shelter those fearing imminent persecution by the new regime.320 If Benn could afford to 
wait out for the opportune moment to step out into the public realm and broadcast his autonomous 
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position on the Nazis’ recent ascension to power, Arendt had to go underground, taking on the 
illicit task of helping the German Zionist Organization with research on antisemitism. The angle 
from which antisemitism was to be researched was not that of neutral sociological inquiry: rather, 
quotidian factual evidence had to be gathered – evidence of specific anti-Semitic remarks made in 
non-governmental, inconspicuous circles, under daily circumstances.321 This research of the 
inconspicuous was also performed quite inconspicuously: within the institutional walls of the 
Prussian State Library, under the guise of scholarly research. Ultimately leading to the researcher’s 
eight-day arrest and subsequent flight from Germany, this peculiar experience of keeping the 
appearance but not the essence of scholarship would coincide with Arendt’s turn to the burning 
question that was politics – a turn that, ironically, would also pave the way for her ultimately 
productive dissociation from the calmer field of philosophy and self-identification as a political 
theorist.322 
 Indeed, the Reichstag Fire would later be recalled by Arendt as the moment in which she 
realized the impossibility of occupying the position of a passive observer any longer and was 
confronted with a sense of responsibility – the moment, that is, in which her “turn to the political” 
could be said to have taken place.323 In this way, Arendt’s self-reported politicization was not a 
result of some patriotically solemn sentiment; on the contrary, it coincided with the moment of 
imposed expulsion from her patria. Ambivalent about the pathos of patriotism early on,324 Arendt 
identified her Jewish heritage –  the circumstance due to which she was forced to flee Germany in 
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the first place – as the deciding factor in her turn away from an academically nurtured apolitical 
intellectuality to a politicized stance.325 If, as Steffan Davies argues, Schiller and Goethe were 
exiles in their own time, fleeing from the political tumult into a radically novel aesthetic program, 
Arendt, too, could be viewed as a kind of deserter and exile from the contemporary intellectual 
realm as it had been crystalized in its traditional academic and academy-adjacent contours – a 
tradition whose trajectory had been determined not least by that arguable flight of Weimar 
Classicism.326 Be that as it may, in summer of 1933,327 Arendt secretly crossed the German-French 
border, eventually having to give up her German citizenship in exchange for the precarious, 
eighteen-year-long status of an emigrant and refugee. Once again, then, she became Gottfried 
Benn’s inadvertent addressee: this time, addressed by his May 1933 “Die Antwort an die 
literarischen Emigranten.” After spending seven years in Paris, Arendt, together with her second 
husband, Heinrich Blücher, was interned in a camp for enemy aliens after the fall of France in 
1940. Arendt and Blücher were among the last 238 refugees to gain life-saving entry visas to the 
United States.328  
 On March 7, 1933, prior to leaving Germany, Arendt had publicly articulated her own 
stance on the country’s ominous political developments in an article titled “Original Assimilation: 
An Epilogue to the One Hundredth Anniversary of Rahel Varnhagen’s Death.” Considering the 
unease of assimilation – and its roots in the Enlightenment’s promise of emancipation – in light of 
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the “general social antisemitism” “today in Germany,” this essay was based on Arendt’s recently 
finished biography of the German-Jewish salonnière, and thus a certain guardian of intellectuality, 
Rahel Levin Varnhagen von Ense.329 The status of this manuscript was particularly telling: in lieu 
of traditional transmission through publication and subsequent entrance into the intellectual 
tradition, it found itself transported in Arendt’s suitcase, on the move, away from the place where 
the language in which it had been written and thought was spoken. With the manuscript of this 
intended Habilitationsschrift detained in a bag, the fact that two fragments from it saw the light of 
day in 1933 and 1934 is significant, as Haun Saussy has underscored. After all, given Arendt’s 
highly precarious existence as a stateless person who had not yet established herself in her field – 
a field whose intellectual coordinates were precisely in flux for her at that time – these two 
fragments could have remained among the few traces of her thought to be preserved for 
posterity.330 In light of the perennial question of national culture and literature, particularly in its 
German-language iteration, these contingencies of transmission are significant. 
 As it turned out, the smuggled Habilitationsschrift would not have a chance to experience 
the realization of its consequential professional function of confirming its author’s university-level 
intellectuality.331 By the time it was finally published – in a 1958 American-English translation as 
Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess – its implicit promise of an academic career in Germany 
had lost its relevance for Arendt, now a US-American citizen with no plans to repatriate to 
Germany. Yet in 1959, the year that this book was finally published in Germany and in its original 
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German, Arendt would make a temporary return to her country of origin, in order to receive a prize 
for her intellectual achievements.  
 
“We Refugees” 
 The mass emergence of refugees and stateless persons arose as a colossal international 
crisis in the wake of World War I, “als zum erstenmal große Gruppen von Menschen auftauchten, 
die in eklatanter Weise aller Rechte beraubt waren.”332 This appalling new reality of multitudes of 
human beings suddenly having no citizenship rights anywhere in the world seems to have had little 
impact on Gottfried Benn’s imagination. The rhetorical levity with which Benn allowed himself 
to deploy the trope of the emigrant as fugitive and defector (Flüchtlinge) stands in stark contrast 
with the indelible trace that the experience of having to flee, shared by her with millions of others, 
appears to have left in Hannah Arendt’s thinking. Whereas the phenomenon of emigration 
provoked an intransigent recourse to spatial as well as intellectual stasis in Benn, it initiated a 
fundamental upheaval of thinking in Arendt. Yet, rather than merely amending the thinker’s 
already developed political theory, the condition of being stateless and thus legally suspended – 
“die unendlich komplizierte Papierexistenz von Staatenlosen”333 – fundamentally informed 
Arendt’s understanding of politics, “der lebendigen Politik”: “Erst die Hunderttausende von 
staatenlosen Flüchtlingen in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts, denen 
Millionen von displaced persons in den vierziger Jahren auf dem Fuße gefolgt sind, haben die 
Frage der Menschenrechte wieder auf die Tagesordnung der lebendigen Politik gebracht.”334 
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 Ten years after its memorable broadcast to the German public, Benn’s answer to the literary 
emigrants received an inadvertent response in Arendt’s short piece “We Refugees” from 1943. 
Here, in a quite peculiar manner, Arendt gave a voice to the strawman figure invoked in Benn’s 
speech. Admittedly, this voice-giving hardly resulted in unmediated testimony. The essay’s 
matter-of-fact, almost comical tone barely concealed the enormity of its topic. Its main conceit – 
namely, the exasperating speechlessness of the refugees – served as the background for Arendt’s 
aim: to call this silence and dismissal into question.335 While Benn’s speech had been broadcast 
centrifugally, from Berlin (the place Arendt would have to flee) to the rest of Germany, Arendt’s 
text appeared in an exceedingly local manner: in a small New-York-based Jewish publication, The 
Menorah Journal.336 Benn had composed his address in early 1933 and thus still with a seemingly 
unimpeachable nationalist pathos of a poet whose language and thought had magically aligned 
with those of his Volk and state; Arendt, on the other hand, wrote her article in 1943, talking about, 
and on behalf of, Jews – that is, those who in 1943 were met with the most dire forms of expulsion. 
Benn’s intensification of “Emigranten” into “Flüchtlinge” had undeniably conveyed the implicit 
sense of their illegality. Independently picking up on precisely this connotation, Arendt also 
commented on the novelty of this refugee status in her essay: The denotation of someone “driven 
to seek refuge” had remained intact, but the connoted causation of this necessitation by some 
extraordinary, illicit activity was no longer valid.337 As Arendt assured her readers, the refugees in 
question were extremely ordinary, guilty of neither wrongdoing nor wrong thinking.  
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 Both texts exhibit a troubling rhetorical character, albeit in very different ways. The third-
person, collectively plural anonymity of Benn’s address – “Antwort an die [...] Emigranten” – 
finds an echo in Arendt’s text, but this time from the first-person point of view – although here, 
too, marked by a collectively plural anonymity of the “We Refugees.” The apparent first-person 
immediacy of her report turns out to be a rhetorical illusion. The incongruity between the text’s 
tone and topic – and, of course, this incongruity is itself the topic – comes through most tellingly 
in Arendt’s mention of the rampant suicides committed by the still non-interned Jews who, 
convinced until the last moment that no harm would come from the external enemy, were 
confronted with the fact that their own neighbors, those spatially nearest to them, had turned 
against them.338 The unspeakable horror of these daily suicides is augmented by the fact that no 
posthumous response accompanies them. As Arendt writes, “Unlike other suicides, our friends 
leave no explanation of their deed, no indictment, no charge against a world that had forced a 
desperate man to talk and to behave cheerfully to his very last day. Letters left by them are 
conventional, meaningless documents.”339 In this early piece, then, Arendt urgently calls attention 
to a certain lack of response, calling on the exiled Jews, one of whom she herself is, to stop hiding 
their Jewish identity and refugee status, to stop retreating into the walls of their private existence. 
To be sure, Arendt recognizes the extreme existential precarity experienced by those she calls upon 
in her article: 
But before you cast the first stone at us, remember that being a Jew does not give any legal 
status in this world. If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would 
mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected, by any 
specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine 
an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as 
such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered discrimination as 
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the great social weapon by which one may kill men without any bloodshed [...] Those few 
refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to the point of ‘indecency,’ get in exchange 
for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is no longer a closed book to them 
and politics is no longer the privilege of Gentiles.340  
 
In this early article, inextricably informed by its author’s particular personal experience of 
displacement and discrimination, Arendt begins to articulate crucial aspects of her political theory: 
a realization of the negative condition of politics – i.e., merely human existence, devoid of the 
fundamental “right to have rights” – and the concomitant existential dead-end of apolitical 
detachment. The question of historical and political consciousness had already been the object of 
Arendt’s reflection in her 1932 essay “Aufklärung und die Judenfrage.” There, similarly to her 
essay on “Original Assimilation,” she criticized the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project for its 
universalizing gesture of considering human beings in terms of their universally essential 
rationality. In doing so, Arendt argued, the Enlightenment failed to consider their irreducible 
historical plurality.341 For Arendt, the Enlightenment’s seemingly emancipatory proposition 
actually had a pernicious effect for the German Jews, fatefully diminishing their future capacity 
for political participation in the German society.  
 Having been deprived of her German citizenship in 1937, Arendt made several visits to the 
country of her birth after the war. Two of them will form the main coordinates of this chapter: 
Arendt’s first postwar visit, in 1949; and her first invited visit, in 1959. Here, one of the literary 
emigrants whom Benn had expelled from Germany’s affairs in 1933 was now returning to 
Germany, even if only temporarily. In her reflections that accompanied these two visits – “The 
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Aftermath of Nazi Rule” in 1949 and “Von der Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten” in 1959 – 
Arendt offered a critical revision of some of the questions at the core of Benn’s censorious 
addresses: questions of speech and silence, reality and myth, world and worldlessness. 
Significantly, in the course of her reflections, Arendt articulated a revision of what human 
existence might presuppose, thereby articulating her unique vision of politics.  
 
Reporting from Germany 
 In 1949, Hannah Arendt traveled to Germany on a restorative mission. Through her work 
as executive director for the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, she was to 
oversee the recovery of Jewish cultural objects expropriated by the Nazis so that they might be 
reinstated to their rightful owners – in many cases, no longer directly possible.342 After several 
postponements, Arendt’s trip ultimately lasted from August 1949 until March 1950, thus 
incidentally coinciding with the new founding of Germany, or part of it, as the Federal Republic 
of Germany on September 15, 1949. Arendt’s first return to her country of origin was certainly no 
easy homecoming.343 After sixteen years and a devastating sociopolitical cataclysm of 
unprecedented proportions, recognition was surely difficult, and impressions must have been 
overwhelming. In a letter to a friend and fellow emigrant in New York, Arendt noted, “Über 
Deutschland könnte man Bände schreiben, ich aber werde nur einen Artikel schreiben.”344 The 
promised article took the shape of a report: “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from 
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Germany,” published in the October 1950 issue of Commentary, an American monthly founded in 
1945 with the aim of exploring contemporary Jewish-American issues from, at that time, a left-
liberal and anti-Communist perspective.345 Yet this report was not, as its genre designation might 
suggest, merely a recording or inventory of the present – as though performed by an alien from a 
different planet, capable exclusively of concurrent observation and no retrospective reflection. 
Anything but terse, Arendt’s article offered not only quotidian details about post-war Germany but 
also far-reaching sociopolitical analysis. Similar to the retroactive nature of her trip’s official 
purpose, the title – “Aftermath” – of her accompanying reflections points to the visiting author’s 
concern with the past, even if, analogously to Benn’s 1933 “Der neue Staat und die 
Intellektuellen,” Arendt’s article could have adopted a novelty-highlighting title. The enthused 
delusions of revival, renewal, and regeneration, persistently intoned in 1933 by such poets and 
thinkers as Gottfried Benn and Martin Heidegger, stand in stark contrast with this statement of an 
“aftermath.”  
 “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from Germany” deals as much with the physical 
destruction of that which is being reported on, Germany, as with its specific and unprecedented 
social disintegration through the “horrible originality” of totalitarian rule.346 Having just completed 
her pioneering study Origins of Totalitarianism, which would be published in English in 1951, 
Arendt was no stranger to these considerations. In this way, Arendt’s reflections about the 
structural premises of totalitarian rule decisively informed her approach to the object of her 
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observation and report, in which she concisely touched on many of the questions discussed in her 
book. Just like the book, the report had the task of studying the present as a diagnosis of the past.347 
The aftermath of totalitarian rule laid bare the sociopolitical premises that had allowed it to 
originate in the first place. Introducing her former home country as the “nightmare of Germany in 
its physical, moral, and political ruin,” Arendt – “mehr traurig als erbittert”348 – hardly intended 
simply to denounce (ANR 342, Arendt’s emphasis)349. Rather, the aim was likely to understand. 
Mere denunciation would have represented an idle stance from a superior vantage point, implying 
a prior division of the world into good and evil. Such a statically moralizing partition would likely 
have been foreign to Arendt’s search for structural and systemic understanding irreducibly 
informed by the actual experiences of actual human beings.350 “If I moralized or became 
sentimental,” Arendt wrote, looking back at her Origins of Totalitarianism, “I simply did not do 
well what I was supposed to do, namely, to describe the totalitarian phenomenon as occurring, not 
on the moon, but in the midst of human society.”351 
 In a 1954 essay titled “Understanding and Politics,” Arendt rejects the claim that any 
cognitive act short of condemnation would be tantamount to exoneration, even in the case of 
something as horrific as totalitarian rule – even in its National Socialist manifestation: “To the 
extent that the rise of totalitarian governments is the central event of our world, to understand 
totalitarianism is not to condone anything, but to reconcile ourselves to a world in which such 
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things are possible at all.”352 Significantly, then, Arendt’s effort to investigate totalitarianism is 
neither merely an academic pursuit nor an exercise in moral judgment. Rather, it stems from an 
existential commitment to the world in its indisputable, albeit more often than not indisputably 
horrific, reality. In the same essay, Arendt writes, “If we want to be at home on this earth, even at 
the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue 
with the essence of totalitarianism.”353 “Being at home on this earth” is an enigmatic, almost 
pleonastic formulation: Where else would one be at home but on this earth, and in what manner 
could one be on this earth but at home? As a refugee and thus a legally “homeless” person, Arendt 
does not romanticize “home” as a site of familiarity or national pride. Rather, “home,” understood 
as terrestrial existence, can only be constituted through a practice of understanding, even if through 
confrontation. In her report from Germany, Arendt confronts an utterly dismal situation: physical 
destruction, utter bankruptcy of former myths, inability to confront the recent past, failures of 
reconstruction policies – a situation of sheer worldlessness. Such a despondent state of affairs 
might inspire one to escape, if not physically, then at least mentally. Arendt, however, chooses to 
make an effort to understand: to observe, respond, and report.  
 In a more than inadvertently curious manner, Arendt’s 1950 “report” from and about 
Germany could be read as a retort to Benn’s 1933 “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” – it, 
too, a kind of denunciatory report from Germany: a report on the “emigrants,” as it were, delivered 
to the popular judgment of the Volksgemeinschaft. Having, on Benn’s pre- and post-war account, 
relinquished her right to talk about Germany by virtue of her decision to emigrate from it,354 Arendt 
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nonetheless not only had the audacity to talk about Germany but did so in an emphatically 
relentless manner in her 1950 Commentary article.355 Also noteworthy is the staging of Arendt’s 
“Report” vis a vis Benn’s “Antwort.” Just as the latter had been addressed to the emigrants in 
appearance only – intended, in actuality, for the supposedly loyal listeners in Germany – Arendt’s 
article, published only in English, in a Jewish-American magazine and thus addressed, to a large 
extent, to emigrants and refugees,356 was directed away from the Germans in Germany while 
talking about them.  
 Admittedly, had Arendt’s report been addressed to the Germans in Germany, it is not clear 
that the transmission of its message would have succeeded. For even as the reporter imagines 
writing volumes about Germany, the subject matter itself is marked by glaring gaps and absences: 
not simply of objects of cognition but also, and more significantly, of this cognition itself. 
Germany – the place most visibly destroyed – also turns out to be the place where this destruction 
is least brought up in thinking or speaking. Whereas Benn prescribed silence to those who had left 
or were yet to leave Germany, the silence that Arendt found upon her return to Germany emanated 
from those who had remained there. As Arendt reports, “A lack of response is evident everywhere” 
(ANR 342). Reminiscent of the lacking response on the part of those on whose behalf Arendt wrote 
in 1943, this lacking response, noted by a returning emigrant shortly after 1945, simultaneously 
stands in stark contrast with the thunderous answer hurled at the departed emigrants in 1933 by a 
German poet on behalf of his fellow Germans.  
 
355 On the dispute between the inner emigres and exiles over the rights to an authentic representation of German 
culture, see Sean Forner, German Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics after 
1945 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP, 2014), 60-61. 
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isolationist position for American Jews as Jews vis a vis the non-Jewish US-American majority (Balint, Running 





 If the subject matter of Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten” were emigrants 
as Flüchtlinge, escapees from History’s inevitable stride, Arendt, too, talks of a certain flight. In 
her depiction, it is, however, the Germans who emerge as the escapees: in this case, from visible 
reality. Indeed, whereas “Geschichte” was the leitmotif of Benn’s April 1933 “Der neue Staat und 
die Intellektuellen,” it is “reality” that occurs again and again in Arendt’s report seventeen years 
later. History, which was made to speak with an overriding voice in Benn’s speech (“[...] wo die 
Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu schweigen”), is represented by a glaring absence in 
Arendt’s report. In this account, the only fact, Tatsache,357 that, in Benn’s terminology, could be 
said to be there, da,358 is the destruction of “the visible marks of more than a thousand years of 
German history” (ANR 342). Having silenced himself as a Person and assumed the role of 
History’s mouthpiece, the German poet was among those whose mind had, to use Arendt’s 
expression, succumbed to the idea of an “irresistible stream of history” (ANR 347). Precisely this 
history has collapsed, is now a site of utter destruction in the visiting emigrant’s report. Once 
addressed by their poet with a victorious laudation of their shared past, present, and future – united 
in a supratemporal wave of poetic and mythogenic inspiration – Germans now 
[...] busily stumble through the ruins of a thousand years of their own history, shrugging 
their shoulders at the destroyed landmarks or resentful when reminded of the deeds of 
horror that haunt the whole surrounding world, one comes to realize that busyness has 
become their chief defense against reality. And one wants to cry out: But this is not real – 
real are the ruins, real are the past horrors, real are the dead whom you have forgotten. But 
they are living ghosts, whom speech and argument, the glance of human eyes and the 
mourning of human hearts, no longer touch. (ANR 345) 
 
 
357 “[Wir stehen] heute vor der Tatsache eines vollkommenen, geschichtlich logischen, von echten menschlichen 
Substanzen ernährten Sieges der nationalen Idee” (Benn, SW, IV, 15). 
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The rare moment of oblique but poignant self-reference – “And one wants to cry out” – in Arendt’s 
otherwise object-oriented account is provoked not by the fact of ubiquitous material devastation 
(“ruin,” “destroyed landmarks,” “deeds of horror”) but rather by the ubiquitous lack of response 
to it. It is significant that Arendt formulates the sentiment of wanting to cry out in the anonymous 
third person (“one”) and only potential modality (“wants to”). At stake in this despaired and 
somehow aborted utterance is something like the very possibility of reaching out to another. That 
is, Arendt’s concern does not reside merely with “reality” but, more importantly, its capacity for 
transmission and reception: an in-between space that might be able to transmit this commonly 
shared “reality” in the first place. In this pivotal passage, the repetition of the word “real” is 
inextricably connected to the word “world.” For Arendt, the specifically outrageous aspect of the 
indifference to the “real” is the fact that what is thus being dismissed otherwise “haunts the whole 
surrounding world.” That is, the observer’s outrage is provoked by the act of abstracting oneself 
from the commonly shared, irrevocable givenness of one’s surroundings as well as from the 
specific past that precedes them. In their myopic effort to shield their sight from the present’s roots 
in the past, Arendt’s former compatriots, as she reports, cling onto the immediate present through 
peculiarly reflex-like “busyness.” The reality with which this busyness is preoccupied is truncated 
of its history. Cropped out is any reflection beyond the present moment framed by immediate needs 
and their clearance. In contesting the reality of this ultra-magnified here and now, Arendt argues 
against an understanding of time as a neutral succession of points on a timeline. She insists on the 
inextricable connection of this here and now to its specific past: “real are the ruins, real are the 
past horrors, real are the dead whom you have forgotten.” In a profoundly unsettling way, Arendt’s 
use of such vocabulary as “ghost-like” and “haunt” is perhaps not entirely figurative, possibly 





Germany in 1949-1950 has an undeniable symbolic significance: the return of the emigrant, of the 
ejected, of the other who, at the level of state policy, was supposed to have been eliminated, of 
whom the state and the home was supposed to have been rid. In this light, it is Arendt who, in the 
very act of returning and introducing herself as a Jew and doing so, moreover, in the German 
language, must have appeared ghost-like to her interlocutors, intent as they were on keeping 
cognitive doors firmly shut for any recollections of the recent past. 
 Sent from the ruins of a shipwreck – a shipwreck not only of gigantic degree but also of an 
entirely unprecedented kind – Arendt’s “Report from Germany” can perhaps be regarded as a kind 
of postcard, albeit an unusual one at that time. In her general critique of Germany’s effort “to 
restore a facsimile of pre-war [...] conditions,” Arendt mentions the Germans’ frequent practice of 
sending each other postcards that display their country’s landmarks, which, having been destroyed, 
no longer demarcate any national borders, be it spatially or symbolically (ANR 345). This postcard-
sending gesture is quite telling. Beyond registering an unwillingness to face the ruins, it also points 
to a prioritization of the image, endowed with preservative power, over that which it is supposed 
to represent. Notably, this phenomenon of (self)-deception and dissemblance of reality was not, in 
Arendt’s mind, limited to the Germans in postwar Germany. In her later reflections on politics, the 
theme of deception through image-making would crucially resurface in the context of US-
American politics, the polar opposite of a totalitarian society, as programmatically prescribed 
ideological splits would have it.  
 Already in her “Report,” Arendt identifies larger implications in the postwar Germans’ 
daily practice of self-deception. She connects it to a more deep-rooted species of lying: the kind 
of lying carried out by totalitarian regimes in general and the Nazi regime in particular. The 





be made true” – ultimately leads to the governed subjects’ complete inability to “distinguish 
between facts and opinion” (ANR 344). Thus, as Arendt reports, lying has interfered with the 
denazification process, but not just in the form of self-conscious dishonesty. Rather, according to 
the reporter’s observations, Germans are no longer capable of telling the truth even if they wanted 
to (ANR 347). Totalitarian rule may have been officially defeated, but this declared victory – as 
well as the official policy of “denazification” – proves utterly powerless with respect to the 
entrenched and inconspicuous traces of that defeated rule.359  
 Arendt’s findings with regard to the civic situation in postwar Germany are corroborated 
by recent historiography. In his study on what he calls “past-political” legislation of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, the historian Norbert Frei offers an account of the widespread resistance to the 
postwar policies of denazification among the German electorate, which would ultimately be 
mirrored in the amnesty laws proposed in 1949 and 1950 by the emerging federal government of 
Germany.360 Similarly, postwar historiography was largely focused on the so-called 
Täterforschung, programmatically unconcerned with researching the uncomfortable phenomenon 
of popular Nazi support.361 Unwillingness to look at the recent past seems to have characterized 
the widespread postwar attitude in Germany. As Arendt highlights in her report, silence seems to 
have been the response.  
 
 
359 On the failings of the denazification program due to its “over-mechanical” procedure, see John H. Herz, “Fiasco 
of Denazification in Germany,” Political Science Quarterly 63, no.4 (1948): 569-594, here: 570.  
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In Search of Sociability: Efforts of Reconstruction and Transformation 
 Arendt’s “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. A Report from Germany” can be read as a record 
of conversations and, more importantly, a commentary on their failures. Attempts to carry out a 
conversation are reported throughout the piece. One particularly poignant example is a 
conversation in the flatland, in which only one of the interlocutors is a Jew. As Arendt reports, this 
type of conversation consists of two parts. After the visitor, formerly a German citizen but now in 
exile, introduces herself as a Jew to her German interlocutor, the latter preemptively aborts this 
conversation by listing the immense difficulties that Germans have had to endure. In this manner, 
the conversation devolves into an act of accounting, settling of scores: “[...] and if the object of 
this little experiment happens to be educated and intelligent, he will proceed to draw up a balance 
between German suffering and the suffering of others, the implication being that one side cancels 
the other and we may as well proceed to a more promising topic of conversation” (ANR 342-3). 
The troubling premise of this conversational deflection is a kind of zero-sum conception in which 
human relation is understood in terms of measurable suffering: suffering of countable individuals 
that can be then added up into comparable sums. Audible in Arendt’s account of this dialogical 
failure, which her interlocutor proposes to mend by selecting a more palatable thematic conduit, is 
an indirect critique of a certain kind of human relation: one based on sociability or Geselligkeit. 
For Arendt, this relation is similarly structured around an additive logic.362  
 Precisely the idea of sociability or Geselligkeit was being mobilized by various socially 
engaged and politically liberal figures in postwar projects of civic reconstruction.363 As Arendt’s 
 
362 For a thorough reconstruction of the postwar problem of community and project of sociability, as well as their 
critique by Arendt, see Jakob Norberg, Sociability and Its Enemies: German Political Theory after 1945 (Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, 2014), 81-105, esp. 83-85. The following outline of the situation is indebted to Norberg’s account.  
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1949-1950 report makes clear, the aftermath of the war in Germany was characterized by utter 
destruction not only of shared physical space but also of social and moral bonds. Moreover, 
nothing was certain about how these bonds might be recovered through politics and policy in the 
near future.364 The Allied approach to this question was based on the concomitant projects of 
denazification and reeducation. A pedagogical approach was envisioned by some Germans as well: 
Through a studious devotion to the German canon, the Germans would rebuild their country on 
the basis of its illustrious cultural heritage. In this vein, the historian Friedrich Meinecke famously 
proposed the establishment of Goethe-Gemeinden, in which Germans would have an opportunity 
to congregate on Sundays in order to recite passages from classical German literature for their 
personal and, additionally, societal, edification.365 With the Weimar “Republic” representing an 
undesirable recent memory, the mind was to be transported to a more distant past and a more 
agreeable Weimar association.366 
 That the undertaking of reeducation entailed a political self-education through a practice 
of civic participation on the part of the German populace was the view of a number of 
democratically oriented public figures in postwar Germany.367 The press was an important 
instrument in this project, and one of the above-mentioned proponents of democracy, journalist 
and political scientist Dolf Sternberger, was commissioned by the American occupation authorities 
 
364 Norberg, Sociability and Its Enemies, 9. 
 
365 Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006), 132-134.  
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with a reeducation-oriented journal.368 Endowed with an aspirational and quasi-expressionist 
title,369 the Heidelberg-based Die Wandlung would be issued monthly from November 1945 to 
December 1949. In order to achieve its aim of rebuilding Germany’s destroyed “bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft,” the journal proposed a program of instilling into its readers a respect for the values 
and practices of sociability: free and non-purposive interaction.370 In contrast to the Nazi model of 
community as Volksgemeinschaft, this interaction would not be externally dictated, be it by 
political authority or by material necessity.371 In the absence of a concrete path for Germany’s 
political reinstatement, Die Wandlung meant to offer a discursive substitute.  
 In his reconstruction of this project of “self-education to democracy” as a remedy for 
postwar civic disintegration, Sean A. Forner highlights its underlying model of the self as an 
autonomous and rational authority: “Rather than approach ‘the masses’ as objects – of exclusion, 
organization, or paternalist concern – [Germany’s engaged democrats] imagine them as the self-
civilizing subjects of a self-constituting public, that is, of “the people” as the sovereign ground of 
sovereign authority.”372 It seems, however, that this idealizing vision of human beings as perfectly 
rational subjects and of human coexistence as an aggregate of such subjects exemplified the 
widespread postwar understatement of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft as a historical 
fact. Seeing in it nothing but a propaganda myth, postwar German historiography largely declined 
to study it as a real phenomenon with roots much more deep-seated than what the ideal of self-
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actualizing reason was capable of accessing.373 Notably, as Jakob Norberg explains, the editors of 
Die Wandlung did not see their project of promoting sociability as itself political; rather, it was 
envisioned as a preparatory stage on the way to proper politicization, which meant participation in 
a democratic society.374 In this light, the Heidelberg project of Die Wandlung bears an 
unmistakable resemblance to the Weimar project of Die Horen from one and a half centuries 
earlier, it too an avowedly apolitical enterprise that nevertheless had the metapolitical ambition of 
preparing humanity for a genuine politics. The gesture of rejecting the specific here and now as a 
satisfactory enough impulse for a thinking of and engagement in politics in medias res is common 
to both projects. The kind of past-inspired contemplative gaze of Die Horen is reoriented as a 
future-directed aspiration of Die Wandlung. 
 In addition to Sternberger, several other “engaged democrats” – among them, the 
philosopher and influential postwar public figure Karl Jaspers – belonged to the journal’s editorial 
board. Jaspers’s postwar societal engagement was a departure from his usual inclination. Prior to 
1945, the philosopher, under whose supervision Hannah Arendt had completed her doctoral 
dissertation several years before 1933, had consciously espoused an apolitical attitude, drawing a 
firm distinction between culture and politics. While, by way of the sociologist Max Weber, Jaspers 
had eventually recognized the significance of politics, he had preferred not to get involved 
himself.375 His focus had resided, rather, with questions of culture: specifically, with the necessity 
of cultural regeneration and the role of Bildung in it. Guided by this strict division of labor, Jaspers 
had sought to contribute to the world through his specific talent for philosophy and pedagogy, 
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leaving the task of politics to those more temperamentally inclined to it.376 However, in the urgency 
of the immediate post-war years, the philosopher saw himself assume the role of a public figure as 
one of the few German intellectuals and so-called inner emigrants uncompromised by 
collaboration with the Nazis, although not distinguished by a vocal criticism of the regime 
either.377 After the war, forced by the circumstances to summon his talents away from an isolated 
grappling with eternal questions, Jaspers recognized the need to respond to the recent past in a 
public manner by addressing multitudes of people here and now, contributing public statements in 
the form of lectures and articles.378 Moreover, Jaspers was one of the first in his country to pose 
the question of responsibility for the atrocities of the Holocaust: His 1946 book Die Schuldfrage 
argued, not uncontroversially in postwar Germany, that a thoroughgoing confrontation by the 
Germans with the recent past was a necessary condition for the possibility of Germany’s 
reconstruction in the wake of the utter devastation brought about by the Nazi rule. Distinguishing 
between four types of guilt – criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical – Jaspers argued against 
those who deemed the Germans universally guilty and a priori incorrigible.379 Jaspers posited 
instead that his compatriots would have to grapple with their involvement in National Socialism 
on an individual basis. One path to such confrontation and transformation seemed to lie through 
civil conversation, afforded by such journals as Die Wandlung.  
 It was Jaspers, too, who authored a programmatic foreword (“Geleitwort”) to the first issue 
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kein Programm,” the philosopher nonetheless enumerates the range of possible topics for solicited 
contributions towards the end of his succinct text:  
Erinnerung aber wird nicht genügen. Aus der Erinnerung wird beseelt, was heute zu tun 
ist. Die Gegenwart und die Zukunft sind unsere Aufgabe. Alles Denken, das für sie 
wesentlich sein kann, soll in dieser Zeitschrift Raum finden, Politik, Wirtschaft, Technik, 
Recht, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Dichtung, Theologie und Philosophie. Nicht die 
Geschichte, sondern dieses Gegenwärtige, so hoffen wir, wird den Hauptraum einnehmen 
[...] So wollen und müssen wir versuchen, wie wir uns denkend in dieser ungeheuren Not 
zurechtfinden.380 
 
Notable in this list is the foregrounding of politics, Politik, as an editorially welcome topic; equally 
notable is the placement of the traditionally apolitical fields, namely, “Wissenschaft, Kunst und 
Dichtung, Theologie und Philosophie,” at the list’s end. This conception of politics as a topic of 
thinking, Denken, recalls Schiller’s restricted authorization of politics only as a subject of the 
“philosophischen Geist.”381 In this light, Jaspers’ 1945 leading word, Geleitwort, recalls Schiller’s 
1794 announcement, Ankündigung, both of them introductions to the programmatically 
transformative projects of Die Wandlung and Die Horen respectively. Both texts articulate highly 
programmatic editorial visions; both are presented as responses to the immediate political 
circumstances; their common impulse consists in some form of education or (re)formation. 
Whereas Schiller’s Ankündigung emphatically rejected the present, protecting the “Geist und 
Herzen des Lesers” from the hazardous “Anblick der Zeitbegebenheiten,”382 Jaspers welcomes 
“die Gegenwart” as “unsere Aufgabe.” Yet the later project, too, sets up a border: “Nicht die 
Geschichte, sondern dieses Gegenwärtige, so hoffen wir, wird den Hauptraum einnehmen.” 
History, understood as remembrance, “Erinnerung,” is to be respectfully displaced into the 
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background. Likewise, whereas Schiller announced his project as emerging from the authority of 
an “achtungswürdige Gesellschaft” about to impart its wisdom to the journal’s subscribers, Jaspers 
rejects the idea of intellectual authority: “Niemand von uns ist Führer, keiner ist Prophet, der giltig 
sagte, was ist und was zu tun sei.”383 However, even as he insists on the collective undertaking at 
stake in Die Wandlung, Jaspers, too, invokes the telos of a common Geist: “Miteinander bauen wir 
nicht nur die Welt unseres materiellen Daseins, sondern den Geist und die Sitte unserer 
Gesellschaft [...] Aber der Einzelne ist machtlos. Er bedarf des öffentlichen Geistes, der ihn trägt. 
Dieser Geist ist unser aller Verantwortung.”384 
 Whereas Schiller programmed the exclusion of politics into his project of social 
transformation through aesthetic edification, Jaspers grants politics a primus-inter-pares status 
within his own project of rebuilding. A conspicuous exclusion of “politics” is revised with its 
conspicuous inclusion. It is as though “politics,” having shown the horrors it is capable of when 
left unattended, is no longer to be ostracized; rather, it should be welcomed back into the fold of 
thinking – “Alles Denken, das für sie wesentlich sein kann, soll in dieser Zeitschrift Raum finden” 
– and socialized into a peaceful coexistence with other disciplines.385 However, this reinstatement 
of politics into the realm of possible thought and speech – and, indeed, the  journal’s prologue 
appeals to the Germans with a concrete plea “zu sprechen, ihre Gedanken mitzuteilen”386 – is not 
quite the fundamental reversal it appears to be. As conceived by the programmatically pro-
democratic journal, politics is not only one among many possible fields of human activity but also 
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one of the numerous objects of thinking and thus conceptual administration. It is regarded as one 
among several possible angles from which to inquire into human existence, all of them united 
under the aegis of thinking, Denken. In this postwar vision, shaken to its core although it may be, 
politics appears to have gained no unique significance. Ultimately, this editorial stance does not 
depart very far from its classical predecessor, sharing with it a speculative perspective on its subject 
matter. 
 Through Jaspers’ invitation, Hannah Arendt, too, contributed to Die Wandlung, although 
not without reservations. She considered her potential contributions to this publishing enterprise 
to be a “form of return” to Germany, which was not a self-evident matter for her.387 In one of her 
first postwar letters to Jaspers, Arendt outlined her conditions for such a homecoming, 
simultaneously drawing a connection between her concrete situation in the world and a key 
principle of her worldview:  
Meine nicht-bürgerliche oder literarische Existenz beruht darauf, daß ich dank meines 
Mannes politisch denken und historisch sehen gelernt habe und daß ich andererseits nicht 
davon abgelassen habe, mich historisch wie politisch von der Judenfrage her zu orientieren 
[...] Sie werden mich nicht mißverstehen, wenn ich Ihnen sage, daß es für mich nicht ganz 
leicht ist, an einer deutschen Zeitschrift mitzuarbeiten.  
 
Eines aber erscheint auch mir klar: wenn Juden in Europa bleiben sollen können, dann 
nicht als Deutsche oder Franzosen etc., als ob nichts geschehen sei. Mir scheint, keiner von 
uns kann zurückkommen (und Schreiben ist doch eine Form des Zurückkommens), nur 
weil man nun wieder bereit scheint, Juden als Deutsche oder sonst was anzuerkennen; 
sondern nur, wenn wir als Juden willkommen sind. Das würde heißen, dass ich gerne 
schreiben würde, wenn ich als Jude über irgendeinen Aspekt der Judenfrage schreiben kann 
[...]388  
 
Jaspers acknowledged Arendt’s reservations, seeing to it that her first article in Die Wandlung, 
“Organisierte Schuld,” be accompanied by a note from the editors informing the readers in 
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Germany of the overseas author’s express wish.389 At another point in the same letter, Arendt 
clarified that, in order to remain recognizable as a Jew, she had opted to keep her birth name after 
marrying her husband, Heinrich Blücher.390 Read together, these comments suggest that one thinks 
historically and politically not when one acquires an abstract theory of world politics, but rather 
when one takes one’s point of departure from one’s concrete circumstances and speaks into the 
public realm from that vantage point. From her husband, Arendt says, she adopted the ability to 
think historically and politically, yet thinking historically and politically meant not adopting her 
husband’s name. It meant remaining visible as a Jew in her literary, public-facing existence.  
 Arendt’s contributions to Die Wandlung would prove pivotal for her work, later 
reappearing in her massive Origins of Totalitarianism, which Arendt herself characterized as a 
“historical study and political analysis.”391 Although these articles would also prove to be some of 
the journal’s most impactful offerings, their impact did not reside in generating the journal’s goal 
of polite or sociable conversation. Controversial by virtue of their relentless tone and method, 
Arendt’s texts in Die Wandlung demonstrated her profound skepticism about the journal’s program 
of revivifying bürgerliche Gesellschaft and Geselligkeit, particularly as a serious political 
project.392 Not only did she doubt the ability of Geselligkeit to offer a remedy against the aftermath 
of totalitarianism but, more importantly, considered the very notion of bourgeoisie or “bürgerliche 
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Gesellschaft” to be structurally prone to the totalitarian path in the first place.393 Devoid of tangible 
political significance, sociability, as Arendt saw it, nonetheless had the pernicious antipolitical 
effect of socializing human beings into economically determined creatures: beings incapable of 
acting in the strong sense of the word and therefore incapable of political and thus, in Arendt’s 
view, plurally human existence.394 As Jakob Norberg reconstructs Arendt’s position, “Sociability 
may very well possess discursive dimensions, but it precludes the articulation of dissent and for 
Arendt, only mutual contestation qualifies as politics.”395 Taking her lead from the journal’s 
“Geleitwort,” Arendt did, then, talk about politics in her articles, but in such a way as to revise its 
position in the emphatically broad list of sanctioned topics of conversation and objects of 
cognition. Contrary to the editorial suggestion of leaving history behind, Arendt did not shy away 
from “Geschichte,” relentlessly probing the circumstances and premises that made possible the 
journal’s immediate situation – “Wir haben fast alles verloren”396 – and impetus. 
 If the founding of Die Wandlung occasioned Arendt’s virtual return (Zurückkommen) to 
Germany, the journal’s closing in December 1949 coincided with her first physical return to the 
country since 1933 – followed by a second departure from it, now accompanied by a report. 
Significantly, the last issue of Die Wandlung included a pivotal article by Arendt: “Es gibt nur ein 
einziges Menschenrecht,” a version of which would reappear in her Origins of Totalitarianism.397 
 
393 On this as well as on Arendt’s use of the word “bourgeoisie” – and the implicit Marxian reference – as opposed to 
Sternberger’s avoidance of that term in favor of the phrase “bürgerliche Gesellschaft,” see Norberg, Sociability and 
Its Enemies, 83.  
 
394 A critique of “the social” would of course reappear as a crucial aspect of Arendt’s argument in The Human 
Condition (see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 38-50).  
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In this article, Arendt reflects on the structural presuppositions of “the peculiarly modern touches 
of physical homelessness, social rootlessness, and political rightlessness” that she would bring up 
in her “Report from Germany” several months later (ANR 342). In her last Die Wandlung article, 
Arendt contests the notion that a single human being is adequately understood as an instantiation 
of the general concept “human,” to which definitional rights can be ascribed. For Arendt, essence-
based rights – i.e., rights based on the human understood as a universal concept398 – are not 
adequate to the given, terrestrially experienced reality of human existence. The spatiotemporal 
reality that this existence has accrued by the mid-twentieth century is such that the map of the 
world has been wholly divided into legal-political units: “Nur bei vollständiger Organisiertheit des 
Menschengeschlechtes konnte der Verlust der Heimat und des politischen Status identisch werden 
mit der Ausstoßung aus der Menschheit überhaupt.”399 This means that any human being, once 
banished from his or her locus of citizenship, loses his or her citizenship rights without, however, 
being able to – automatically, definitionally – acquire such rights anywhere else. This means, too, 
that such a stateless and rightless human being may indeed be “human” according to an abstract 
definition but, in concrete legal terms, becomes the complete opposite of the human being 
envisioned as a grand, universal concept. Highlighting Arendt’s striking formulation “Ausstoßung 
aus der Menschheit,” Werner Hamacher interprets Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights as a 
“prelegal premise, a protoright, in which it is left open, what a human may be, who a human may 
be”: “[...] this privilege is preceded neither by a natural nor a historical determination of man, of 
 
398 On the definitive Enlightenment gesture of “Bestimmung des Menschen,” see Wolfgang Albrecht, 
“Bestimmung(en) des Menschen. Zu einem Zentralthema des Aufklärungsdiskurses und einigen seiner Facetten im 
Umkreis Lessings,” in Practicing Progress: The Promise and Limitations of Enlightenment, ed. Richard Schade 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007) 21-34. 
 





humanity, and its humanness.”400 In this manner, then, Arendt’s article carries out a crucial 
reversal: Instead of taking her point of departure from an idealizing concept of the human being 
(des Menschen) contained in the notion of human rights (Menschenrechte) – an essentializing 
idealization that from the outset discards as mere accidents such infelicitous situations as flight 
and exile – Arendt insists on the limit situation instead: on the situation of flight, exile, 
homelessness. Dethroning it from its Enlightenment-era idealization, Arendt brings the notion of 
Menschsein down to earth – down, that is, to the temporally constrained space: a space that is 
constituted by temporal accidents, one that knows no pre-determined necessity.  
 
Authoritative Silences: Benn and Heidegger 
 
 Some of the postwar silence and lack of response to the past that Hannah Arendt noted in 
her 1950 report from Germany was authored by Gottfried Benn. In an open letter titled Berliner 
Brief, Juli 1948, his third publication after the war,401 Benn declined an invitation to publish in 
Merkur, a culturally conservative and eventually influential Southern German journal.402 With this 
missive, the poet abstracted himself from the public sphere, reverting to his prewar stance of civic 
detachment. Concurrently gestating a poetics of stasis in his lyric cycle Statische Gedichte, Benn 
evidently considered the past, which Arendt insisted on in her report, to have passed. He was more 
concerned with the immediate present. Admittedly, Benn’s vision of this present was presented 
 
400 Werner Hamacher, “The Right to Have Rights (Four-and-a-Half Remarks),” trans. Kirk Wetters, South Atlantic 
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401 Alexander Schüller, “Kleinere Essays, Reden und Schriften 1941-1950,” in Benn Handbuch. Leben – Werk – 
Wirkung, eds. Christian M. Hanna and Friederike Reents (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 2016), 215. 
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through the familiar lens of a grand oppositional narrative: “Die Lage ist bedauerlich, denn neue 
Elemente sind vorhanden, das Abendland möchte einen neuen Absprung wagen. Es ist für mich 
kein Zweifel, daß eine zerebrale Mutation im Anzug ist, niedergehalten von allem, was 
Öffentlichkeit heißt [...].”403 As though undeterred by the colossal failure of the Nazis’ regenerative 
project, the poet held on to the rhetoric of renewal and transformation (“einen neuen Absprung,” 
“zerebrale Mutation”). It appears that some of the same anxieties of degeneration and decay that 
had propelled Benn’s essayistic output in the late 1920s and 1930s continued to animate him even 
after the devastating collapse of the organized crusade against those ills’ purported causes.   
 Dispatched from the fallen capital into the geopolitically divided ether, Benn’s Berliner 
Brief explicitly thematizes the question of “politics.” The poet’s vantage point is certainly 
unexpected: Rather than point to the atrocities only recently perpetrated by the Nazi regime, he 
imputes the decline of “Abendland” – a word with its own conservative geopolitical implications404 
– precisely not to the concrete mechanisms of that regime’s terror apparatus but rather to something 
quite abstract, namely, political concepts:  
Das Abendland geht nämlich meiner Meinung nach gar nicht zugrunde an den totalitären 
Systemen oder den SS-Verbrechen, auch nicht an seiner materiellen Verarmung oder an 
den Gottwalds und Molotows, sondern an dem hündischen Kriechen seiner Intelligenz vor 
den politischen Begriffen. Das Zoon politikon, dieser griechische Missgriff, diese 
Balkanidee – das ist der Keim des Untergangs, der sich jetzt vollzieht. (BB 282).  
 
Promptly requalifying universal concepts (“politische Begriffe”) into a regional error (“dieser 
griechische Missgriff”), Benn evidently does not consider the current year of 1948 to be an 
 
403 Gottfried Benn, “Berliner Brief, Juli 1948,” in Gesammelte Werke in vier Bänden, ed. Dieter Wellershoff, 4 vols. 
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aftermath of something, i.e., of a specific political cataclysm with specific preconditions and 
specific consequences. According to Benn’s non-conformist historiography, this something – the 
“Untergan[g], der sich jetzt vollzieht” – is very much still in the process of taking place. 
Polemizing against democracy – “als Staatsprinzip das Beste, aber zum Produktiven gewendet 
absurd!” – Benn reiterates his long-held conviction that art, as “alles Primäre,” is incompatible 
with the secondary phenomenon of the public (Öffentlichkeit) and its procedures of deliberation 
and debate (BB 283). “Gegen diese Öffentlichkeit meine eigenen tragischen Gedanken halten,” 
declares the poet, “ist nicht mein Beruf. Ich trage meine Gedanken alleine [...]” (BB 283-4). Benn’s 
diatribe against the “zoon politikon” goes hand in hand with a refusal to respond to, and engage 
with, the surrounding world, a refusal declared by the poet in a performative and programmatic 
manner. In a self-exculpatory gesture akin to the one reported by Arendt in her “Aftermath,” Benn 
presents himself as a victim, universally ostracized “von den Nazis als Schwein, von den 
Kommunisten als Trottel, von den Demokraten als Prostituierter, von den Emigranten als Renegat, 
von den Religiösen als pathologischer Nihilist” (BB 281).405 With an adamantly isolationist tone, 
Benn insists on his first-person stance, refusing to leave it for any external territory, be it via 
emigration or public engagement: “Und damit leben Sie wohl und nehmen Sie Grüße aus dem 
blockierten, stromlosen Berlin [...] Aber es ist die Stadt [...] deren Elend ich jetzt heimatlich 
ertrage, in der ich das zweite, das dritte und nun das vierte Reich erlebe und aus der mich nichts 
zur Emigration bewegen wird” (BB 285, my emphasis). Seemingly distancing himself from his 
1933 glorification of the Third Reich as a “neue Epoche des geschichtlichen Seins,”406 Benn now 
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presents it as merely one in a series of several equally ephemeral political programs – programs 
that his self-contained ich is now wise enough to keep track of from a distance. Even as he thus 
appears to deride “das dritte [...] Reich,” the poet simultaneously also normalizes it in neglecting 
to point out this particular regime’s and program’s unprecedented atrocity.407 Silent about the 
sociopolitical reality surrounding him, the poet withdraws into spiritual and aesthetic depths of his 
own mind. For Hannah Arendt, precisely this state of withdrawal and refusal to act – whether in 
deed or thought – constitutes the condition of possibility for totalitarian takeover. Not so much a 
freely available – personal – stance among others, apolitical silence and dismissal of the public 
realm is, on Arendt’s account, a prerequisite for the possibility of sociopolitical totalization and 
ultimately extermination of those incapable of being accommodated within the programmatic 
borders of the totality.  
 Significantly, Benn’s vocal silence and self-isolation after the war did not prevent him from 
achieving an impressive comeback on the literary scene.408 In 1951, only a few years after his 
Berliner Brief, the poet would be honored with the first postwar award of the prestigious Georg 
Büchner Prize, which had just been reinstated and upgraded from a regional distinction to a 
Germany-wide literary accolade. Crucially, this national recognition coincided with Benn’s highly 
influential lecture on the problems of lyric poetry, his 1951 “Probleme der Lyrik,” which, first 
delivered to a university audience, developed a theory of autonomous poetics. Reminiscent of 
those postcards reported on by Arendt that anachronistically depicted Germany’s prewar 
landmarks, Benn’s address invoked a similar kind of postcard: “Meine Damen und Herren, wenn 
Sie am Sonntag morgen Ihre Zeitung aufschlagen, und manchmal sogar auch mitten in der Woche, 
 
407 On Benn’s tacit normalization of the Nazi regime, see Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History, 144. 
  
408 For an outline of the poet’s postwar cultural rehabilitation, see Judith S. Ulmer, Geschichte des Georg-Büchner 





finden Sie in einer Beilage meistens rechts oder links unten etwas, das durch gesperrten Druck und 
besondere Umrahmung auffällt, es ist ein Gedicht.”409 With these words, Benn welcomed his 
audience into a weekly routine’s idyllic present tense, crucially appealing to the atemporal 
authority of “ein Gedicht” – a symbolic cultural object that, regardless of the cataclysms outside 
of its “besondere Umrahmung,” guarantees a sense of continuity.  
Benn was not the only illustrious figure who assumed a silent stance after the war. And, of 
course, the parallels I have intermittently outlined between Hannah Arendt and Gottfried Benn are 
somewhat arbitrary. After all, they neither knew each other nor referred to each other’s writings. 
However, the link between the German poet and the exiled German-Jewish political theorist 
appears less arbitrary when one considers the resemblance between Benn’s profile and that of the 
philosopher Martin Heidegger, one of the early influences on Arendt’s thought.410 It was during 
her trip to Germany in 1949-1950 that Arendt talked to Heidegger for the first time after seventeen 
years, their last prewar correspondence consisting of Arendt’s inquiry about Heidegger’s alleged 
support for the Nazis and his prompt denial of such allegations.411  
 Similar to Benn, Heidegger can be associated with the interwar phenomenon loosely 
known as the Conservative Revolution. Similar to Benn, Heidegger entertained visions of national 
rebirth and regeneration, locating the potential for their realization in the National Socialist 
movement and regime. Similar to Benn, Heidegger expressed vocal support for the Nazis in the 
spring of 1933,412 although unlike Benn he also took the extra step of officially joining the Nazi 
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party. Similar to Benn, this public association did not last very long – here, too, due to the Nazis’ 
ultimate disinterest and not due to any moral epiphany on the part of the collaborating intellectual 
himself. Similar to Benn, Heidegger’s association with the Nazis has led to the justifiable question 
of a substantive connection between the philosopher’s earlier thought and later deed. After the 
war, both found themselves constrained by and resentful of the Allies’ denazification policies, 
although neither one publicly condemned the crimes committed by the Nazis. When granted the 
permission to teach again, Heidegger opened his first lecture by reciting several of Benn’s poems 
– a piece of news that the poet was delighted to receive and saw as a personal validation.413 In 
what follows, I would like to devote brief reflections to the figure of Heidegger, without, however, 
pretending to do justice to the uneasy question of the potential structural affinities between his 
thought and the Nazi ideology.414    
 Before 1933, Heidegger in Freiburg – just like Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg – had cultivated 
his own scholarly-philosophical legacy within the institutional walls of the university, an elite site 
of cultural preservation. Venerated by the Bildungsbürgertum, the professorial class at large 
considered itself to be the guardian of German high culture and Bildung against the pernicious 
effects of modern mass society.415 Conforming to the Bildungsbürgertum’s general interwar 
anxiety about Weimar Republic’s nascent processes of democratization, both Heidegger and 
Jaspers endeavored to preserve the cherished cultural heritage: a misguided subsumtion of 
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complex and multifaceted sociopolitical crises under an overarching cultural one.416 Abstracting 
themselves from the public sphere, Jaspers and Heidegger adhered to culturally conservative 
convictions, albeit in dissimilar ways and to varying degrees. In contrast to Heidegger, for instance, 
Jaspers’ conservative impulses led him neither to embrace völkisch views nor to collaborate with 
the Nazi regime. Heidegger, in his administrative position as rector and Führer417 of Freiburg 
University, participated in carrying out discriminatory policies and practices of 
Gleichschaltung,418 and the philosopher’s eventual resignation from the rectorate did not deter him 
in his support for the National Socialist movement, which he still expected to bring about a national 
rebirth in Germany.419 
 As Adam Knowles has recently demonstrated, the disposition of silence was particularly 
significant in Heidegger’s case: Beyond characterizing his personal attitude – but also 
sociopolitical stance – it also represented an important intellectual preoccupation for the 
philosopher.420 If Germanic folklore proved a fertile source of inspiration and respite for many 
adherents to the specifically völkisch brand of conservatism in Germany, Heidegger’s remedy 
against the evils and noises of modernity consisted in the Schillerian gesture of turning away from 
the spatiotemporal confines of the Weimar Republic and towards the supratemporal realm of the 
Greeks.421 Consonant with the Nazis’ own philhellenism, Heidegger’s version inspired his research 
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seminars in the 1930s422 – which, incidentally, were supplemented by a 1936-37 lecture on 
Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe. What Heidegger was specifically interested in recovering from the 
Greeks was the allegedly authentic, Greek form of philosophical questioning.423 This detour, he 
believed, would afford nothing less than a regeneration of the German essence – not unlike 
Friedrich Schiller’s own regenerative ambitions in Die Horen one and a half centuries earlier.  
 This ambitious turn to the Greeks found a vivid articulation in Heidegger’s infamous public 
address titled “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität,” which he delivered on May 27, 
1933 on the occasion of being inaugurated a month earlier as the new rector of Freiburg University. 
Similar to Benn’s enthused vision of mere intellectuals’ inadequacy to their extraordinary 
historical moment, Heidegger’s text calls for a decisive transformation of Wissenschaft from mere 
knowledge acquisition to an originary questioning. In an anaphorically incantatory manner, his 
text arrives at a kind of apotheosis of questioning, das Fragen:  
Das Fragen ist dann nicht mehr nur die überwindbare Vorstufe zur Antwort als dem 
Wissen, sondern das Fragen wird selbst die höchste Gestalt des Wissens. Das Fragen 
entfaltet dann seine eigenste Kraft der Aufschließung des Wesentlichen aller Dinge. Das 
Fragen zwingt dann zur äußersten Vereinfachung des Blickes auf das Unumgängliche.424 
 
We can only attain this kind of privileged philosophical questioning, Heidegger warns, “wenn wir 
uns wieder unter die Macht des Anfangs unseres geistig-geschichtlichen Daseins stellen. Dieser 
Anfang ist der Aufbruch der griechischen Philosophie.”425 Heidegger’s central question and 
ultimatum in this speech – “ob wir als geschichtlich-geistiges Volk uns selbst noch und wieder 
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wollen” – further highlights the fundamental historical-existential stakes of his invitation to return 
to the origins of (Greek) philosophy.426  
 In an article written in 1945 and titled “Das Rektorat 1933/1934. Tatsachen und 
Gedanken,” Heidegger neglected to reflect on the recent past by, for instance, critically assessing 
any specific instances of wrongdoing or flawed thinking on his part. Instead, the philosopher, too, 
appeared to succumb to the “irresistible stream of history,” gauging the world’s evils with 
planetary dimensions: “[...] die universale Herrschaft des Willens zur Macht innerhalb der 
planetarisch gesehenen Geschichte. In dieser Wirklichkeit steht heute Alles, mag es 
Kommunismus heißen oder Faschismus oder Weltdemokratie.”427 With the Bennian gesture of 
indifferently listing quite different political projects, Heidegger, similar to Benn, dismisses the 
public realm, unwilling to engage with it: “[...] weil [...] mir nicht daran liege, [...] meine Person 
ins öffentliche Gerede zu bringen.”428 Despite Heidegger’s attempts to exculpate himself, the 
French-Zone denazification commission found grounds to bar him from teaching and lecturing. 
Despite this ban, however, the philosopher was able to achieve a successful comeback on the 
postwar intellectual scene. Already in January 1950, one of the things Hannah Arendt was able to 
report from Germany to New York was that “In Deutschland ist wieder alles von Heidegger 
überschwemmt.”429  
 Heidegger’s philhellenic rhetoric – with some of its troubling overtones from 1933 – 
reemerged in an early postwar text: the lecture titled “Was ist das – die Philosophie?,” which 
 
426 Heidegger, GA, 16: 117. 
 
427 Heidegger, GA, 16: 375. 
 
428 Heidegger, GA, 16: 389. 
 






Heidegger delivered in 1955 at an eponymous conference (“Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?”) 
organized by Jean Beaufret, a philosophy instructor and Heidegger evangelist in France.430 The 
German philosopher’s lecture was paradigmatic on several levels. As a lecture – as opposed to a 
printed text – it carried a certain oracular weight. Its title alone – “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” 
– augured a heavy task: one of answering the question “what is” not just for any field but the 
eminent field of philosophy. The added significance stemmed from the location of the lecture: 
outside of Germany, on the territory of a former geopolitical adversary and one of the postwar 
occupation forces. In this manner, this border-crossing act by the recently rehabilitated philosopher 
would appear to carry unequivocal symbolic significance. Yet the reality of Heidegger’s mission 
to France was somewhat different. Organized in a highly scripted manner, the conference in Cerisy 
hardly allowed for a free-flowing conversation.431 The gathering was, in fact, quite monologic.432 
And if the context of the lecture appeared to call for critical retrospection – recognition, revision 
– its thematic content performed a retrospection of a somewhat different kind.  
 Announcing an inquiry into what philosophy is, Heidegger’s postwar address recalls his 
1933 rectorial speech, in which precisely “philosophy” figured prominently. Likewise, the title’s 
interrogative formulation pays homage to the rectorial address and its central aim of recovering 
the authentic manner of – philosophical – questioning. The deictic gesture inside the question – 
“Was ist das [...]?” – is quite intriguing indeed, potentially all-encompassing: What is (all of) this? 
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It is as though Heidegger, emerging from his imposed silence, begins to wonder at this, das, limited 
by no specific referent. Only after the awe-denoting dash does the object of Heidegger’s wonder 
emerge: “die Philosophie.”433 With this text, too, Heidegger promises access to philosophy as 
opposed to speech merely about it: “Aber das Ziel unserer Frage ist, in die Philosophie 
hineinzukommen, in ihr uns aufzuhalten, nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten, d.h. zu 
‘philosophieren.’”434 Throughout his address to his listeners, Heidegger alludes to the proper ways 
of hearing and attunement: We must, the philosopher warns, “unser Ohr öffnen, freimachen für 
das, was sich uns in der Überlieferung als Sein des Seienden zuspricht. Indem wir auf diesen 
Zuspruch hören, gelangen wir in die Entsprechung.”435 He begins by replacing the “abgebrauchten 
Titel” – “Philosophie” – with its properly heard counterpart: “φιλοσοφία,” a word we utter “wenn 
wir [...] das Wort ‘Philosophie’ aus seinem Ursprung hören.”436 Greek words spelled with Greek 
letters appear throughout Heidegger’s lecture as though to forestall any unfortunate leakage 
through their German spellings. The stakes of such proper transmission are high indeed:437 
Speaking to a French audience, Heidegger nonetheless assures them that “die φιλοσοφία bestimmt 
auch den innersten Grundzug unserer abendländisch-europäischen Geschichte”438 – as though the 
recent geopolitical cataclysm is merely a minor misunderstanding, an error in transmission as it 
 
433 To be sure, Heidegger debunks such superficial musings, letting us know at the end of his lecture that this intriguing 
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were. After trying out several answers to the titular question of his “Gespräch,” Heidegger cautions 
that, while useful, they will lead “niemals zu einer echten, d.h. legitimen Antwort auf die Frage: 
Was ist das – die Philosophie? Die Antwort kann nur eine philosophierende Antwort sein, eine 
Antwort, die als Ant-wort in sich philosophiert.”439 Having dutifully warned us that we are in need 
“einer höheren Sorgfalt” when “wir es wagen, ein Gespräch unter dem Titel ‘Was ist das – die 
Philosophie?’ zu beginnen,” Heidegger concludes this “Gespräch” by suggestively alluding to a 
kind of circle of the initiated, somewhat reminiscent of similar community-founding efforts in 
Schiller’s Ankündigung for Die Horen and in Goethe’s Baroness in the Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten: “Aber [unser Gespräch] möchte sich bemühen, alle, die daran teilnehmen, für 
eine Sammlung bereit zu machen, in der wir von dem angesprochen werden, was wir das Sein des 
Seienden nennen.”440  
 Heidegger’s 1955 lecture “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” was not a unique effort to think 
about philosophy in the early 1950s – a time when many erstwhile truths and authorities had to be 
fundamentally called into question. Around the same time, Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt 
produced their own reflections about “philosophy”: Jaspers – in his 1953 essay “Die Aufgabe der 
Philosophie in der Gegenwart”; Arendt – in her 1954 lecture “Philosophy and Politics.” Already 
the titles of their respective contributions point to the different paths taken by Heidegger, Jaspers, 
and Arendt. In the title of Jaspers’s essay, “philosophy” is surrounded by two not quite 
philosophical words: Aufgabe and Gegenwart. As the assignment of an extra-philosophical 
purpose and the spatiotemporal specification indicate, Jaspers is interested in philosophy’s 
significance and role in and for the present moment. Yet the philosopher universalizes this here 
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and now when he writes, “Philosophie ist überall, wo Menschen sich ihres Daseins denkend 
bewusst werden [...] Wo immer eine Welt ist [...] da ist Philosophie.”441 The figure of thinking, 
Denken, familiar from Jaspers’s aforementioned Geleitwort to the first issue of Die Wandlung, 
comes up here as well. Thus, if Heidegger demarcates the originary space of philosophy as a 
special realm to which we first need to acquire access, Jaspers renders philosophy into an 
omnipresent element inherent in everything there is. As the bipartite title of Arendt’s lecture 
announces, Arendt departs from Heidegger’s and Jaspers’s central concern with “philosophy,” 
confronting it, instead, with its other – “politics.” Her own meditation on philosophy leads Arendt 
to talk about the notion of plurality, marking an important break from the universalist conception 
of the human. In contrast to this notion of humanity as a universal concept, Arendt envisions the 
specifically human mode of life as a plurality of singular human beings acting together, “in 
concert.”442  
 
Sine Ira et Studio: Thinking Historically 
 
 In his reflections on the inextricable relationship between the intellectual and exilic modes 
of being, the cultural and literary theorist Edward Said identifies the affect of surprise as a privilege 
of the non-conforming intellectual:  
So while you are neither winning prizes nor being welcomed into all those self-
congratulating honor societies that routinely exclude embarrassing troublemakers who do 
not toe the party line, you are at the same time deriving some positive things from exile 
and marginality. / One of course is the pleasure of being surprised, of never taking anything 
for granted, of learning to make do in circumstances of shaky instability that would 
confound or terrify most people.443 
 
441 Jaspers, Philosophie und Welt. Reden und Aufsätze (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1958), 9. 
 
442 Hannah Arendt, “Freiheit und Politik,” in Die Welt verstehen. 35 Beiträge aus der Geschichte des Schweizerischen 
Instituts für Auslandforschung, ed. Martin Meyer (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2013), 449-461, here: 459. 
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Said then goes on to list a second advantage of the intellectual-exilic existence:  
A second advantage to what in effect is the exile standpoint for an intellectual is that you 
tend to see things not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way. Look at 
situations as contingent, not as inevitable, look at them as the result of a series of historical 
choices made by men and women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not as 
natural or god-given, therefore unchangeable, permanent, irreversible.444 
 
A similar sense for the irreducible contingency and plurality specific to the human condition – “a 
series of historical choices made by men and women” – profoundly informs Hannah Arendt’s 
thinking. For her, the practice of overshadowing reality with overarching historiographic 
constructs is a persistent concern. Significantly, however, Arendt’s diagnosis of flight from reality, 
thematized in her “Report from Germany,” is not limited to those directly and indirectly involved 
in perpetrating the atrocities of the Nazi regime. In her review of Denis de Rougemont’s 1941-
1942 novel Devil’s Share, Arendt discerns a similar flight from reality in the Belgian author’s 
attempt to explain – or explain away – the phenomenon of totalitarianism. Arendt faults de 
Rougemont’s account with “evading the responsibility of man for his deeds”445 through an “escape 
from reality into a cosmic flight”446 and search for the “deceptive security of those ‘keys to history’ 
which pretend to explain everything.”447 Even as she uncompromisingly exposes the decisive 
insufficiencies of de Rougemont’s novel, however, Arendt highlights its specific value as a 
“document humain.”448 Precisely in its insufficiency, she argues, it must be read and understood 
as a crucial testament to its time – a testament that documents the deficiency in understanding as 
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much at the core of contemporaneous atrocities as attempts to explain them. With this inflection, 
Arendt speaks not so much as a historiographer as, rather, a historian working in the archives. 
 Precisely this kind of flight from reality, too, is at the core of Benn’s 1933 vision of a 
history that speaks over human voices – “Wo die Geschichte spricht, haben die Personen zu 
schweigen.” This statement understands history as a process that resides above and beyond 
individual human beings. Definitionally silencing the latter, Benn glorifies “History” as a self-
revealing process governed by a teleology inaccessible to limited – human – understanding. 
Precisely this supra-human notion of history is anathema to Arendt’s thinking: “The historian, by 
gazing backward into the historical process, has been so accustomed to discovering an ‘objective’ 
meaning, independent of the aims and awareness of the actors, that he is liable to overlook what 
actually happened in his attempt to discern some objective trend.”449 Contrary to Benn who, in a 
stance of wise resignation, watches History unfold, Arendt insists on the human being’s capacity 
for new beginnings, which she sees as irreducibly connected to human freedom as an irreducibly 
political phenomenon.  
 The daily practice of forgetting, quotidian erasure of history, which Arendt highlights in 
her 1950 “Report from Germany” is consonant with the general importance of history and 
historiography for Arendt, a thinker with a “powerfully sensitive historical consciousness.”450 
Highlighting Arendt’s crucial Weimar influences, Liisi Keedus argues that her preoccupation with 
the question of history is not merely thematic but also methodological: It lies at the very core of 
Arendt’s early scholarly formation and thus understanding of how the world might be accessed 
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and made into an object of study in the first place.451 Trained in theology and philosophy at the 
universities of Marburg and Heidelberg, Arendt partook of the post-World War I transdisciplinary 
upheaval, which called into question the dominance, in the nineteenth century, of the approach 
later pejoratively labeled as “historicist.”452 Foregrounding an arguably myopic treatment of 
historical sources, this approach did not see modern scholarly conceptuality as qualitatively 
distinct from the assumptions underlying the experience of distant centuries, pretending to gain 
access to them without further ado.453  
 Arendt’s preoccupation with the past is neither a nostalgic impulse to retrieve a longed-for 
image or memory nor disinterested scientific consideration. It stems, rather, from an imperative to 
understand the inextricability of the past from the present. Describing the “simple and baffling” 
problem at stake in her Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt writes, “[...] all historiography is 
necessarily salvation and frequently justification; it is due to man’s fear that he may forget and to 
his striving for something which is even more than remembrance.”454 As Arendt sees her task, it 
is imperative to challenge “the tradition of sine ira et studio,” a tradition of dispassionate history-
writing.455 “The problem of style,” Arendt writes in the same article, “is a problem of adequacy 
and of response. If I write in the same ‘objective’ manner about the Elizabethan age and the 
twentieth century, it may well be that my dealing with both periods is inadequate because I have 
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renounced the human faculty to respond to either.”456 In Arendt’s view, historically informed 
thinking emerges not from a neutral historicist stance but rather from an agitated response to that 
which is being thought and written about – a response of impassioned anger cited in the formulaic 
prescription “sine ira et studio”: without anger and passion.457 Animating Arendt’s thinking about 
history, then, is the same problem that troubles her during her 1949-1950 trip to Germany: the 
ability and willingness to respond. 
 
Ambivalent Return: Arendt’s Lessing Prize Address 
 Anger, Zorn, as a Hamburg audience would find out on a Saturday morning in the fall of 
1959, was a distinctive affect in the case of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, a venerated exponent of 
this audience’s very own literary canon. The audience members would further find out that 
separating them from that Lessingian Zorn was something directly related to the construction of 
canons: a “Geschichtsbesessenheit und Ideologieverschworenheit,” particularly that of the 
nineteenth century but also one that concerned their own time: “gerade im politischen Denken 
unserer Zeit noch so wirksam, daß wir ein ganz und gar freies Denken, das sich weder der 
Geschichte noch des logischen Zwanges als Krücken bedient, für unverbindlich zu halten geneigt 
sind” (MfZ, 15).458 The audience would find out, too, that, unlike the reality-diminishing passions 
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(Leidenschaften) of hope (Hoffnung) and fear (Furcht), the passion of anger, Zorn, imparts reality 
and is bound up with the world: “Das gesteigerte Realitätsbewußtsein, das als solches Lust ist, 
entstammt einer leidenschaftlichen Weltoffenheit und Weltliebe, [...]” (MfZ, 12). Finally, the 
audience members would find out that this particular passion also exposes the world (“stellt die 
Welt bloß”) and thus directly implicates them, those comfortably sitting in the audience and 
finding all of these things out (MfZ, 12).  
 While Hannah Arendt did not address the German public during her first visit after the war, 
she would do so ten years later.459 On September 28, 1959, she delivered a speech titled “Von der 
Menschlichkeit in finsteren Zeiten,” on the occasion of being honored with the Lessing Prize “der 
Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg” – an honor first granted in 1930 to Friedrich Gundolf, Arendt’s 
former literature professor in Heidelberg and an early influence on her thinking.460 The occasional 
character of Arendt’s Hamburg address, which she would highlight retrospectively,461 as well as 
its complex situational context have been extensively explored in the more recent scholarship.462 
Certainly not blind to the unease of being summoned to receive an honor from a place which she 
had previously been judged unworthy of inhabiting –  “Wenn man sich so überlegt, wie es denn 
eigentlich um Ehrungen und Preise der Öffentlichkeit unter den gegenwärtigen Weltumständen 
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bestellt sei [...]” – Arendt was quite ambivalent about the prize and its implications (MfZ, 10).463 
Yet, in contrast to Gottfried Benn, who had vocally declined the word offered to him in 1948, 
Arendt chose not to retreat from the world, to which, she warned, our attitude or grasp (Haltung) 
was ever weaker: “Nichts, scheint mir, ist in unserer Zeit fragwürdiger geworden als unsere 
Haltung zur Welt, nichts weniger selbstverständlich als der Einklang mit der Öffentlichkeit, zu 
dem die Ehrung verpflichtet und den sie bestätigt” (MfZ, 8-9).464 Whereas in 1946 Arendt had 
envisioned coming back to Germany – her “Zurückkommen” through potential publications in Die 
Wandlung – only by first introducing herself as a Jew, she does not explicitly introduce herself in 
this way to her Hamburg audience in 1959, her references to her Jewish heritage conspicuously 
indirect.465  
 Notably, too, Arendt prefaced the substantive part of her address by pointing out that it was 
a free city466 that had decided to grant her the distinction of a literary prize, and that this free city 
had tied this prize to Lessing, another intellectual: “Die Auszeichnung, die eine freie Stadt verleiht, 
und ein Preis, der sich auf den Namen Lessings beruft, sind eine große Ehrung” (MfZ, 7). Made in 
passing, the enigmatic link between freedom and obligation contained here will prove to be a key 
thematic concern of Arendt’s speech: specifically, her emphasis on a political, relational space as 
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a necessary condition for freedom. As Ingeborg Nordmann proposes, Arendt’s aim in her Lessing 
address is nothing less than “Politik anders zu denken.”467 The aim, then, of this chapter’s 
concluding pages is to explore the way in which Arendt reflects on the question of politics in this 
address from 1959.  
 Arendt centers her reflections around Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, someone traditionally 
considered a church father of German letters468 – a venerable tradition that Friedrich Schlegel, only 
sixteen years after Lessing’s death, could identify as “ein blinder Glauben, eine gedankenlose 
Gewohnheit, welche bald heilige Überlieferung und endlich beinah unverbrüchliches Gesetz 
wird.”469 In the context of postwar Germany, Lessing was granted an even more pronounced 
symbolic significance. At this time of profound devastation, the treatment of the so-called classics 
as “cultural currency” allowed for a certain, albeit dubious, continuity via the intellectual 
tradition.470 Arendt, however, is interested in Lessing as the “Ahnherr und Meister aller Polemik 
in deutscher Sprache”: in Lessing who was “ein so durchaus politischer Mensch” (MfZ, 48, 54). 
Thus picking up the more peripheral, Schlegelian tradition of calling into question Lessing’s 
domestication through institutional veneration, Arendt examines what exactly Lessing’s famous 
polemical existence might have meant: “Denn Lessing hat den Einklang in die Welt und die 
Öffentlichkeit nie gefunden, wohl auch nie finden wollen, und hat sich doch auf seine Weise ihr 
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immer verpflichtet gefühlt” (MfZ, 10). Already at the outset of her prize acceptance speech, which 
by convention honors the intellectual in whose honor the accolade has been established, Arendt 
focuses on a question quite a bit broader: the question of the world.  
The laureate of the 1959 Lessing Prize does not deferentially retreat into the background 
in order to honor her canonized predecessor out of merely conventional respect. As Sonja Boos 
underscores, even as Arendt’s Lessing Prize address conspicuously skirts oratorical conventions 
of acceptance speeches, it simultaneously exceeds a narrowly theoretical reflection, subtly 
undermining the stifling sociopolitical premises of the postwar German public sphere.471 Arendt’s 
engagement with Lessing in this text is not merely theoretical also in the sense that she does not 
locate theses in Lessing’s writings that could serve as supporting evidence for the arguments she 
herself is putting forward. Just as Lessing, in Arendt’s eyes, was concerned not so much with 
absolute truths as with the situatedness of those truths in the world, Arendt’s aim, too, is not to 
present a scientifically objective account of Lessing’s thought but, rather, to explore its relation to 
its world. And Lessing, Arendt tells us, “hat die Welt im Zorn und im Lachen erfahren, und Zorn 
und Lachen sind ihrem Wesen nach parteiisch” (MfZ, 13). Instead of inquiring into the definitional 
attributes or responsibilities of the intellectual as a type or envisioning intellectuality as privately 
held knowledge, Arendt is concerned with it as a mode of being in the world.  
Accordingly, Arendt approaches her Hamburg audience by dwelling on the nature of the 
occasion at hand – the moment of bestowing or receiving an honor (Ehrung). For Arendt, the prize 
and the honor are no merely external trappings of recognition that would provide an opportunity 
for her to enrich the intellectual canon with a set of remarks about the world as a kind of intellectual 
 






enrichment. Not so much a merely supplemental acknowledgement of an individual’s 
achievements in the world of letters, the act of honoring is, for Arendt, disclosive of the world:  
In der Ehrung meldet sich die Welt zu Wort, und wenn wir sie annehmen und für sie 
danken, so können wir es nur ohne alle Selbstreflexion im Rahmen unserer Haltung zur 
Welt, zu einer Welt und Öffentlichkeit nämlich, welcher wir den Raum verdanken, in den 
wir sprechen und in dem wir gehört werden. (MfZ, 8) 
 
As this formulation suggests, Arendt sees herself being addressed by, and therefore responding to, 
the world. There is something inextricably linguistic in this moment of honoring: Proposing that 
it be given the word (“meldet sich [...] zu Wort”), the world is that to which we owe the space into 
which we speak (“in den wir sprechen”). It should be noted that Arendt articulates the relation of 
the speakers to their world in the accusative case, as opposed to a perhaps more intuitive dative 
formulation (*“in dem wir sprechen”). With this distinctive syntactic choice, the honoree 
emphasizes the directionality of the speakers’ speech, illuminating a vital link between this speech 
and the world that cannot be secured in place, made into a static infrastructure. Not so much a 
space that would contain speakers and their conversations – perhaps a space of sociability, 
Geselligkeit – the world is constituted through these conversations in the first place. At stake for 
Arendt is relatability and addressability, and not just those who address or are addressed. Indeed, 
the accusative case stresses the precarity of the common space – the in-between, das Zwischen – 
that Arendt highlights as the object of widespread concern (Sorge): “Aber die Welt und die 
Menschen, die sie bewohnen, sind nicht dasselbe. Die Welt liegt zwischen den Menschen, und 
dies Zwischen – viel mehr als, wie man häufig meint, die Menschen oder gar der Mensch – ist 
heute Gegenstand der größten Sorge und der offenbarsten Erschütterung in nahezu allen Ländern 
der Erde” (MfZ, 9). For Arendt, a qualitative change takes place between a single human being and 
a space that could be called “public.” By de-coupling the world (Welt) from the individual human 





between is the primary character of the world – as opposed to a merely secondary phenomenon 
that would materialize additively only after one human being would occupy a spot next to another. 
Because, for Arendt, the human being qua political being is irreducibly plural, the Zwischen is 
coeval with the specifically human existence in the first place. It might strike one as quite bizarre 
that, in diagnosing the key affliction of her time, Arendt shows such apparent disregard precisely 
for the individual – or, for that matter, for numerous individuals – and pivots, instead, to a 
discussion of that which is not even visible, cannot be inserted into a frame, memorialized, 
commemorated: the in-between space, nameless and inorganic. Instead of being used as a secure 
prop of tradition withstanding accidental historical turbulences, Lessing emerges in Arendt’s 
address to her Hamburg audience as a figure of destabilization. 
Even as Arendt insists on Lessing’s commitment and boundedness to the world, she 
highlights his characteristic affinity for criticism (Kritik) and thus, presumably, a certain distance 
from the world.472 Radically critical is how Arendt characterizes Lessing’s attitude to the world, 
differentiating it from a simple binary of approval or disapproval: “Seine Haltung zur Welt war 
weder positiv noch negativ, sondern radikal kritisch und, was die Öffentlichkeit anlangte, durchaus 
revolutionär; aber sie blieb der Welt verpflichtet, verließ ihren Boden niemals und übersteigerte 
nichts in die Schwärmerei einer Utopie” (MfZ, 11). For Arendt, Lessing’s attitude of specifically 
radical critique is, counterintuitively, not one of rejecting the world but rather one of remaining 
committed to it:   
Kritik im Sinne Lessings ist diese Gesinnung, die immer Partei ergreift im Interesse der 
Welt, ein jegliches von seiner jeweiligen weltlichen Position her begreift und beurteilt und 
so niemals zu einer Weltanschauung werden kann, die von weiteren Erfahrungen in der 
Welt unabhängig bleibt, weil sie sich auf eine mögliche Perspektive festgelegt hat. (MfZ, 
14-15) 
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In this light, if a certain rootedness is at the core of Lessing’s critique of, and holding onto (Haltung 
zur), the world and to its ground (Boden), then it is precisely not a tribal one but rather a 
fundamentally ambivalent stance: one that, taking sides with the world, does not take sides with 
any one particular attribute of, or object in, the world. Lessing’s critique, as Arendt sees it, is an 
essentially dynamic practice insofar as it can never congeal into a result or a state. Rather than an 
overarching worldview or observation of the world (Weltanschauung), this Lessingian critique is 
an act of taking sides with the world (Parteinahme für die Welt): with the world as the very 
condition of possibility of relating in the first place. As a critic, one is no neutral observer of the 
world (Welt-Anschauer as it were) but is rather inextricably bound up with it. In highlighting this 
peculiar and dynamic attitude of partisanship in her portrait of Lessing, Arendt distinguishes him 
from Schiller’s postulate of neutrality, non-engagement with, and non-partisanship for, the world 
at hand in his program for Die Horen.   
 For, having paid tribute to Lessing and his relation to the world, Arendt proceeds to talk 
precisely about the “finstere Zeiten” mentioned in the title of her speech – a subject matter akin to 
the “allverfolgenden Dämon der Staatskritik” which Friedrich Schiller had insisted on banning 
from his projected intellectual community a century and a half earlier, one and a half decades after 
Lessing’s death.473 More precisely, Arendt proceeds to talk about the implications of not talking 
about this previously banned but “allverfolgende” subject matter, thereby indirectly reflecting on 
what a project such as Schiller’s in Die Horen would mean not simply for philosophy or even for 
the to-be-aesthetically-educated human being but, much more crucially, for the world:  
In der Geschichte sind die Zeiten, in denen der Raum der Öffentlichkeit sich verdunkelt 
und der Bestand der Welt so fragwürdig wird, daß die Menschen von der Politik nicht mehr 
verlangen, als daß sie auf ihre Lebensinteressen und Privatfreiheit die gehörige Rücksicht 
nehme, nicht selten. Man kann sie mit einigem Recht ‘finstere Zeiten’ (Brecht) nennen. 
 





Denjenigen, die in solchen Zeiten leben und von ihnen erzogen worden sind, hat es wohl 
immer nahe gelegen, die Welt und ihre Öffentlichkeit gering zu achten, sie so weit als 
möglich zu ignorieren, oder auch sie zu überspringen und gleichsam hinter sie zu greifen 
– als wäre die Welt nur eine Fassade, hinter der sich Menschen verbergen –, um sich dann 
mit Menschen ungeachtet der Welt, die zwischen ihnen liegt, zu verständigen. (MfZ, 21-
22)  
Speaking of “die Zeiten” “in der Geschichte” in the plural and thus suggesting their ubiquity 
throughout the historical existence of the humankind, Arendt proceeds to suggest that episodes of 
inner emigration – “ein eigentümlich zweideutiges Phänomen” – were not limited to the twelve 
years of Nazi Germany (MfZ, 34). In fact, Arendt discerns in the present moment and place – in 
the moment, that is, in which her speech is taking place – a similarly troubling retreat from the 
world: through an effort to erase the recent past from memory, an effort “‘Vergangenheit zu 
bewältigen’” – a phrase Arendt puts in scare quotes, criticizing it as an utterly inadequate attitude 
to the past (MfZ, 34). In this manner, the question that preoccupied Arendt in her “Report from 
Germany” in 1949-1950 – the question of silence and non-response – resurfaces in her address to 
the German public ten years later. In her Lessing Prize speech, too, Arendt insists on speaking 
(“Gespräch” or “Sprechen”) “weil dies Gespräch [...] der gemeinsamen Welt gilt, die in einem 
ganz präzisen Sinne unmenschlich bleibt, wenn sie nicht dauernd von Menschen besprochen wird” 
(MfZ, 43). Without this indispensable practice, the world – the space between individual human 
beings – is endangered. Endangered with it is the possibility of human action “in concert” and 
ultimately freedom, which, for Arendt, is crucially neither a “Mitgift der menschlichen Natur” nor 
“innere Freiheit”: both of them legacies of the philosophically conceived concept, or capture, of 
freedom.474 Neither a property of an individual human subject nor a feature of the universal concept 
of humanity,475 freedom, for Arendt is “eine weltliche Realität” that, as such, is profoundly 
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precarious and dependent for its preservation on human beings acting in concert and speaking 
about the world: “Frei sein können Menschen nur in Bezug aufeinander, also nur im Bereich des 
Politischen und des Handelns.”476 Against the tradition of expelling politics from theorizations of 
the political as it pertains to human beings’ existence and coexistence, Arendt thinks politics as an 




























Poetic Address: Osip Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor” (1913) and Paul Celan’s “Die 




                                             An intellectual is like a shipwrecked person  
                                             who learns how to live in a certain sense    
                                           with the land, not on it, not like Robinson  
Crusoe whose goal is to colonize his  
little island, but more like Marco Polo, whose 
    sense of the marvelous never fails him, and  
who is always a traveler, a provisional guest,  
not a freeloader, conqueror, or raider. 
 
– Edward Said, “Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals”477  
 
 
 Paul Celan may not have objected to being called a poet in the same way that Hannah 
Arendt protested against being called a political philosopher. Yet, like Arendt, Celan did object to 
certain traditional conceptions of the poetic vocation. Calling into question the concept of poetry 
understood as expression or edification, Celan similarly did not accept the notion of a poet as a 
self-contained lyric I in full mastery of, and therefore essentially indifferent to, its surroundings. 
In a similar way, Arendt’s objection to being counted among political philosophers was directed 
at this profession’s underlying conception of the human being as a sovereign entity that is at its 
best and most essential when left within its own internal borders. For Arendt and Celan, openness 
to something outside of oneself was an irreducible characteristic of being human tout court. It was 
thus also a precondition for their respective engagements with the world: whether through political 
theory or poetry, a question of politics or a question of poetics. In this manner, then, Celan’s and 
Arendt’s objections to traditional conceptions of their respective vocations were no narrowly 
 






professional considerations. Rather, these objections gave voice to a profound concern with the 
human being’s relation to the world.  
 
Part I: Osip Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor” 
Das Gedicht kann, da es ja eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache und damit seinem Wesen 
nach dialogisch ist, eine Flaschenpost sein, aufgegeben in dem – gewiß nicht immer 
hoffnungsstarken – Glauben, sie könnte irgendwo und irgendwann an Land gespült 
werden, an Herzland vielleicht. Gedichte sind auch in dieser Weise unterwegs: sie halten 
auf etwas zu.478 
 
With these words, Paul Celan reflects on a poem’s precarious capacity for conveying – qua 
Flaschenpost (message in a bottle) – although he promptly qualifies the transitive implication of 
this act with the more intransitive notion of “sailing towards something” (“auf etwas zuhalten”). 
The origin of Celan’s reflection on poems’ peculiar metaphoricity479 is often located in Osip 
Mandelstam’s first published essay, “O sobesednike” (“О собеседнике,” 1913).480 Centered 
around the figure of the interlocutor (alternatively: conversation partner, collocutor)481 as 
 
478 Paul Celan, Gesammelte Werke in fünf Bänden, 5 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 3:186. 
 
479 Metaphors are not an unproblematic concept for Celan; indeed, he calls their commonly undisputed centrality to 
lyric poetry into question. In the preparatory notes for his “Meridian” address, Celan writes, for instance, “[...] wer 
das Gedicht aufsucht, um nach Metaphern zu schnüffeln, wird immer nur – Metaphern finden” (Celan, Der Meridian. 
Endfassung. Vorstufen, 157). 
 
480 See Martine Broda, “‘An Niemand gerichtet.’ Celan als Leser von Mandelstamms Gegenüber,” in Paul Celan, eds. 
W. Hamacher and W. Menninghaus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 209-221; Natascha Timoschkowa, Ein 
Mandeltraum: übersetzungskritische Untersuchungen zur Rolle Ossip Mandelstamms im dichterischen Gesamtwerk 
Paul Celans (Berlin: Frank & Timme, Verlag für Wissenschaftliche Literatur, 2015), 77. 
 
481 Consisting of the prefix so- (with) and the root besed – *bez (outside) and *sedeti (to sit) – the Russian word 
sobesednik suggests a participant in a beseda (conversation, discussion). In the English-language translations of 
Mandelstam’s essay, sobesednik has been rendered as “addressee” (Jane Garry Harris), “interlocutor” (Sidney Monas), 
and “conversation partner” (Anna Glazova). “Addressee” is not quite fitting because Mandelstam also uses the Russian 
equivalent of this word (adresat) in addition to the term sobesednik. Glazova prefers “conversation partner” to 
“interlocutor” because of the latter’s added meaning related to minstrel performances (Anna Glazova, Counter-
Quotation: The Defiance of Poetic Tradition in Paul Celan and Osip Mandelstam, 2008, Northwestern U, PhD 
Dissertation, 120, note 130). To avoid the latter connotation, one might consider the rarely used word “collocutor.” 
Since “conversation partner” foregrounds the notion of partnership and thus of partition or distribution, which may 





constitutive for lyric poetry, Mandelstam’s essay envisions the poem as a message in a bottle 
thrown overboard in the moment of shipwreck and marked with no specific addressee. As Barbara 
Wiedemann has shown, however, this early text by Mandelstam may have actually been read by 
Celan only as late as June 1961482 and thus after his composition of the Bremen prize acceptance 
address (January 1958), in which the metaphor of the Flaschenpost quoted above appears.483 Even 
if no genetic link can be identified between the two poets’ crucial use of this metaphor, it does 
point to a remarkable affinity between their respective visions of poetry. In what follows, I would 
like to take a closer look at Mandelstam’s early text in preparation for a subsequent consideration 
of Celan’s radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms.”484 By examining more closely 
Mandelstam’s theory of the poetic interlocutor, I hope to offer a helpful qualification of the parallel 
frequently drawn between Mandelstam’s and Celan’s arguably dialogical poetics.485 All too 
readily, the attribute “dialogical” suggests two conversation partners – poet and reader – who 
happen to coalesce in the moment of poetic reception, which is not quite what Mandelstam presents 
in his essay.  
The main thesis of “About an Interlocutor” is that poetic language is never confined to its 
moment of articulation but, rather, always comes into being with a view to a space beyond itself, 
 
482 Barbara Wiedemann, “Eine Flaschenpost auf Atemwegen: Paul Celans zweite Begegnung mit Ossip 
Mandelstamm,” Sprachkunst: Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft 36 (2005): 69-97, esp. 72-73. 
 
483 Ibid.,75. As Wiedemann demonstrates, Celan’s notes from December 1957 – contemporaneous with the news of 
the Bremen Prize committee’s decision – point to the literary scholar Hans Mayer’s colloquium in Wuppertal, in which 
Celan participated and in which Mayer formulated the metaphor of “Flaschenpost” in relation to Goethe’s 1829 poem 
“Vermächtnis” (Wiedemann, 73, note 18).   
 
484 The germanified spelling Mandelstamm was preferred by Celan because of its illumination of the name’s link to 
“Mandelbaum,” a significant word for Celan (see Wiedemann, 69, note 1). I will use the common English spelling 
“Mandelstam,” but the more phonetically accurate transliteration from the Russian "Мандельштам" should probably 
be “Mandel’shtam.” 
 
485 For a critical problematization of the role of dialogue in Celan’s poetics and its departure from Buber’s concept of 





namely, a future, albeit unspecified, addressee. Through the aforementioned epistolary metaphor 
to be discussed at a later point in this chapter, Mandelstam formulates the pivotal analogy of his 
essay’s poetic theory: “Like the poem, the letter,” he writes “isn’t addressed to anyone in particular. 
Nevertheless, both have an addressee: the letter’s is the person who will accidentally notice the 
bottle in the sand; the poem’s is a ‘reader in posterity.’”486 Having previously used synonymous 
terms such as “addressee” and “listener,” Mandelstam uses the titular term sobesednik 
(“interlocutor”) for the first time only toward the middle of the essay: “Rejection of an 
‘interlocutor’ [sobesednik] passes like a red thread through all of Balmont’s487 poetry and greatly 
diminishes its value. In his poems, Balmont is always slighting somebody, looking down his nose 
at him, contemptuously. This ‘somebody’ is the secret interlocutor” (OS, 60). Twice in this crucial 
sentence Mandelstam uses tentative scare quotes in referring to the elusive figure he has announced 
in his essay’s title. Given that the source of lyric poetry has traditionally come to be located in the 
lyric “I,”488 it is especially notable that the young Mandelstam’s theory of poetry turns instead 
towards something like a lyric “you.” Why was it important for the poet to invite this 







486 Osip Mandelstam, Selected Essays, trans. Sidney Monas (Austin: University of Texas Pres, 1977), 60. I will cite 
this translation of Mandelstam’s essay in the body of the chapter as OS followed by the page number.  
 
487 Poet Konstantin Balmont (1867-1942) belonged to the poetic school of Symbolism. 
  
488 The German-Jewish critic, poet, and philosopher Margarete Susman is considered to have coined the term 
“lyrisches Ich” in her 1910 study Das Wesen der modernen deutschen Lyrik. In his overview of the various conceptions 
of the “lyric I,” Matías Martínez,calls this assumption into question: Matías Martínez, “Das lyrische Ich. Verteidigung 
eines umstrittenen Begriffs,” in: Autorschaft: Positionen und Revisionen, ed. Heinrich Detering (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
2002), 376–389, esp. 379-380. On the increasing association of lyric poetry with the subject in the course of the 







Mandelstam opens his five-section essay with a polemic against the poetic school of 
Symbolism, accusing the Symbolists of an unwillingness to confront a crucial question: “To whom 
does the poet speak? It’s a disturbing question, and very contemporary, because to this very day 
the Symbolists have avoided posing it sharply” (OS, 58). This, in Mandelstam’s eyes, is no small 
transgression, for he regards this question to be inherent in any act of speech:  
Symbolism completely neglected the, as it were, contractual relationship, the mutuality that 
accompanies an act of speech. (I speak, and that means that I am listened to, and not for 
nothing, not out of kindness, but because there is an obligation). The Symbolist poets 
turned their attention exclusively to acoustics. (OS, 58-59) 
 
The young Mandelstam admired, was influenced by, and later distanced himself from the leading 
figure of Russian Symbolism Viacheslav Ivanov.489 The latter’s 1904 essay  “Poet i chern’” (“The 
Poet and the Mob”) – a reflection on the poet’s antagonistic relationship to the world – is one of 
the points of departure for Mandelstam’s “About an Interlocutor.”490 Both Ivanov and Mandelstam 
turn to the Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin’s provocative poem “Poet i tolpa” (“The Poet and the 
Crowd,” 1828), but with starkly different conclusions. Reading Pushkin’s depiction of the 
antagonism between the poet and the crowd as a diagnosis of an epochal schism,491 Ivanov 
ultimately sees a path toward the two poles’ reconciliation: a path that lies through the 
“mythopoetic” realm of “genuine symbols.” Articulating his Symbolist program, Ivanov explicates 
such symbols – “limitless in their meaning” – as those that “utter in [their] innermost (hieratic and 
magic) language of hint and suggestion something unverbalizable, inadequate to the external 
 
489 On Mandelstam’s ambivalence towards Ivanov, see Yelena Glukhova, Oleg Lekmanov, “Osip Mandel’shtam i 
Vyacheslav Ivanov,” Viacheslav Ivanov i kul’tura serebriannogo veka, (St. Petersburg 2006) 173-179.  
 
490 Osip Mandelstam, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem v trekh tomakh, 3 vols., eds. A. Mets, and V.V. Ivanov, 
(Moscow: Progress-Pleiada, 2009), 2:476. 
  
491 Viacheslav Ivanov, “Poet i chern’,” Sobranie sochinenii, 4 vols, eds. D.V. Ivanov and O. Deschartes (Brussels: 






word.”492 As I will discuss below, no such reconciliation appears possible to Mandelstam, who 
deciphers a somewhat different diagnosis in Pushkin’s poem: the poet’s irreducible rejection of 
precisely a friendly, receptive crowd. 
Decoupling poetry from any transcendent authority, Mandelstam insists on its terrestrial 
orientation. With his critique of Symbolism, he fits in the turn-of-the-century Russian literary 
landscape, which saw this hitherto dominant poetic school being supplanted by so-called 
“Acmeism.”493 First formulated by the poet Nikolaj Gumilyov in 1912 (“Letter on Russian 
Poetry”),494 the term “Acmeism” contains the Greek word akme (“peak,” “summit”) and, although 
difficult to define, broadly calls for a concrete, thing-oriented495 poetry that, in lieu of otherworldly 
symbolism, would focus on the here and now.496 In addition to Mandelstam, this new poetic trend 
counted among its several practitioners such poets as Nikolai Gumilyov and Anna Akhmatova. 
Although the twenty-one-year-old Mandelstam may have missed the March 1912 meeting at which 
“Acmeism” was officially hatched,497 the transition attempted by this new poetic stance acutely 
preoccupied the young poet. He made two programmatic attempts to articulate the specifically 
Acmeist vision of poetry: the 1913 essay “O sobesednike”498 as well as the essay “Utro 
 
492 Ibid., 2:712, 713 (my translation).  
493 On the complicated relationship between Russian Symbolism and Acmeism, see Jane Garry Harris, Osip 
Mandelstam (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1988), 13-30. 
 
494 Ibid., 19. 
 
495 On Acmeism’s Dinglichkeit, see Annette Wegberger, Postsymbolistisches Schreiben. Studien zur Poetik des 
Akmeismus und Osip Mandel’stams (Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2005), 67. 
 
496 For an overview of Acmeism’s self-understanding, see Harris, Osip Mandelstam, 18-23. 
 
497 Nikita Struve, Osip Mandelshtam (London: Overseas Publication Ltd, 1990), 14.  
 






Akmeizma” [“The Morning of Acmeism,” written in 1913 but not published until 1919].499 To be 
sure, Mandelstam was not alone in his preoccupation with the question of communication 
(obshcheniye)500 in poetry. Fellow Acmeist Nikolai Gumilyov likewise explored this question in 
an essay laconically titled “Tchitatel’” (“The Reader”). A brief sketch of Gumilyov’s theory of the 
reader will offer a glimpse into a conception of poetry that, while contemporary with and 
seemingly akin to Mandelstam’s own, is nonetheless much less radical.  
Composed around 1919-1920 and published posthumously, the essay “Tchitatel’” was 
likely conceived as a preface to a comprehensive theory of poetry, which Gumilyov planned to 
title “Theory of Integrated Poetics.”501 Examining the relationship between the poet and the reader, 
the essay adopts a generic-taxonomic approach intimated in the title of another essay by Gumilyov, 
titled “Anatomy of a Poem.” Ultimately, this inquiry into the nature of the reader is meant to shed 
light on the concept of poetry, the central object of the poet’s interest. The gesture of 
hierarchization structures much of the essay’s argument. Thus, Gumilyov prefaces his discussion 
of the reader by distinguishing between poetry and prose. Conceding that it may be impossible to 
spot an uncontaminated case of either, the poet nonetheless diligently lists the main marks of 
distinction between the two: typography, phonetics, composition, and choice of images. 
Furthermore, having from the essay’s very first line defined poetry as a medium of expression for 
 
499 This essay was rejected as a manifesto for the new poetic approach by the more senior Acmeists Gumilyov and 
Gorodetsky, both of whom published their own manifestos instead. In his essay titled “The Legacy of Symbolism and 
Acmeism,” Gumilyov criticizes symbolism for too fervently trying to approach the unknown and presents Acmeism 
as a kind of poetic common sense, which sees all phenomena as equal qua phenomena. For his part, Mandelstam goes 
further, arguing that poems contain not simply reality but highly concentrated reality. On the generic peculiarities of 
these Acmeist manifestos, see Wegberger, Postsymbolistisches Schreiben, 62f.  
 
500 The partially preserved typescript of Mandelstam’s essay bears the title “On the ‘moment of communication’ in 
artistic creation” (see Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 2:476). Similar to the English term “communication,” the Russian 
obshcheniye stems from the adjective “obshchij” (“common”) and contains the particle “ob” (around). 
 






the human being’s personality,502 Gumilyov glorifies the uniqueness of the authentically poetic 
consciousness, locating its essence in the sense of knowing something hitherto unknown and being 
overcome by a “catastrophic” need to say it.503 In his implicitly poetocratic vision,504 Gumilyov 
imagines the poet as someone who, rising above his contemporaries, is in a position to enlighten. 
Positing that “the poet always addresses someone, some listener,” Gumilyov proceeds to identify 
a number of such possible addressees: “Sometimes it is a sort of mystical interlocutor, a friend or 
beloved not yet appeared, sometimes it is God, Nature, the People ...”.505 The poet-taxonomist then 
goes on to identify and criticize the most common types of readers – “naive,” “snobbish,” and 
“ecstatic” – in order to, finally, uncover the rare readerly type:  the “reader-friend.”506 
Exceptionally empathetic, this ideal reader vicariously lives through the moment of poetic 
creation: “A beautiful poem enters his [the reader’s] consciousness as an immutable fact, changes 
him [the reader], determines his feelings and actions.”507 The relationship diagnosed by Gumilyov 
between the poet and his reader-friend is peculiarly symbiotic. On the one hand, while recognizing 
the ideal imagined reader as the necessary condition for poetry’s ability to “fulfill its task of 
ennobling the human race,” Gumilyov nonetheless subordinates this imagined reader to the poet 
who, after all, is “marked by God’s favor.”508 At the same time, however, Gumilyov endows the 
 
502 From its opening sentence, Gumilyov’s essay offers an anthropocentric view of poetry: “Poetry for man is one of 
the methods of expressing his personality and manifests itself by means of the word, the sole instrument that satisfies 
its [the personality’s] requirements”: Nikolai Gumilyov, “The Reader,’” in On Russian Poetry, trans. David Lapeza 
(Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1977), 25. 
 
503 Ibid, 25.  
 













reader with the right to place demands on the poet: “What the reader has a right to and, therefore, 
ought to demand of the poet will be the subject of this book.” 509 As I will show below, precisely 
this kind of reciprocal interaction between the poet and the reader would be significantly 
inadequate for Mandelstam’s vision of poetry. In contrast to Gumilyov’s conception of poetic 
reception as confluence and identification, Mandelstam’s is dissociative and defamiliarizing. 
 
Addressing with Poems  
 
Structured around the prefix so-, which, akin to the Latin con-, means “with,” the Russian 
word sobesednik is indicative of a certain simultaneity. Likewise, this word’s English rendering as 
“interlocutor” implies the simultaneity of a back-and-forth in real time between two speaking 
subjects situated one across from the other. Despite this appearance of conversationality, the figure 
of the interlocutor in Mandelstam’s essay “O sobesednike” proves to be quite unfamiliar upon a 
closer look. To be sure, Mandelstam’s poetological essay is already notable in its disregard for the 
expected question of genre – namely, “What is poetry?”. However, equally noteworthy is the 
essay’s decision to bypass such a generic approach with respect to its titular figure of the 
interlocutor – in direct contrast, for instance, to Gumilyov’s tactic. Mandelstam’s essay offers 
nothing like a profile of this coveted figure, information that would be useful for poets and readers 
alike: poets would finally be able to locate an appreciative audience for their poems, while readers 
would learn the proper manner of inheriting the fruits of poets’ divinely inspired labor.  
The poetic interlocutor envisioned by Mandelstam proves to be elusive of definition, 
unknowable and unlocatable in advance. “We don’t know,” writes the young poet, “we never know 
where such listeners might turn up...” (OS, 58). That is, at the moment of the poem’s emergence, 
 
 





nothing can be known about its potential recipient, and not much of a generally applicable theory 
can be formulated on this subject. By using the indefinite article to render its non-existent 
counterpart in Russian, Sidney Monas’s translation of the essay’s title – “About an Interlocutor” 
– is able to convey the indeterminable nature of this recipient of poems – or, more precisely, a 
recipient of a poem.  
While poetry, for Mandelstam, is not the only kind of language that reaches out to someone 
else, it does so differently from other forms of speech. Thus, having posited that a familiar 
interlocutor can only inspire one to say something familiar, Mandelstam distinguishes poetry from 
what he calls “literature” (literatura): “The difference between literature and poetry is the 
following: the litterateur always addresses a concrete listener, a living representative of the epoch. 
Even if he prophesies, he has in view a contemporary of a future time” (OS, 61). The specific 
manner in which Mandelstam articulates this distinction is worth a closer look. Differently from 
Gumilyov’s distinction between “poetry” and “prose,”510  Mandelstam does not refer to any 
essential features – e.g., meter, theme, form – based on which one could learn to distinguish 
“poetry” from mere “literature.” For Mandelstam, this distinction is not based on either “poetry’s” 
or “literature’s” generic essence. Rather, by invoking the figure of the interlocutor, Mandelstam 
highlights the irreducibly relational aspect. His only requirement is that this relation be marked by 
non-predictability from the poet’s point of view. When Mandelstam distinguishes poetry from 
literature as a podium-capable medium, he thereby disables poetry from constituting or 
constructing a simultaneous audience. It is important that the structure of address which 
 
510 Cf. Jane Garry Harris’s rendering of Mandelstam’s literatura as “prose”: “The difference between prose and poetry 
may be defined as follows. The prose writer always addresses himself to a concrete audience, to the dynamic 
representatives of his age. [...] The poet is bound only to his providential addressee” (Osip Mandelstam, The Complete 






Mandelstam sees inscribed in every poem as poem is tied to a singular addressee, not a collectively 
plural one. It prevents poetry from organizing a community of readers enchanted by a singular 
voice and made into a community through that shared unidirectional enchantment in the first 
place.511  
For Mandelstam, the main characteristic of “literature” consists in its didactic potential and 
therefore rootedness in the time contemporary to, or subsequent from, it:  
What the litterateur has to say, he pours out to his contemporaries on the basis of the 
physical law of unequal levels. Consequently, the litterateur is obliged to be “above,” 
“better” than society. Instruction is the central nerve of literature. For this reason, the 
litterateur has to have a pedestal. Poetry is another matter. The poet is bound only to his 
providential interlocutor. He’s not obliged to be above his epoch or better than his society. 
(OS, 61-62) 
 
The litterateur’s function is to enlighten. The relationship between this practitioner of literature 
and his or her audience is based on a framework of progress: as the audience becomes increasingly 
filled with light, the point at which the litterateur’s instruction is no longer necessary is approached 
– presumably, an anticipated endpoint society should strive for. The underlying temporality is 
teleologically determined, bound towards the endpoint of societal progress. Literature, in this 
sense, is envisioned by Mandelstam as a function of the social infrastructure, assigned a purely 
instrumental function of humankind’s enlightenment. In distinguishing “poetry” from “literature,” 
Mandelstam rejects the latter’s infrastructure of predictability and manageability. What one can 
further observe from this passage is that, in contrast to his determination of “literature,” 
Mandelstam’s corresponding determination of “poetry” is articulated in a largely negative manner. 
“Poetry,” Mandelstam claims, “is another matter.” Indeed, while positive formulations of 
literatura (“literature”) abound in the short essay, one is hard-pressed to locate an equally positive 
 
511 On the notion of a “stimm-zentrierten Hörgemeinschaft” and the central role it played in the Nazi techniques of 
social consolidation, see Cornelia Epping-Jäger, “Stimmräume. Die phonozentrische Organisation der Macht im NS,” 





formulation of what poeziya (“poetry”) might look like – based on what definitional criteria, that 
is, one might identify an instantiation of it in the real world. In the poet’s view, it cannot be 
integrated into, or subsumed under, a pre-given framework. Likewise, impossible to calculate in 
advance or account for post factum, poetry cannot become a foundation for something else.  
 One should not overlook the surprising character of this non-instrumental conception of 
poetry, for, surely, many a poem has indeed been written for such and such socially prescribed 
purpose; and, certainly, it has, on countless occasions, been demanded of poets that they comply 
with priorities prescribed to them by higher authorities. To be sure, Mandelstam acknowledges as 
much, commenting on the aforementioned poem by Pushkin, “The Poet and the Crowd”:  
The people of whom this rabble is concretely composed, the “philistines of society,” would 
permit him [the poet] “to give them bold lessons,” and would in general be ready to hear 
out almost anything, so long as the poet’s message had the precise address: “such-and-such 
rabble.” [...] There have been whole epochs when the charm and essence of poetry was 
brought as a sacrifice to this far from harmless demand. (OS, 62) 
 
Admittedly, the distinction between “literature” and “poetry” has a long and complex history, and 
Mandelstam’s deployment of it is no isolated occurrence at the time.512 His rejection of an 
instrumentally conceived “literature” as the opposite of “poetry” can be likened to many similar 
attempts in the history of poetics to stake out a space for a literary or poetic language that would 
not derive its legitimacy from its socially utilitarian value. Two such attempts have been discussed 
in the preceding chapters: Friedrich Schiller’s and Gottfried Benn’s respective searches for an 
autonomous poetics. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent Mandelstam’s early poetics in 
fact calls for an autonomy of poetry. Contrary to Benn’s location of poetry’s origins in the pre-
 
512 On the Ancient Roman understanding of “literature” as a state of literacy, which would begin to shift in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, see Giovanni Gullace “‘Poetry’ and ‘Literature’ in Croce's La Poesia,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19.4 (Summer 1961): 453-461, esp. 459. On the distinction between “Dichtung” and 
“Literatur” in the contemporaneous German context, see Lepenies, Die Drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur 






rational and mythogenic depths of the poet’s consciousness that are addressed to no one,513 
Mandelstam insists on poems’ definitionally unavoidable address to someone else. 
 
Throwing Bottles Overboard: A Poetological Vision  
 
At this point, it would be instructive to look more closely at the composition of 
Mandelstam’s essay – specifically, at the moment in which it introduces the figure of the 
“interlocutor.” The essay opens by addressing an audience: “What is there about a madman, tell 
me, that produces the most frightening impression of madness?” (OS, 58).514 This opening question 
is quickly succeeded by an answer from the point of view of a “we”:  
In the madman, we fear for the most part that uncanny, absolute indifference that he turns 
toward us. Nothing frightens a man more than another man who has no concern for him. 
There is deep significance in that cultivated pretense, that politeness, we continually use in 
order to emphasize a certain interest in each other. (OS, 58, my emphasis)  
 
As though appealing to some unaccountably primordial psychic predisposition, the first-person 
plural perspective consolidates itself in a common object of fear – the non-seeing pupils of a 
“madman” – whose commonly acknowledged horror consists in its disregard for those across from 
it, i.e., from the objects of its own sight. The horrifying aspect of the non-seeing pupils stems from 
their disregard for the expectation of mutual recognition in communal existence. In view of this 
essay’s rejection of poetry as a didactic medium, it is bizarre that it should open with this set-up 
of communal agreement by formulaically asking an imagined audience to concede a commonly 
known fact. Only after several paragraphs of convincing his audience that a poet is not, in fact, a 
madman because, as it turns out, he does address someone, Mandelstam moves on to his essay’s 
 
513 See the exemplary exposition of this theory in Benn’s 1930 essay “Zur Problematik des Dichterischen.”  
 
514 The gesture of addressing is even more pronounced in Mandelstam’s Russian original whose very first word is 
“Tell/Say” (skazhite), which is marked by a second-person plural ending: “Tell [me], what in a madman makes the 





announced subject matter: the figure of the interlocutor. The subsequent part of the essay is then 
devoted to articulating the moment in which, as Mandelstam sees it, a poem becomes a poem – 
the moment in which it is encountered by its distant interlocutor.  
 What is particularly interesting, however, is the moment of transition from the opening 
section, which I have just sketched out, to what comes after it: from a situation of conventionally 
determined communal address to that of unexpected, unpredictable encounter. This moment of 
encounter is delayed one more time, however, as the opening section’s expository-theoretical 
appeal to an understanding audience makes itself heard in the second section’s terse opening 
statement: “Everybody has friends” (OS, 59). Referring to an evident reality and appealing to a 
communally shared interpretation of that reality, the question that directly follows – “Why doesn’t 
the poet turn to his friends, those people who are naturally close to him?” – remains unanswered. 
For, abruptly leaving behind this pragmatic question of friendship and its utilitarian potential for 
poetic ends, the next sentence ousts the quintessentially self-evident opening figure of “everybody” 
(“Everybody has friends”), turning instead to that of the moryeplavatel’ (“seafarer”).515 On this 
new path, Mandelstam, offers a brief vision of something quite unimaginable and unpredictable, 
separated by a mere sentence break from the appeal to a shared, quotidian reality: 
Everybody has friends. Why doesn’t the poet turn to his friends, to those people who are 
naturally close to him? The shipwrecked seafarer throws a sealed bottle into the sea at a 
critical moment, and it has his name in it and what happened to him. Many years later, 
walking along the dunes, I find it in the sand, I read the letter, I learn when it happened, 
the testament of the deceased. I had a right to do this. I did not unseal someone else’s letter. 
The letter sealed in the bottle was addressed to its finder. I found it. That means, then, that 
I am its secret addressee. (OS, 59, translation slightly modified) 
 
The montage of the vision offered here is quite peculiar. The undeniably poignant scene of a 
seafarer’s last act of communication – which can no longer be of any use to him – is matter-of-
 






factly followed by the depiction of a dune-wanderer’s accidental discovery of the message-
containing bottle. Two quintessentially nomadic figures, the seafarer and the dune-wanderer 
experience an inexorable intervention from an outside force and pure chance. Goal-oriented though 
it might have been, the seafarer’s journey is cut short by the unmanageable force of the sea. The 
dune-wanderer, for his part, has no choice but to stumble upon an unexpected obstacle in his sandy 
path. Notable in both cases is the shifting ground underneath the two travelers: Sea and sand alike 
tend to guarantee no firm foundation and only sometimes correspond to the calculable prediction 
of how the forces in question may play out. Mandelstam’s choice of the sea as the opening setting 
for his poetological vision is quite intriguing, evoking but also subverting relevant topoi. The 
traditional topos of the poet as the nostos-accomplishing Odysseus, which Judith Ryan has 
proposed to replace with the figure of the perpetually revising Penelope,516 is swiftly thrown 
overboard in Mandelstam’s vision of a fatal shipwreck. Similarly, in Friedrich Gundolf’s 1914 
lyric cycle Staatsgedichte, the topos of the state as a ship is made politically productive, 
constituting a glorious locus of confluence between the poet and the state.517 Notably, in Gundolf’s 
depiction, the sea has become firm ground, making the act of deboarding unnecessary: “Kein 
landen gilt: wir sind das land das schwimmt/ Beladen mit den erden und den wogen/ Hinfahrend 
auf der kugel kühnem bogen/ Der in sich mündend ewig anfang nimmt.”518 By thus imposing a 
cyclical order on the maritime element, Gundolf seems to safeguard against the traditionally feared 
and denigrated uncontrollability of the sea – “dieses von Gott niemals erschaffenen Restes des 
 
516 Judith Ryan, “Ezra Pound und Gottfried Benn: Avantgarde, Faschismus und ästhetische Autonomie,” in: 
Faschismus und Avantgarde, eds. R. Grimm und J. Herman (Zürich/Berlin: Athenäum, 1980), 20-34, here: 31. 
 
517 On this troubling union between the poet and the state, see Anke Gilleir, “Margarete Susman, Staat, Literatur oder 
nochmals zum deutschen Intellektualismus,” The German Quartely 82 (2009): 483-503, here: 493. 
 





uranfänglichen Chaos,” to use Bernhard Siegert’s formulation.519 This compensatory topos of the 
ship and of the ship as a topos likewise fails in Mandelstam’s vision. Here, after all, the ship has 
been wrecked.    
As we find out several lines later, the peculiarly disruptive vision offered by Mandelstam 
anticipates the analogy that anchors his theory of the poetic act as an encounter. Yet Mandelstam 
once again delays the laconic statement of the pivotal analogy – this time, by interpolating a poem:    
My gift is poor, nor loudly rings my voice 
And yet I live – and on the earth, my being 
Means something dear to someone: 
My distant heir will find it 
In my verses; who can tell? my soul 
Will turn out to be bound with his in tie 
And as in my generation I found a friend 
So will I find a reader in posterity. 
 
“Reading Boratynsky’s poem,” Mandelstam adds directly after quoting the poem, “I have the same 
feeling I would have if such a bottle had come into my hands” (OS, 59). As a comparison, 
Mandelstam’s analogy should and does contain the necessary elements: a literal term, a figurative 
term, and a tertium comparationis. However, as we can see in retrospect, the poet compiles these 
elements in a somewhat peculiar manner. To begin with, Mandelstam not only does not announce 
the analogy as analogy to his reader but also introduces the figurative set of terms first: the 
shipwrecked sailor, the bottle, and the dune-traveler. Only then does he introduce the analogy’s 
literal terms: the quoted poem and the first-person comment that “I have the same feeling I would 
have if such a bottle had come into my hands.” In Mandelstam’s analogy, the tertium 
comparationis thus distills into a sense of the unexpected yet providential encounter, common to 
the bottle-finder and poem-reader. This means, however, that the first part of the figurative term – 
 
519 Bernhard Siegert, “Der Nomos des Meeres,” in: Politiken der Medien, eds. D. Gethmann and M. Stauff 





the depiction of the shipwrecked sailor – has become superfluous, for it has no counterpart in the 
analogy’s literal term. No quasi-shipwrecked poet makes it to the other side of things. An 
unexpected aspect of Mandelstam’s analogy, then, is that it does not foreground the traditionally 
central figure of poetological reflection: the poet. By displacing his poetic theory away from the 
poet as the creator of poems, Mandelstam goes beyond the Gumilyovian egocentric conception of 
poetic creation, according to which it is precisely the poet who, overwhelmed by the need to 
dispense poetic insight into the world, stands front and center. By letting an actual poem intervene 
between the analogy’s figurative and literal terms, Mandelstam’s central analogy does not so much 
serve as a secondary, decorative correspondence to an already essentially constituted primary idea, 
as it appears to enact the non-teleological structure of that which the poet is trying to theorize in 
his essay, namely, the moment of poetic encounter or relation: the moment in which the poem 
stumbles upon its unforeseen reader. Entirely accidental, this poetic encounter follows no 
prescriptive roadmap, intervening into the matrix of quotidian regularity. Definitive of the poetic 
relation, as Mandelstam sees it, is that it may not have happened. “The air of a poem is the 
unexpected” (OS, 61). In a similarly unexpected manner, the introduction of the poetic encounter 
takes place in Mandelstam’s own essay.  
 It is important to distinguish between a poem’s imagined addressee and its eventual reader. 
For Mandelstam, the mysterious addressee and the accidental reader coincide precisely because 
the place of the poem’s addressee is left open from the outset: decoupled from the poet’s 
consciousness and volition and governed entirely by chance. If, on Gumilyov’s account, the 
moment of poetic reception consolidates the connection between the mind of the poet and that of 
the reader in a kind of atemporal present tense, Mandelstam’s is marked by anonymity and 





accidental interlocutor stumbling upon the poem. The Mandelstamian poetic relation or encounter 
takes place precisely in the structural rupture between the poet and the addressee.  
Once thrown into the sea, the bottle with the message in it ceases to belong to anyone in 
particular.520 Indeed, in a sense, the finder of the bottle can be said to be possessed by the bottle: 
Using the verb okhvatyvaet (“comes over someone,” but, if read literally, “seizes, grasps”) to 
characterize the effect of this finding on the unexpectant recipient, Mandelstam writes, “[...] the 
feeling of the providential seizes [okhvatyvayet] the one who has found it.”521 The bottle-finder’s 
cognitive faculties are quite irrelevant in this moment: The message in the bottle is stumbled upon 
by chance and, once stumbled upon, it pre-occupies its finder. The admittedly catastrophic moment 
in which the seafarer facing imminent death throws the bottle overboard is nonetheless marked by 
a matter-of-fact attitude: The necessity stems not from the seafarer’s conscious will but rather from 
uncontrollable external circumstances. Thus, differently from Gumilyov’s conception of the poetic 
event as a function of the poet’s uncontainable promethean need to bestow something upon the 
world, Mandelstam locates the sense of the overwhelming not on the side of the poet but, rather, 
on the side of the recipient, the interlocutor.  
Contributing to the urgency of Mandelstam’s depiction of the bottle-finding episode is the 
abrupt shift from the previous section’s expository mode to one of enactment. Right after the event 
of the shipwreck is mentioned, the first-person singular pronoun I suddenly comes up repeatedly: 
“Many years later, walking the dunes, I find it in the sand, I read the letter, I learn when it happened, 
the testament of the deceased. I had a right to do this. I did not unseal someone else’s letter. The 
 
520 On the affinity between the figure of “someone” (“niekto”) in Mandelstam’s essay – very close to the pronoun 
“nikto” (“no one”) – and Celan’s notion of Niemand in the title of his poetry volume Niemandsrose, see Broda, “An 
Niemand gerichtet,” 209.  
 
521 This is my literal translation of the original Russian formulation. Sidney Monas’ rendering of this line underplays 
the overwhelming character of this poetic encounter: “[...] and the finder cannot escape a certain feeling of 





letter sealed in the bottle was addressed to its finder. I found it. That means, then, that I am its 
secret addressee” (OS, 59, emphasis mine). Notably, this is the first time that the first-person 
pronoun is uttered in this essay – apart from the parenthetical citation of a general fact in the 
essay’s opening section (“I speak, and that means I am listened to [...]”). Emerging right after the 
mention of the shipwreck yet not in any determinable causal lineage to it, the first-person pronoun 
is notably first uttered by the figure of the distant interlocutor, not the lyric subject or the poetic 
voice. Thus, speaking from the perspective of the bottle’s finder, and not that of its sender, 
Mandelstam’s poetological text crucially revises the first-person singular perspective as the 
authoritative lyric origin. Also noteworthy is the shifting character of the first-person singular 
pronoun in this passage. Within the span of only a few lines, the pronoun “I” speaks, first, for the 
– unannounced – metaphorized finder of the bottle; then, it speaks for the lyric I in Boratynsky’s 
poem cited by Mandelstam; and finally, it speaks for the finder of the poem, presumably the 
speaker of Mandelstam’s own essay. In a peculiar conflation of perspectives, the actual lyric I –
the first-person singular pronoun uttered in Boratynsky’s poem – stands between the “I” of the 
figurative bottle-finder and the “I” if the literal poem-finder. In this context, Mandelstam’s polemic 
against the egocentric overuse of the first-person singular pronoun by the Symbolist poet 
Konstantin Balmont is particularly significant:  
His [Balmont’s] need for self-assertion is quite pathological. He cannot say “I” sotto voce. 
He screams ‘I.’ ‘I am’ – an abrupt pause, – ‘I who play thunder.’ In Balmont’s poetry, the 
‘I’ has definitely and unfairly tipped the scales against the ‘non-I’ as if it were so much 
fluff. Balmont’s shrill individualism is unpleasant. This is not the quiet solipsism of 
Sologub, offensive to nobody, but individualism at the expense of someone else’s ‘I.’ Note 
how Balmont loves to catch you by surprise with his direct and harsh ‘thou’: in these 
passages he is like a bad hypnotist. Balmont’s ‘thou’ never finds an addressee, whizzing 






In this manner, the groundbreaking character of Mandelstam’s theory lies in the fact that it thinks 
poetry not from the point of view of the “I” or from the point of view of the “you,” but rather from 
the point of view of the non-coincidental in-between.  
What is the point of the shipwreck episode in an essay that otherwise seemed to start out 
quite didactically? After all, Mandelstam could have changed out of the poet’s attire into that of a 
scholar and composed a treatise on the nature of poetry. He could have posited what poetry is and 
what it does by differentiating it from other linguistic genres on generic grounds: by erecting 
borders. Yet, isn’t precisely the notion of the border called into question by the essay’s central 
figure of the bottle thrown into the raging sea and found in shifting sand? For all its seemingly 
facile imaginative appeal, the message-in-a-bottle metaphor is not as light as it may appear. 
Contained in it is an irreducible rupture: irreversible despair (and thus a break with the future) as 
well as ultimate ignorance about where it might land (and thus a break with the past). In a way, 
this metaphor seems to operate on a suspension of consciousness as a final authority on the making 
and sending of messages. A peculiar figure of the poem emerges in this early essay by the young 
Mandelstam: the poem as a kind of wanderer whose unpredictable movement calls into question 
the validity of borders as such. What seems to emerge in Mandelstam’s essay, even if 
inadvertently, is a profoundly medial, relational understanding of poetry: By singling out the 
moment of the wholly accidental discovery of a bottle in the sand – and analogously, the accidental 
discovery of a poem – Mandelstam singles out the movement and the in-between space inherent 
in the relation that is a poem. The defining feature of a poetic text, for Mandelstam, is its capacity 





In direct contrast to the traditional way of conceptualizing poetic activity as inward-bound, 
Mandelstam calls this orientation into question, proposing a radically different route – toward 
Mars, quite a re-orientation indeed:  
It isn’t about acoustics one should concern oneself: that will come of itself. More likely, 
about distance. It’s boring to be whispering to a neighbor. It’s infinitely tedious to pressure-
drill one’s own soul (Nadson). But to exchange signals with Mars – without fantasizing, of 
course – that is a task worthy of a lyric poet. [...] Maybe, for these lines to reach their 
address, it will take the same hundreds of years that it does for the light of a planet to reach 
another planet. As a result, Sologub’s lines continue to live after they have been written, 
as events, not merely as tokens of emotional experience [perezhivaniya] [...] (OS, 63) 
 
Significantly, Mandelstam’s parenthetical remark – “without fantasizing, of course” – implies that 
this figure of Mars invoked here does not spring from a poem-maker’s hyper-creative imagination 
that, not sufficiently engaged on planet Earth, would think up an alternate universe. Rather, 
Mandelstam highlights an a priori aspect of the poetic word: distance and such that it has not been 
brought nearer through exploration and colonization. In this way, exchanging signals with Mars – 
this “task worthy of a lyric poet” – is a task without precedent, incapable of relying on any 
preexistent system of communication. Consequently, the route of exchange between the poet and 
the planet cannot serve as a mere means to an end: as a vehicle for transporting a packaged meaning 
from Earth to Mars and from Mars to Earth.522 Qualifying his conjecture about the possible number 
of years it might take a poem to arrive at its destination with a crucial “maybe,”523 Mandelstam 
underscores that this is not a matter of predictability based on statistically generalizable laws. 
Notably, too, he rejects the notion of perezhivaniya – literally, “living through” or, more 
 
522 This is not at all to say that Mandelstam does not care about the meanings of words – in fact, his contemporaneous 
essay “The Morning of Acmeism” as well as his later essays “About the nature of the word” as well as “Word and 
Culture” from the early 1920s insist on the inseparability of words and their earthly meanings – a polemic, once again, 
directed against the symbolist tendency to encrypt words into transcendent signification. 
 
523 “Maybe, for these lines to reach their address, it will take the same hundreds of years that it does for the light of a 






figuratively, “emotional experience” – as inadequate for talking about poetry. Pertaining to the 
interiority of the (lyric) subject, this word finds itself in a timeless present continuous tense that 
can be preserved within a poem for future generations’ edification or empathy. In contrast, 
Mandelstam sees poems as events that live on as singular temporal interventions.     
When Mandelstam suggests that it is not “acoustics” one should be concerned about but 
rather “distance,” he is once again invoking the Symbolists’ preoccupation with poetic sound 
effects.524 In this manner, he deemphasizes the narrowly intersubjective concern. The 
Mandelstamian poem, rather than being dialogically directed at a conversation partner who, akin 
to Gumilyov’s ideal reader (reader-friend), would empathize with the received missive, radiates 
into space, aimed at no pre-conceived point of destination. Importantly, Mandelstam specifies:  
And so, if individual poems (in the form of missive or dedication) can actually address 
concrete persons, poetry as a whole is always directed at a more or less distant, unknown 
addressee, in whose existence the poet may not doubt without doubting himself. 
Metaphysics has nothing to do with it. Only reality can call to life another reality. A poet 
is not a homunculus and there is no reason why one should ascribe to him the characteristics 
of spontaneous generation. (OS, 64) 
 
This once again underscores that Mandelstam is not prescribing certain criteria that would have to 
be fulfilled by a poem in order to count as a poem. This is why individual poems may, as 
Mandelstam concedes, address specific people. Concerned with “poetry as a whole,” Mandelstam 
hardly has in mind the genre “poetry” but rather the most fundamental characteristic of a poem: 
Even if a particular poem addresses a specific person, this poem as poem – and not simply as a 
private message – is at the same time also directed at a distant addressee who cannot be known in 
advance. 
 
524 As discussed earlier in this chapter, Mandelstam writes, “The Symbolist poets turned their attention exclusively to 
acoustics. They hurled sound into the architecture of the soul and, with that self-absorption characteristic of them, 






Mandelstam sees the self-transcendence inscribed in the specifically poetic language as 
fundamentally different from communication between two contemporaries sharing a common time 
– communication in which, in Mandelstam’s view, nothing principally new can be said. Thus, 
Mandelstam casts his conception of a poem’s interlocutor against the relationship of friendship – 
namely the relationship proper to humans qua co-existing and communicative beings: “Everybody 
has friends. Why doesn’t the poet turn to his friends, to those people who are naturally close to 
him?” (OS, 60). Differently from the Gumilyovian ideal of the “reader-friend” selflessly willing 
to be engulfed by the befriended poem,525 Mandelstam rejects the relation of friendship as 
structurally monolingual and homogeneous. For Mandelstam, this is language as a means to an 
end, unencumbered by foreignness. The discursive infrastructure in which its speakers co-exist is 
structurally incapable of opening up its borders to an un-predictable and un-localizable other. 
Paradoxically, then, precisely in its ability to connect speakers to one another, non-poetic language, 
as Mandelstam conceives of it, isolates. 
Having succinctly posited that “There is no lyric without dialogue,” Mandelstam pinpoints 
self-alterity as a definitive feature of poetic language: “Yet the only thing that pushes us into the 
arms of an interlocutor is a desire to be surprised by our own words, to be captivated by their 
novelty and unexpectedness (OS, 63). This is a rather defamiliarizing claim: wondering at one’s 
own words implies that one does not exactly “own” these words. For Mandelstam, then, the poetic 
act is primarily one of self-distancing: becoming foreign to him- or herself, the poet becomes his 
or her own bewildered interlocutor. This vision defies the assumption of a unified, self-same 
authorial origin, out of which poetic pronouncements would emanate. Rather, taking place in the 
 





mode of chancing upon,526 the poetic encounter estranges the poet from the poem and estranges, 
too, the poet from this poet’s language.527 Sent on its way with no specific address, the poem 
speaks without a means of recognizing, or being recognized by, its eventual reader. A poem’s 
interlocutor may materialize at any given moment. In this way, the poetry which the young 
Mandelstam has in mind is not a private matter. Interrupting the intimate bond between the poet 
and the poet’s words, Mandelstam’s vision of poetry opens up, radiates something like a public 
space. 
For all its brevity and shortage of theoretical development, this 1913 essay by the young 
Osip Mandelstam is nonetheless quite ground-breaking.528 Admittedly, “About an Interlocutor” 
appears to offer a rather rigid notion of poetry, insisting as it does on a distinction between “poetry” 
and “literature” and contending that certain poems do not qualify to be considered poems in the 
first place. And yet, this text transcends the boundaries of generic prescription by inscribing into 
the poetic act a radically open gesture of transgressing, of reaching out.529 Precisely, then, in 
 
526 To characterize the peculiar contingency of the poetic encounter, Mandelstam uses the common Russian verb 
popadudtsya (“will be chanced/happened upon”), which shares the same root as the verb “to fall” (padat’): “And 
anyone to whom Boratynsky’s verses will present themselves [popadudtsya] feels as such a ‘reader’ – chosen, called 
by name...” (Mandelstam, Polnoye sobranie sochinenii, 2:7).  
 
527 In this, Mandelstam’s theory of the unfamiliar interlocutor calls to mind Viktor Shklovsky’s theory of ostranenie 
(defamiliarization, estrangement) in literature, which he articulated in his 1917 essay “Iskusstvo kak priyom” (“Art as 
Device”).  
 
528 Especially relevant here is, for instance, Gottfried Benn’s monologic conception of lyric poetry, which he 
articulated in his influential 1951 speech “Probleme der Lyrik.” For Benn, the “lyrisches Ich” is the “Inkarnation alles 
dessen, was an lyrischem Fluidum in dem Gedichte produzierenden Autor lebt, ihn trennt vom epischen und 
dramatischen Autor, ihn befähigt und zwingt, in spezifischer Weise Eindrücke, innere und äußere, zu sammeln und 
sie in Lyrik zu verwandeln” (“Vortrag in Knokke,” an abridged version of “Probleme der Lyrik,” cited in Martínez, 
378). 
 
529 The anti-utilitarian stance evident here and elsewhere in Mandelstam’s essays on poetry is possibly a reflection of 
his interest in Bergson’s distinction between intellectual cognition and (poetic) intuition. The theory of the (poetic) 
word Mandelstam develops in his essay “O prirode slova” (“On the Nature of the Word” 1922) hinges on a paraphrase 
of Bergson. For a discussion of Bergson’s influence on the post-symbolists more generally, see Elaine Rusinko, 






seemingly narrowing down the scope of what counts as poetry, Mandelstam fundamentally 
expands its purview. Brushing away the local concerns of poetry conceived as a learnable, 
atemporal craft of rendering supposedly prosaic thoughts in poetic form, Mandelstam focuses on 
its fundamental kernel: poetry considered as a poem, as a singular occurrence – and thus a temporal 
phenomenon that opens up, or radiates, a space beyond itself. By highlighting the act of reaching 
out to an unlocalizable interlocutor, Mandelstam offers a vision of poetry that is eminently 
political. Admittedly, its irreducible political dimension does not consist in a preference for politics 
as a subject matter. To be sure, in Mandelstam’s view, a poem may deal with a political subject 
matter, but as soon as its audience can be located in a particular place and time, the verses 
articulating this political topic cease to be poetry.530 The fundamentally political disposition of 
what Mandelstam is willing to call a “poem” resides in its refusal to circumscribe the boundaries 
of its outreach, to prescribe its audience in advance, to create a vocally enchanted community. The 
sheer openness which Mandelstam traces at the core of the poetic address offers a vision of being-
together that is fundamentally different from the one structured by homogenizing speech. In his 
later autobiographical piece Fourth Prose (1930), Mandelstam, who was at that time being 
persecuted with false accusations of plagiarism, would offer precarious visions of poets and poems 
that read almost like a complex, pained intensification of his 1913 theorization of the distant, 
indeterminate, detached character of poetry as address: “I divide all the works of world literature 
into those written with and without permission. The first are trash, the second – stolen air.”531 
 
530 Mandelstam writes, “The civic orientation of the tendentiousness is fine in and of itself: ‘You need not be a poet,/ 
But a citizen you’re obliged to be –’ is an excellent verse, flying on powerful wings to its providential interlocutor. 
But put in his place the Russian philistine of this or that decade, thoroughly familiar, known ahead of time, and 
immediately it will turn into something trite’” (OS, 62). 
  
531 Osip Mandelstam, “Fourth Prose,” trans. Clarence Brown, The Hudson Review, 23.1 (Spring 1970): 49-66, here: 
57. On Mandelstam’s repudiation of “culture” and self-presentation as a “disruptive renegade” in Fourth Prose, see 
Clare Cavanagh, Osip Mandelstam and the Modernist Creation of Tradition. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994), 193-





 Although Mandelstam vehemently rejects the contemporaneous poetic movement of 
Futurism – Acmeism’s rival in dethroning and replacing Symbolism as the dominant poetic 
movement in Mandelstam’s Russia – paradoxically, with this early essay the young Mandelstam 
projects a future-oriented poetics. Crucially, his poetic vision opens up a space between a poem’s 
moment of articulation and its existence thereafter, displacing the poetic into a kind of threshold 
territory. However, differently from literature’s utilization of language in the present as a starting 
point for a prescribed future and differently, too, from the futurist attempt to invent a future and 
posit it in the present, Mandelstam’s interlocutor-bound poetics reaches out to a distant and non-
localizable – yet emphatically real – moment outside of itself. Here, futurity is not separate from 
but constitutive of the present moment of poetic articulation. 
In a letter to writer and editor Hans Bender from November 18, 1954, Paul Celan, too, 
insists on a certain distance in poetry as he rejects the possibility of Nachbarschaft for the event 
that is the emergence of a poem:  
Dichtung, sagt Paul Valéry irgendwo, sei Sprache in statu nascendi, freiwerdende Sprache 
[...] Ich fürchte, es gehört zum Wesen des Gedichts, daß es die Mitwisserschaft dessen, der 
es ‘hervorbringt,’ nur so lange duldet, als es braucht, um zu entstehen... Denn gelänge es 
dem Dichter, das freiwerdende Wort zu belauschen, es gleichsam auf frischer Tat zu 
ertappen, so wäre es damit wahrscheinlich um sein weiteres Dichtertum geschehn: ein 
solches Erlebnis duldet keinerlei Wiederholung und Nachbarschaft.532  
 
It is as though the poet only comes into being when read by a distant interlocutor. Notably, it is 
also in this letter that Celan admits to not knowing the definitional borders of poems’ specifically 
poetic quality: “[...] und doch: das Wie und Warum jenes qualitativen Wechsels, den das Wort 
erfährt, um zum Wort im Gedicht zu werden, weiß ich auch heute nicht näher zu bestimmen.”533 
 
 








Unsure of the qualitative – something that could be attributed to the poem as such – Celan 
nonetheless singles out the relational aspect of the poem’s essence: the essential thing about poems 
– “[...] es gehört zum Wesen des Gedichts” – is that they do not tolerate authorial ownership and 
cognizance (Mitwisserschaft).  
 
Part II: Paul Celan’s “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” 
On July 8, 1959, during a stay in the mountainous Swiss region Sils, Paul Celan receives a 
request from the journalist and literary scholar Werner Weber to send some poetry from up there, 
where Celan is staying, down to where he, Weber, is: “Und könnte es Sie locken, mir etwas 
herunter zu spenden, Lyrik oder so...?”534 Celan, without sending the requested originals of lyric 
poems, promises, instead, an attempt at translation:  
Auf meinem Tisch liegt die Jeune Parque: vielleicht kann ich hier die fehlenden fünfzig 
Verse übersetzen, vielleicht. (Übersetzungen: Annäherungsversuche, manchmal, selten, 
kommt einem auch der andere und des anderen Sprache ein wenig entgegen: Gott hat die 
Sprachen kaum im Hinblick auf ihre Übertragbarkeit geschaffen...).”535  
 
In his parenthetic reflection on the act of translating, Celan notably refers to it in the plural 
(Übersetzungen) and punctuates its path with several pauses – “(Übersetzungen: 
Annäherungsversuche, manchmal, selten, [...])” – thereby calling into question an overarching 
concept of translation that could function as an exemplary conduit for this always singular and 
uncertain act of reaching out. Rather than conceiving of translations as accomplishable acts of 
decoding and substituting, the poet highlights their doubly tentative nature – evident both in the 
notion of “approach” (Annäherung) as well as “trial” or “attempt” (Versuch). Significantly, too, 
 
534 Werner Weber. Briefwechsel des Literaturkritikers aus sechs Jahrzehnten (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
2009), 146.  
 






Celan envisions translation not as an active enterprise on the part of the translator but as an 
experience that happens to this translator: a rare occurrence – hesitant even in its rarity 
(“manchmal, selten”) – of being approached, faced with or accommodated (entgegenkommen) by 
the other and the other’s language. What Celan says here about translations anticipates what he 
will have to say about poems.  
Paul Celan’s poetological statements have been so firmly etched into the discourse on his 
poetry that one almost takes their granular exactitude for granted.536 However, as can be surmised 
from his refusal, in November 1954, to contribute to the writer and editor Hans Bender’s anthology 
on the poetic craft (Handwerk) – a notion of poetry advocated by Gottfried Benn in his 1951 
“Probleme der Lyrik”537 – the poet did not always have a well-articulated poetics at his disposal: 
“[...] – und doch: das Wie und Warum jenes qualitativen Wechsels, den das Wort erfährt, um zum 
Wort im Gedicht zu werden, weiß ich auch heute nicht näher zu bestimmen.”538 Notably, as he 
reports a certain difficulty in approaching this question (näher bestimmen), Celan articulates it in 
terms of change (Wechsel) and thus a transformation or translation. At stake in Celan’s admission 
to Bender is a definitional question for the field of poetics: the question of what the essence of a 
poem is. Celan’s use of the definite article points to the fundamental nature of the border in 
question: If only, that is, one could pinpoint this essential and yet so elusive transition through 
which the word (das Wort) – and thus, metonymically, language, sense, thought539 – has to pass in 
 
536 For a critique of Celan scholars’ excessive reliance on Celan’s poetological texts written around 1960, see Thomas 
C. Connolly, Paul Celan’s Unfinished Poetics: Readings in Sous-Oeuvre (Cambridge: Legenda, 2018), 30-41.  
 
537 In his “Probleme der Lyrik,” Benn writes, “Ein Gedicht entsteht überhaupt sehr selten – ein Gedicht wird gemacht” 
(Benn, SW, VI, 10).  
 
538 Briefe an Hans Bender, ed. Volker Neuhaus (München: Hanser Verlag, 1984), 34-5.  
 






order to turn into the word in the poem (“das Wort im Gedicht”). Yet, directly preceding Celan’s 
admission of definitional hesitancy is a note about the circumstantial: “Die Lebensumstände, das 
Leben in fremdem Sprachbereich haben es mit sich gebracht, daß ich mit meiner Sprache viel 
bewußter umgehe als früher – und doch: das Wie und Warum [...].”540 The circumstances, then, of 
daily life in a foreign language have led the poet to a much more conscious attitude toward 
language – yet, not exactly toward language as such (i.e., the word) or even the poet’s native 
language more narrowly. Rather, the possessive pronoun in Celan’s formulation “mit meiner 
Sprache” would perhaps be more accurately interpreted as the poet’s singular relation to his 
language: most certainly, no private language inaccessible to others but also not a simple relation 
of possession.541  
Four years later, Celan will offer a similar remark about language – specifically, in 
reference to the language of contemporary German poetry: “Freilich ist hier niemals die Sprache 
selbst, die Sprache schlechthin am Werk, sondern immer nur ein unter dem besonderen 
Neigungswinkel seiner Existenz sprechendes Ich, dem es um Kontur und Orientierung geht. 
Wirklichkeit ist nicht, Wirklichkeit will gesucht und gewonnen sein.”542 In response to a survey 
about the surveyed authors’ current creative projects, Celan offers a succinct reflection about 
“deutsche Lyrik” and the different path it has had to go compared to that of its French counterpart. 
This poetry, Celan reports, “verklärt nicht, ‘poetisiert’ nicht.”543 Hardly a question of prosody or 
national idiosyncrasy, his remark refers, rather, to German poetry’s immediate, circumstantial 
 
540 Briefe an Hans Bender, 35.   
 
541 One could think of Jacques Derrida’s articulation of the linguistic condition in his Monolingualism of the Other: 
the condition of having but one language and yet not being in possession of it.  
 
542 Celan, Gesammelte Werke, 3:167f. 
 






environment: “dürsterstes im Gedächtnis, Fragwürdigstes um sich her.”544 In response to a 
question about his authorial, creative visions and projects, Celan answers, instead, by responding 
to what he sees outside, before and around him. The only seemingly autonomous notion of the I, 
“ich,” in Celan’s remark is, upon closer look, bound by its existentially singular angle of 
inclination. Notably, too, the “reality” to which Celan responds is not simply “da,” as Gottfried 
Benn would have claimed: an inescapable datum that would prescribe and determine one’s 
response. Rather, as Celan suggests, this reality, “Wirklichkeit,” has to be sought in the first place 
– a search that would be impossible without reaching out beyond the confines of an autonomous 
I, lyric or otherwise.  
It is noteworthy that Celan’s reflections on the nature of poetry emerge increasingly at a 
crossroads of circumstances.545 These circumstances involve steps to approach the other and the 
other’s language. Among them, for instance, is Celan’s renewed interest in philosopher Martin 
Heidegger’s thought on language and poetry546 as well as his encounter – as reader and translator 
– with a fellow poet, Osip Mandelstam.547 Short of discovering a compass toward definitional 




545 Around the time of working on his radio essay on Mandelstam, Celan was contemplating an essay on his translation 
of Paul Valéry’s poem “La jeune Parque” as well as an essay on Osip Mandelstam. See Paul Celan, Der Meridian. 
Endfassung. Vorstufen. Materialien, eds. Bernhard Böschenstein and Heino Schmull (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1999), xi. 
 
546 On the traces of Heidegger’s language in Celan’s reflections on poetry, see Amir Eshel, “Paul Celan’s Other: 
History, Poetics, and Ethics,” New German Critique 91 (2004): 57-77; James Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin 
Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006), 81-91; Joachim Seng, 
Auf den Kreis-Wegen der Dichtung. Zyklische Komposition bei Paul Celan am Beispiel der Gedichtbände bis 
“Sprachgitter” (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998), 154-160.  
 
547 For an account of Celan’s encounter with Mandelstam’s poetry, see Victor Terras and Karl Weimar, “Mandelstam 






practice, if not a theory, of that transition that the word might have to pass through, or perhaps be 
derailed by, in order to become a word in a poem.  
The occasion that allows some of these paths to intersect is Celan’s introduction of a 
foreign poet to the German-speaking audience by way of a radio essay. Commissioned by the 
Norddeutscher Rundfunk in February 1960, the assignment succinctly informs Celan as follows: 
“Am 19. März haben wir eine 20 Minuten-Sendung mit Gedichten von Ossip Mandelstamm im 
Programm. Freilich soll die knappe Hälfte davon ein biographisch-analytischer Kommentar über 
den Autor sein.”548 With professional brevity, the prompt relays a). that a transmission of 
someone’s poems has been planned, and b). that these poems should be made more approachable 
by way of a clarifying commentary about their author. The resulting broadcast bears the title 
borrowed from Celan’s translation of a poem by Mandelstam: “Die Freiheit, die da dämmert. 
Gedichte von Ossip Mandelstamm, aus dem Russischen übertragen und eingeleitet von Paul 
Celan.”549 A clear border seems to have been drawn: The poems, the program’s title announces, 
are Mandelstam’s; their introduction and translation – Celan’s. Tasked with introducing and 
familiarizing,550 Celan’s radio essay appears at first glance as a particularly familiar version of 
translation: compensation for distances – between languages, cultures, and physical spaces. 
Having reviewed the script for the radio program, the radio editor, Wilhelm Asche, implies as 
much, assuring the poet of the reliability of his essay’s transmission and reproduction: “[...] dieser 
Text wird zusammen mit den Gedichten sicherlich ein genaues Bild geben.”551 Celan himself, 
 




550 “Fremde Nähe” Celan als Übersetzer: eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Literaturarchivs in Verbindung mit dem 
Präsidialdepartement der Stadt Zürich im Schiller-Nationalmuseum Marbach am Neckar und im Stadthaus Zürich 
(Marbach am Necker: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1997), 362. 
 





however, reports, “Mir war der Text über den Kopf gewachsen, ihn zu kürzen war schwerer als 
ihn zu schreiben.”552 
Despite its occasional and ostensibly instrumental character, Celan’s radio essay 
nonetheless goes beyond a transparent reproduction of a foreign subject matter into a familiar 
language. Rather, it articulates an increasingly dense meditation on the nature of the poem (das 
Gedicht), which Celan intersperses with six poems by the to-be-introduced poet – poems that, as 
the title of the radio program indicates, are presented in Celan’s translation.553 Celan’s effort to 
transmit Mandelstam’s Dichtung – translatable both as “poetry” but perhaps also as the process 
whereby “poetry” takes shape – begins to articulate a poetics that, in lieu of the word’s qualitative 
change from non-poetic to poetic, comes up against an inextricable boundedness to the other and 
the other’s language. Similar to Arendt’s sketch of Lessing in a meditation on crucial questions of 
what politics might mean, Celan’s radio essay on Mandelstam offers a reflection on what poetry 
might mean.554 In a way, the necessity of this other-oriented gesture is contained precisely in its 
 
 
552 Fremde Nähe, 366. 
 
553 The scope of this chapter does not permit an analysis of Celan’s translations of Mandelstam’s poems or their 
placement within the radio essay. For a reading of Celan’s translations of Mandelstam’s poems in this essay, see Anna 
Glazova, “The Poetry of Bringing about Presence,” MLN 123 (2008), 1114-23. On the role of translation in Celan’s 
poetics, see Leonard Olschner, “Grenzgänge und Gegenwart. Notizen zu Celans Poetik der Übertragung,” in 
Unverloren. Trotz allem. Paul Celan Symposium Wien 2000, ed. Hubert Gaisbauer, Bernard Hain, and Erika Schuster 
(Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2000), 244-264; for a discussion of the contemporaneous reception of Mandelstam’s 
translations with respect to the problematic of translation adequacy, see Barbara Wiedemann, “‘gezeitigte Sprache’. 
Paul Celans Mandelstamm-Übertragungen aus dem Mai 1958,” in Zwischentexte: literarisches Übersetzen in Theorie 
und Praxis, ed. C. Dathe, R. Makarska, and S. Schahadat (Leipzig: Frank & Timme Verlag, 2013), 165-196, esp. 165-
170. 
 
554 Incidentally, this gesture of turning to others also marks Mandelstam’s essay: he turns to Boratynskij, Pushkin, and 
a number of other poets and, most importantly, their poems. A similar kind of turn to past texts – although in a 
dogmatic fashion – also takes place in Benn’s “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten,” where Benn appeals to the 
higher authority of Hegel, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Fichte in an attempt to corroborate his own theses – a gesture 
that seems closer to the Rechthabenwollen criticized by Arendt in her Lessing speech as the atrophied contemporary 






apparent contingency. It is a worldly gesture, distinct from an isolated thinker’s concern with 
eternally valid truths.  
Preceding the May 1960 news of Celan’s recognition with the Georg Büchner Prize by a 
couple of months, this radio essay acquires further significance as an inadvertent precursor to what 
has come to be regarded as Celan’s main poetological statement: his address “Der Meridian,” 
delivered by the poet on October 22, 1960 in Darmstadt, Germany, on the occasion of accepting 
the aforesaid prize and recognition. Key passages from the radio essay reappear in the acceptance 
speech: Celan’s introduction of a foreign poet and his poems reemerges in an account of his own 
poems and, ultimately, a reflection on poetry.555 From this angle, “Die Dichtung Ossip 
Mandelstamms” seems crucial for the emergence of Celan’s poetics: this Dichtung itself but also, 
and perhaps no less significantly, the act of its introduction and transmission.  
 Of course, it is a quite contingent circumstance that Celan’s reflections on “Die Dichtung 
Ossip Mandelstamms” take the shape of a radio essay. Nevertheless, this circumstance can be 
situated within a broader logic of cultural production and a renewed, albeit questionable, energy it 
experienced in Germany in the 1960s.556 Speaking publicly in post-war Germany was not a self-
evident matter, and the uneasy gesture on the part of exiled intellectuals of stepping out and 
addressing an audience whose members may well have contributed to the speakers’ exclusion and 
expulsion – and thus to their inability to speak and address in the first place – has been rigorously 
 
555 On this radio essay’s significance for Celan’s “Meridian,” see Bernhard Böschenstein, “Celan und Mandelstam. 
Beobachtungen zu ihrem Verhältnis,” Celan-Jahrbuch 2 (1988): 156-159;“Fremde Nähe,” 364; Christine Ivanovic, 
Das Gedicht im Geheimnis der Begegnung (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1996), 321-325; Lehmann, Handbuch, 
164-167.  
 
556 On the efforts in the 1960s West Germany at rehabilitation and reconciliation, see Amir Eshel, Zeit der Zäsur. 
Jüdische Dichter im Angesicht der Shoah (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1999), 83-85; see also Wolfgang 
Emmerich, “‘Ich bin der, den es nicht gibt.’ Der Plagiatsvorwurf gegen Paul Celan und die Folgen,” in Unverloren. 
Trotz allem. Paul Celan Symposium Wien 2000, ed. H. Gaisbauer, B. Hain, and E.Schuster (Vienna: Mandelbaum 






explored.557 In Celan’s oeuvre, the texts usually considered under this angle are his prize 
acceptance addresses: one of them delivered in 1958 in Bremen and the other in 1960 in Darmstadt.  
As a radio broadcast, Celan’s introduction of Mandelstam is embedded into the tradition 
of the radio as a centralizing instrument of culturalization, as a Rundfunkübertragung, whose 
generic function consists in centralizing and unifying by way of transmitting common information 
– from a single origin, to as many listeners at once as possible, about something that concerns all 
of them.558  The radio, we will recall, was a crucial medium for Gottfried Benn’s self-presentation, 
allowing him to centralize and amplify his poetic voice. The posture, afforded by the radio, of 
broadcasting unique wisdom to an audience without at the same time having to interact with this 
audience was eagerly adopted by Benn. Here, one may recall a particularly poignant instance of 
this consolidating practice: Benn’s dogmatic radio addresses to the German nation from the spring 
of 1933, “Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen” and “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten.” 
In the latter, the poet broadcasts precisely about the medial exclusivity of the national community 
he is addressing:559  
Nur die, die durch die Spannungen der letzten Monate hindurchgegangen sind, die von 
Stunde zu Stunde, von Zeitung zu Zeitung, von Umzug zu Umzug, von 
Rundfunkübertragung zu Rundfunkübertragung alles dies fortlaufend aus unmittelbarer 
Nähe miterlebten, Tag und Nacht mit ihm rangen, selbst die, die das alles nicht jubelnd 
begrüßten, sondern es mehr erlitten, mit diesen allen kann man reden, aber mit den 
Flüchtlingen, die ins Ausland reisten, kann man es nicht.560 
 
 
557 On the difficulty, experienced by exiled Jewish and German intellectuals, of speaking publicly after the Shoah, see 
Sonja Boos, Speaking the Unspeakable in Postwar Germany (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2014), 3-23. 
  
558 On early German radio’s political function of centralization, see Solveig Ottmann, Im Anfang war das Experiment. 
Das Weimarer Radio bei Hans Flesch und Ernst Schoen (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2013), 156-163.   
 
559 On Benn’s open letter’s diminishing estrangement and ensuing potential for propaganda, see Olga Solovieva, 
“‘Bizarre Epik des Augenblicks’: Gottfried Benn’s ‘Answer to the Literary Emigrants’ in the Context of his Early 
Prose,” German Studies Review 33.1 (2010): 137. 
 






Most flagrant in this unabashedly verbose and broadly transmitted address is its denial to the other 
of the bare minimum: the ability to speak. To be sure, the refugees may certainly speak, but their 
speech will be utterly futile, sent into thin air and not received by authentic speakers – speakers 
bound to their homeland with an immediate bond (“aus unmittelbarer Nähe”) of direct experience 
and engagement. As Benn’s words imply, one’s capacity to transmit to the other is confiscated 
once one steps outside of the threshold of the national borders, whose radius is circumscribed by 
the national radio. The ominous shadow of Benn’s nationally broadcast demand for a common 
tongue that is an immediately shared experience sets Celan’s radio essay and its gesture of 
transmission into sharp relief. Whereas Benn appeals to a first-person plural standpoint easily 
translatable into the ubiquitous third-person man (“mit diesen allen kann man reden”), the very 
possibility of such a shareable, transmittable perspective is a profound problem in Celan’s 
introduction of Mandelstam. To be sure, Celan, too, uses the pronoun man – yet not as a transparent 
substitute for an all-encompassing wir but, rather, as a defamiliarizing indication of its indirect 
provenance, of an elsewhere from which this report about Mandelstam originates: “1913 erscheint 
in Petersburg ein schmaler Gedichtband: ‘Der Stein.’ Diese Gedichte haben, das erkennt man, 
Gewicht, man möchte sie [...] selbst geschrieben haben.”561   
 Written a year before the construction of the Berlin Wall, Celan’s radio essay on 
Mandelstam is marked by circumstances of separation and exclusion. Here, one poet, living away 
not only from his no longer existent homeland562 but also from places where his native German is 
spoken, is trying to bring something closer to speakers of German in Germany – most of whom 
 
561 Celan, Der Meridian. Endfassung. Vorstufen. Materialien, 215. This essay will henceforth be cited within the text 
as DOM followed by a page number. 
 
562 As Celan had poignantly outlined in his 1958 Bremen speech: Celan, Gesammelte Werke, 3:186. Celan immigrated 






may nominally share a language with this poet, but likely from a vastly different angle.563 To be 
brought closer is the poetry of another poet: one whose poetic language earned him not only 
expulsion from the literary profession but also exile – within the borders of the Russian-speaking 
territory, within his “homeland.”564 Having died under dire circumstances on his way to a forced 
labor camp in 1938,565 the Russian-Jewish poet was now, in March 1960, posthumously censored 
by the Soviet state, unknown not only to the German-speaking audience but also to most of his 
fellow speakers of Russian. On this suppression, Celan comments in the preface to the 1959 
volume of his translations of forty poems by Mandelstam: “In Rußland, der Heimat dieser 
Dichtung, zählen die Gedichtbände Ossip Mandelstamms [...] noch immer zum 
Totgeschwiegenen, Verschollenen, allenfalls am Rande Erwähnten.”566 Notably, too, the radio 
essay on Mandelstam and his poetry coincides with Celan’s own experience of persecution through 
slanderous accusations of plagiarism – attempts to erase the accused poet’s singular poetic 
voice.567 Written in the wake of the unspeakable consequences of the national – linguistic, cultural, 
intellectual – totalization hailed by Benn, Celan’s “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” reads as 
a particularly poignant missive from one literary emigrant about another, directed toward the 
 
563 On Celan’s anxiety when crossing the German border, see Emmerich, “‘Ich bin der, den es nicht gibt,’”182.  
 
564 On the state-induced barriers to Mandelstam’s literary career, see Cavanagh, Osip Mandelstam and the Modernist 
Creation of Tradition, 193-212. 
 
565 Clarence Brown, Mandelstam (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973), 134. 
 
566 Celan, Gesammelte Werke, 5:623. 
 
567On this defamation campaign and its relation to the repressed Antisemitism of the post-war German cultural 
institutions, see Emmerich, “‘Ich bin der, den es nicht gibt,’” 178-185. On Celan’s use of the word “totgeschwiegen” 
in reference to his own experience of persecution as well as in reference the murdered Gustav Landauer, whose 
mention in Celan’s Büchner Prize speech, was inexplicably silenced by the sound system during the award ceremony 






speakers of the German language, in Germany – a defiant gesture of poetry against exclusionary 
borders, categories, and idioms. 
 Although the rest of this chapter will focus on Celan’s radio essay without direct 
engagement with the poet’s Büchner Prize acceptance speech, I would like to devote brief 
reflections to the context of the latter in order to delineate, in turn, the context of Celan’s reflections 
on Mandelstam, which would prove to be an important precursor for “Der Meridian.” Having been 
originally instituted as a distinction of merely local significance, the Georg Büchner Prize had, in 
1951, been upgraded into a nationwide recognition for all literary achievement in the German 
language: “der Literaturpreis der deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung.”568 Notably, the 
committee chairing this academy consisted of representatives of the so-called “Innere Emigration” 
– this term’s alleged author, Frank Thieß, among them –  i.e., those who had remained in, but not 
collaborated with, the Nazi state, and who often regarded this circumstance as itself a praiseworthy 
distinction and cultural-political privilege.569 Taking place only two years after the “new 
beginning” of 1949, the transformation of the prize and its prestige more or less coincided with 
the re-emergence of Germany as a nation state: a reemergence that was significantly conditioned 
by a desire to shed the enormity of the recent past. It was this collective phenomenon of the past’s 
repression, however, that the poet honored with the Büchner Prize in1960, Paul Celan, whose 
parents had been killed in the Nazis’ internment camps, could hardly partake in.570  
 
568 Judith S. Ulmer, Geschichte des Georg-Büchner Preises. Soziologie eines Rituals (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2006), 141. 
  
569 Ibid., 142-3.  
 
570 On the difficult question of forgetting, specifically for Celan, see Hans Mayer, “Erinnerung an Paul Celan,” Merkur 






 Notably, the 1951 mandate of the Büchner Prize echoed a key prewar cultural framework, 
specifying that the award was to be conferred “an einen Dichter oder Schriftsteller.”571 Gottfried 
Benn, who had devoted considerable energy to crystallizing a particular version of this distinction 
and whose own acceptance speech would touch on the perennially fascinating question of “das 
Mysterium der Kunst,” emerged as the winning nominee in the inaugural year of the honor’s 
reemergence.572 The choice of Gottfried Benn as the inaugural honoree was quite telling: Here was 
someone who had lent enthusiastic and early support to the Nazi regime, but also someone who, 
as Judith Ulmer points out, crucially contributed to the programmatic separation of politics from 
poetics in the West-German lyric poetry of the 1950s.573 
 If Mandelstam dismissed the act of addressing one’s contemporaries as inadequate to 
poetry, Celan in his “Meridian” prize acceptance speech does precisely that: He addresses his 
contemporaries, and does so with an undeniable insistence. Throughout his speech, the phrase of 
address “Meine Damen und Herren” appears with great frequency. Accomplished by this repetition 
is a subtle subversion of the apparently narrowly poetological character of this text, which has 
often been pointed out.574 As Kristina Mendicino has argued, the specific manner in which this 
apostrophe recurs throughout “Der Meridian” accomplishes a crucial rhetorical performance that 
exposes and calls into question a certain tradition of rhetoric and speech.575 Alexandra Richter has 
 
571 Ibid., 140. 
  
572 Gottfried Benn, Büchner-Preis-Reden 1951-1971 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1972), 11-14, here: 12.  
 
573 For a discussion of the broad support for Benn’s candidacy among the jury members as well as of the controversial 
nature of this choice, see Ulmer, Geschichte des Georg-Büchner Preises, 144-147. 
574 Hans Mayer, “Lenz, Büchner, Celan. Anmerkungen zu Paul Celans Georg-Büchner-Preis-Rede ‘Der Meridian‘ 
vom 22. Oktober 1960,” 162; Kristina Mendicino, “An Other Rhetoric: Paul Celan’s Meridian,” MLN 126, no.3 
(2011): 630-635; Alexandra Richter, “Prier pour le petit bossu: La dimension politique de l’attention dans Le Méridien 
de Paul Celan,” Poe&sie 159 (2017): 111-121; Boos, Speaking the Unspeakable, 62.  
 






similarly drawn attention to this repetition in her analysis of the political implications of the 
question of attention in Celan’s “Der Meridian.”576 The repetition of this phrase does not only 
expose the speaker’s gesture of address, here and now, but also suggests a certain sense of despair, 
as though the ones being addressed, seemingly so close, somehow prove hard to reach.577 Even as 
he addresses his contemporaries, Celan stresses the precarious character of this address, as though 
aware of the possibility of reception failure.578 Celan, for his part, does not make it easy for the 
Damen und Herren in his audience. His incredibly complex text, marked by citations, references, 
and interruptions, conspicuously neglects to talk of Lyrik, a collectively palatable subject matter.579 
Instead, it focuses on punctual, singular poems (Gedichte). To be sure, already this plurality must 
have estranged the audience, defamiliarizing the expected difficulty of the elevated, evening-
filling580 subject matter toward a much harder difficulty that would implicate this very audience in 
this address, Ansprache, and its claim, Anspruch. In his preparatory notes for “Der Meridian,” 
Celan writes, “[...] es bedarf des personaler Gegenwart, es bedarf des Gesprächs; Gespräch{e} und 
 
576 See Alexandra Richter, “Prier pour le petit bossu: La dimension politique de l’attention dans Le Méridien de Paul 
Celan,” Poe&sie 159 (2017): 111-121. 
 
577 In this vein, Alexandra Richter highlights Celan’s break with the formulaic act of thanking one’s listeners for their 
attention when he concludes his speech, instead, by thanking them for their presence: “Meine Damen und Herren, ich 
danke Ihnen für Ihre Anwesenheit” (Richter, 121). Crucially, Richter points out, precisely this concluding phrase is 
not transmitted or reproduced in the French translations of Celan’s address. As Sonja Boos underscores, this barely 
noticeable change in phrasing is significant in light of the thematic importance of “attention” in Celan’s Speech (Boos, 
Speaking the Unspeakable, 59-61). 
 
578 On the central problem of dialogue, address, and transmission – and their impossibility – in Celan’s “Meridian,” 
see ibid., 52-69.  
 
579 In the preparatory notes for his Meridian speech, Celan rejects the term “Lyrik,” insisting that he is concerned, 
instead, with “Gedicht”: “Ich spreche, dies zunächst, nicht von ‘moderner Lyrik’ [.] In Klammern ich spreche vom 
Gedicht heute”; against the Bennian notion of Artistik, Celan writes, “heute: eine gewisse Kunstlosigkeit (im 
Gegensatz zur Bennschen Artistik)”: in Celan, Der Meridian. Endfassung. Vorstufen, 151, 152. 
 
580 Likely referencing Benn’s notion of Artistik, Celan writes in his preparatory notes to „Der Meridian,“ “Artistik und 
Wortkunst – das mag etwas Abendländisches-Abendfüllendes für sich haben. Dichtung ist etwas anderes; Dichtung 
[...] himmel- und herzgraue atemdurchwachsene Sprache der Zeit” (Celan, Meridian. Materialien, 110), also cited in 






Unterhaltung, das ist zweierlei; Gespräche nehmen in Anspruch, sie strengen an.”581 In the year 
1960, the Georg Büchner Prize and the ceremony of its conferral experienced a profound jolt. A 
significant contribution to the specific rupture, carried out by Celan’s Büchner Prize acceptance 
address – a rupture within the poetic tradition but also its constitution through rhetorical and 
oratorical conventions – had been made by the poet’s essay about Osip Mandelstam, which, like 
the Büchner Prize address itself, had been transmitted on the German radio waves.582 
  
An Estranging Introduction 
One could reasonably expect Celan’s essay of introduction to serve as a path toward 
familiarization and reconciliation: as a helpful mediator between an unknown poet and an 
unknowing audience. However, from the outset, Celan oddly insists on a certain estranging quality 
of the to-be-introduced poet and his poems: “[...] man möchte sie, wie die Dichter Georgij Iwanow 
und Nikolaj Gumiljow bekennen, selbst geschrieben haben, aber – diese Gedichte befremden” 
(DOM 215). Introduced with an adversative “aber” and a dash, the word “befremden” cannot be 
assimilated easily into its surroundings and yet insistently intervenes three more times in the course 
of the essay’s introductory passages.583 This word does not lend itself easily to translation. Most 
idiomatically rendered as “to disconcert,” it also contains an echo of its components – the transitive 
prefix be- and the adjective fremd – suggesting not only that a certain foreignness is contained in 
the subject being introduced but also that the quality thus verbalized could affect the recipients of 
 
581 Celan, Der Meridian. Endfassung. Vorstufen, 132. 
  
582 On the significant implications of this transmission in the case of “Der Meridian,” see Boos, Speaking the 
Unspeakable, 65-69. 
583 After three insistent iterations, befremden comes up once more – this time without italics: “Die zwanzig Gedichte 






this introduction as well. The to-be-introduced poems appear strange, take by surprise, but perhaps 
also distance, render foreign – a veritable predicament for an essay of introduction.  
Despite the reportedly estranging character of Mandelstam’s poems, Celan rejects a series 
of three composite nouns – seemingly fitting translators of novelty and strangeness – as these 
poems’ characterizations: they are neither “word-music’ [Wortmusik] nor “tone-colors” 
[Klangfarben] nor “mood-poetry” [Stimmungspoesie] (DOM  215). All three of them in some way 
synesthetic,584 these terms seek to unite two disparate semantic elements in order to cross a certain 
border by poetic means, as it were – surely, a possible solution to the puzzle about the qualitative 
transition the word has to go through in order to become the word in the poem.585 Celan further 
contrasts Mandelstam’s poems with the poetic practice of spatiotemporal overreach – futurism: 
“Diese Verse sind, im Gegensatz zu dem sich gleichzeitig Raum greifenden Futurismus, frei von 
Wortschöpfungen, Wortballungen, Wortzertrümmerungen; sie sind keine neue ‘Ausdruckskunst’” 
(DOM  215). Here, too, rejecting a series of composite words, Celan distinguishes between the 
specific novelty of Mandelstam’s language and that of futurism, which is supposed to derive from 
the artistic technique of neologizing. By rejecting the notion of a new art of expression, 
Ausdruckskunst – which is also Celan’s term for the poetic style and movement of expressionism586 
– Celan simultaneously rejects two key components of lyric poetry: its artistic presentation and its 
expressive potential.  
With his largely negatively formulated introductory report, Celan sets Mandelstam’s 
attitude toward language apart from the more familiar one: language as a posterior translator of 
 
584 I thank Kirk Wetters for calling my attention to the synesthetic character of these three nouns as well as to Celan’s 
rejection of a poetics of synesthesia.  
 
585 Celan’s rejection of these terms is also an allusion to his rejection of similar vocabulary used by the 
contemporaneous press reviews of his own poetry (see Mikrolithen sind’s, Steinchen, 874).  
 





and instrument of familiarization with something essentially prior to and separate from it. Rather 
than lying outside as an object importable into poetry, the estranging factor identified by Celan in 
Mandelstam’s poetic language is inextricably bound up with this language itself. It seems, then, 
these to-be-introduced poems estrange, befremden, in a strange manner. To be sure, Celan’s 
insistence on the estranging quality of Mandelstam’s poems could be a borrowing from the 
philologist Gleb Struve’s biographical-critical preface to the 1955 two-volume edition of 
Mandelstam’s writings, which Celan worked with when writing his radio essay. However, whereas 
Struve uses the neutral, or even positively charged, verb udivlyat’ (“to surprise,” “to cause 
wonder”) and related adjective udivitel’nyj (“wondrous” or “wonderful”) to characterize the effect 
of Mandelstam’s poems,587 Celan not only intensifies it by choosing a word that connotes a sense 
of being disconcerted, estranged, alienated, but he also insists on it four times in the span of the 
essay’s compact opening remarks. 
 
Philosophical Echoes and Their Transmission 
 From another angle, Celan’s vocabulary of wonder-causing estrangement also recalls 
Martin Heidegger’s invocation of the Greek verb thaumazein, which the philosopher translates 
into German as “Erstaunen” (“to wonder”) and interprets as the authentically philosophical 
predisposition in his 1955 essay “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” – Heidegger’s authoritative and, 
in some sense, inaugural postwar meditation on the essence of philosophy. In this address, 
delivered on foreign ground (Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandie) but on a fundamental topic, Heidegger, 
too, takes on the role of mediator, translator, and introducer. Under the shield of the familiar first-
 
587 Cf. Gleb Struve, “Opyt biografii i kriticheskogo kommentariya,” Collected Works, by Osip Mandelstam (New 






person plural pronoun wir, the German-speaking thinker transmits to speakers of French essential 
missives about philosophy, which he mines from its original language, Ancient Greek: “Wir sind 
durch das griechisch gehörte Wort unmittelbar bei der vorliegenden Sache selbst, nicht zunächst 
bei einer bloßen Wortbedeutung.”588 Holding on to the Greek words, presumably for fear of 
spilling some of their original authority via translation, Heidegger writes, “Das Erstaunen ist als 
πάθος die ἀρχή der Philosophie.”589 Moreover, by reaching over for the properly heard Greek 
word, Heidegger wants to bypass the obstacle of mere words in order to gain immediate access to 
the thing itself (“bei der vorliegenden Sache selbst”): the fundamental question of what philosophy 
is. Heidegger, too, appears to be concerned with questions of hearing and transmission. 
Reminiscent of Celan’s 1954 wonder about the qualitative change necessary for the word to pass 
through in order to become the word in the poem, Heidegger is in search of a path toward the 
entrance into philosophy: “Aber das Ziel unserer Frage ist, in die Philosophie hineinzukommen, 
in ihr uns aufzuhalten, nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten, d.h. zu ‘philosophieren’.”590 The 
philosopher-guide is concerned with identifying the qualitative change necessary for the word – 
the thought – to become the word and the thought in philosophy (“die Philosophie”).  
Even as Heidegger seems to acknowledge the wondrous nature of his inquiry’s subject 
matter by interrupting the flow between the question (“Was ist das”) and its object (“die 
Philosophie”), he wants to balance this situation out: 
Unser Sprechen muß dem, wovon die Philosophen angesprochen sind, ent-sprechen. Wenn 
uns dieses Ent-sprechen glückt, dann ant-worten wir im echten Sinne auf die Frage: Was 
ist das – die Philosophie? Das deutsche Wort „antworten“ bedeutet eigentlich soviel wie 
ent-sprechen.591 
 
588 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1975), 11:22. 
 
589 Ibid., 13. 
 
590 Heidegger, GA, 11: 7, Heidegger’s italics. 
 






The philosopher lends an attentive ear to a speech (“Sprechen”) authentic enough to be an “Ent-
sprechen” and one that could be translated with no leftovers (“soviel wie”) as the German word 
(“das deutsche Wort”) “ant-worten.” With this origin-seeking equation, Heidegger pinpoints the 
notion of Entsprechen, which, starting from his 1936 essay “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” 
frequently resurfaces in the philosopher’s later theories about language and poetry.592 Most readily 
rendered in English as the verb “to correspond,” the word entsprechen appears to contradict 
Heidegger’s signature critique of truth as correspondence, although, to be sure, the philosopher’s 
elusive use of the term outmaneuvers this merely apparent contradiction.593  
In a preparatory note to his radio essay on Mandelstam, Celan, who owned and likely read 
Heidegger’s essay about the essence of philosophy,594 seems to refuse to lend an ear precisely to 
the idiosyncratic subtlety of Heidegger’s terminology of correspondence. The poet, for his part, 
insists on an irreducible foreignness that cannot be canceled out:  
Das Gedicht ist hier der Ort, wo das Angeschaute und sprachlich Wahrgenommene – das 
Genannte – mit seiner Zeit in ein Spannungsverhältnis tritt zum Anschauenden und 
Sprechenden. *Das Fremde bleibt fremd, es ‘entspricht’ [und antwortet] nicht ganz, es 
behält seine [ihm Relief und Erscheinen (Phänomenalität) verleihende] Opazität. (71) 
 
Shortly, we will encounter the final version of these notes, but in this incipient articulation they 
bear witness to a peculiar borrowing from Heidegger. Without outright rejecting the philosopher’s 
vocabulary, Celan interjects into its wholesome linguistic equation a number of diacritic 
correctives that call into question the possibility of uncompromised transmission from the 
 
 
592 On Celan’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of Entsrpechen, see David Brierley, “Der Meridian”: ein Versuch zur 
Dichtung und Poetik Paul Celans, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1984, 203 ff.; Lyon, Unresolved Conversation, 
118-119, 130-132; Seng, Auf den Kreiswegen der Dichtung, 157.  
 
593 On Heidegger’s ambiguous concept of correspondence, see Susan Bernstein, “Correspondances – Between 
Baudelaire and Heidegger,” MLN 130 (2015): 614-621.  
 





purportedly originary language of thinking. Celan envisions the poem as a place of confrontation 
and tension within and through language: “[...] das Angeschaute und sprachlich Wahrgenommene 
– das Genannte [...].” In this linguistically hesitant note about (poetic) language there emerges the 
gesture of approaching, reminiscent of Celan’s note to Werner Weber from July 1959: There, 
trying to approach translation, Celan attributed the gesture of coming closer and against 
(“entgegenkommen”) not to the translator but to the to-be-translated other and this other’s 
language. Here, in this slightly later preparatory note, Celan similarly locates the gesture of moving 
toward (“tritt zum”) not in the one who is speaking but in that which is spoken, perceived through 
language.  
Whereas Heidegger imagines philosophy as a coveted destination, into which one finds 
entrance through appropriate hearing and transmission (“griechisch gehört”) and in which one 
finds refuge through appropriate conduct (“nach ihrer Weise uns zu verhalten”), Celan sees the 
poem as the space in and through which something takes place – and not just a univocal something 
but rather a relation and, moreover, a relation of tension. This way, the moment of approach, 
tension, and non-identity intervenes into Celan’s reflections on the question at stake in his 
Mandelstam radio essay, namely, what a poem is. Differently from the ultimately harmonious state 
of wonder in Heidegger, the tension of foreignness and strangeness envisioned by Celan in the 
space that is a poem precludes the possibility of definitional, qualitative borders. 
Whereas Heidegger wants to carry out a smooth transmission from the philosopher-guide 
to his keen listeners, Celan’s vision of the poem is much more indirect. Instead of filling in the 
gaps left by the negatively formulated opening remarks about the strangeness of the to-be-





one that, several months later and in a slightly altered form, will reemerge in the poet’s “Meridian” 
speech:595  
Das Gedicht ist hier das Gedicht dessen, der weiß, daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seiner 
Existenz spricht, daß die Sprache seines Gedichts weder ‘Entsprechung’ noch Sprache 
schlechthin ist, sondern aktualisierte Sprache, stimmhaft und stimmlos zugleich, 
freigesetzt im Zeichen einer zwar radikalen, aber gleichzeitig auch der ihr von der Sprache 
gesetzten Grenzen, der ihr von der Sprache erschlossenen Möglichkeiten eingedenk 
bleibenden Individuation. (DOM 215, Celan’s italics)596 
 
Once again rejecting the notion of Entsprechen, which Celan inflects slightly as Entsprechung,597 
the poet borrows, and decisively edits, another word from Heidegger’s vocabulary: 
Individuation.598 At a crucial definitional locus in his 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time,599 
Heidegger stakes out his vision of philosophy:   
Sein und Seinsstruktur liegen über jedes Seiende und jede mögliche seiende Bestimmtheit 
eines Seienden hinaus. Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin. Die Transzendenz des Seins 
des Daseins ist eine ausgezeichnete, sofern in ihr die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der 
radikalsten Individuation liegt. Jede Erschließung von Sein als des transcendens ist 
transzendentale Erkenntnis. Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist 
veritas transcendentalis.600  
 
 
595 Seng, Auf den Kreis-Wegen der Dichtung, 157.   
 
596 In the closely related passage from the Meridian speech, Celan writes:  
 
Dieses Immer-noch kann doch wohl nur ein Sprechen sein. Also nicht Sprache schlechthin und vermutlich 
auch nicht erst vom Wort her “Entsprechung”. / Sondern aktualisierte Sprache, freigesetzt unter dem Zeichen 
einer zwar radikalen, aber gleichzeitig auch der ihr von der Sprache gezogenen Grenzen, der ihr von der 
Sprache erschlossenen Möglichkeiten eingedenk bleibenden Individuation. / Dieses Immer-noch des 
Gedichts kann ja wohl nur in dem Gedicht dessen zu finden sein, der nicht vergißt, daß er unter dem 
Neigungswinkel seines Daseins, dem Neigungswinkel seiner Kreatürlichkeit spricht. (GW, 3: 197) 
 
597 Brierley, “Der Meridian”: ein Versuch, 203.  
 
598 See Lyon, Unresolved Conversation, 120; Seng, Auf Kreiswegen der Dichtung, 157.  
 
599 On Celan’s reading of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, see Seng, Auf Kreiswegen der Dichtung, 154.  
 






Curiously, it is also in this paragraph that the philosopher will preemptively apologize for the 
imminent awkwardness of his diction, citing as an excuse the peculiarity of the subject matter – 
Being (Sein) as opposed to mere beings (Seiendes) – and an absence of adequate linguistic tools 
to capture it.601 At this definitional juncture, however, Heidegger writes not only quite clearly but 
also with the authority of Latin philosophical terminology. It is noteworthy, then, that, in a passage 
appearing to correspond to Heidegger’s vocabulary, Celan unapologetically puts forward an 
emphatically convoluted reflection, and does so in an effort to introduce and translate the poetic 
language of another. Heidegger’s definitional consideration subordinates everything, albeit 
structurally and not literally, to a transcendent beyond: Being (“Sein”). Celan’s, in contrast, 
foregrounds that which is most concrete, bound to its here and now: the poem (“das Gedicht”). 
Likewise, differently from Heidegger’s declaratively articulated statements, in which 
individuation is mentioned merely as a distinct moment within the ontological hierarchy, Celan 
weaves his reflection on individuation from a tightly interconnected series of past and present 
participles (“freigesetzt,” “gesetzt,” “erschlossen,” “bleibend”). Beginning with “the poem” (“das 
Gedicht”), this participial chain arrives at “individuation” at the very end of the sentence. The link 
between “the poem” and “individuation” lies in the possessive pronoun dessen (“whose” or “of 
the one who”): “Das Gedicht ist hier das Gedicht dessen, der [...].” Both emphatically bound and 
open at once, this pronoun allows Celan’s essay to step beyond a narrowly biographical report and 
to venture instead into a meditation on poetry tout court. However, rather than offer a generic-
poetological definition, Celan envisions poetry in terms of a single, concrete poem whose 
 
601 Heidegger writes, “Mit Rücksicht auf das Ungefüge und das ‚Unschöne‘ des Ausdrucks innerhalb der folgenden 
Analysen darf die Bemerkung angefügt werden: ein anderes ist es über Seiendes erzählend zu berichten, ein anderes, 
Seiendes in seinem Sein zu fassen. Für die letztgenannte Aufgabe fehlen nicht nur meist die Worte, sondern vor allem 






singularity lies in its inextricable tie to a dessen. The poem as poem is of someone: of someone, 
more precisely, who is aware of their singular moment of speaking – what Celan here and 
elsewhere calls “angle of inclination of one’s existence” (“Neigungswinkel seiner Existenz”).602 
In explicating this enigmatic “dessen,” Celan, in lieu of a biographical portrayal, defines 
this genitive in terms of a relation:      
Diese Gedichte sind die Gedichte eines Wahrnehmenden und Aufmerksamen, dem 
Erscheinenden Zugewandten, das Erscheinende Befragenden und Ansprechenden; sie sind 
Gespräch. Im Raum dieses Gesprächs konstituiert sich das Angesprochene, 
vergegenwärtigt es sich, versammelt es sich um das es ansprechende und nennende Ich. 
Aber in diese Gegenwart bringt das Angesprochene und durch Nennung gleichsam zum 
Du Gewordene sein Anders- und Fremdsein mit. (DOM  216)  
 
Yet, rather than presenting the relata as pre-existing entities that can enter into relations with one 
another within time,603 Celan emphasizes their irreducible boundedness to, and constitution 
through, the moment of encounter. Once again, constructed around a series of nominalized 
participles, Celan’s characterization of “these poems” shifts the substantive meaning away from 
its usual carrier: i.e., nouns that are a posteriori capable of performing certain actions (finite 
conjugated verbs). These poems, namely, are someone’s precisely not in the sense of being the 
product of this someone’s autonomous genius – in fact, Celan’s formulation decisively calls any 
such autonomy into question, registering, rather, this someone’s irreducible relation to something 
or someone else. The participle allows Celan’s characterization of the poem to evade the border 
between the speaking and the spoken and to remain rather in the liminal space between them.   
 
602 “Existence” (Existenz) is, of course, likewise a technical Heideggerian term used by Heidegger to characterize the 
specifically human mode of being, which he calls Dasein. For Heidegger, Existenz harbors the specific sense of being 
outside of oneself as a definitive characteristic of Dasein and which he relates to the problem of ecstatic temporality 
more generally.  
 





As much as Celan’s diction in this passage resembles Heidegger’s, the poet nonetheless 
complicates the philosopher’s analysis of the human mode of being as “Ek-sistenz” by probing an 
in-between, a space of tension: 
Es ist dieses Spannungsverhältnis der Zeiten, der eigenen und der fremden, das dem 
mandelstamm’schen Gedicht jenes schmerzlich-stumme Vibrato verleiht, an dem wir es 
erkennen. (Dieses Vibrato ist überall: in den Intervallen zwischen den Worten und den 
Strophen, in den „Höfen“, in denen die Reime und die Assonanzen stehen, in der 
Interpunktion. All das hat semantische Relevanz.) Die Dinge treten zueinander, aber noch 
in diesem Beisammensein spricht die Frage nach ihrem Woher und Wohin mit – 
„offenbleibende“, „zu keinem Ende kommende“, ins Offene und Besetzbare, ins Leere und 
Freie weisende Frage. (DOM  216)  
 
Somewhat counterintuitively identifying the not easily recognizable characteristic of tension 
(Spannungsverhältnis) as a mark of recognition (“an dem wir es erkennen”), Celan insists on 
alterity as a constitutive feature of Mandelstam’s poems.604 We have already encountered this 
relation of tension between times (“Spannungsverhältnis der Zeiten”) in Celan’s preparatory notes, 
where he corrected Heidegger’s synchronizing verbs “entsprechen” and “antworten” with the 
verdict “Das Fremde bleibt fremd.” Here, in the broadcast version of that remark, Celan insists 
that the strangeness of these to-be-introduced poems lies not in their self-contained essence but, 
rather, in their constitutive transcendence of themselves: in their relatedness. Resonating in Celan’s 
notion of individuation is perhaps something like relation, tension.  
In his reflections on the role of time and language in Mandelstam’s poetry, Celan singles 
out the non-finite verb form as a definitive aspect of Mandelstam’s own poetic language: 
Diese Frage [nach ihrem Woher und Wohin] realisiert sich nicht nur in der „Thematik“ der 
Gedichte; sie nimmt auch – und eben dadurch wird sie zum „Thema“ – in der Sprache 
Gestalt an: das Wort – der Name! – zeigt eine Neigung zum Substantivischen, das Beiwort 
schwindet, die „infiniten“, die Nominalformen des Zeitworts herrschen vor: das Gedicht 
bleibt zeitoffen, Zeit kann hinzutreten, Zeit partizipiert. (DOM 216, Celan’s italics)  
 
 





This passage is characterized by a double move of translation. First, Celan renders the familiar 
Latin borrowing “Verb” with its much less familiar German equivalent “Zeitwort” – presumably 
to underplay the connotation of “word” (verbum) and to highlight instead that of “time” (Zeit). 
However, in order to further illuminate the peculiar role of time in Mandelstam’s poems, Celan 
opts for a rare Latin rendering of a possible German verb: “Zeit partizipiert.” Entangling 
grammatical categories with their concrete implications, this peculiar word choice does not so 
much correspond to Mandelstam’s original Russian as it recalls Celan’s own prominent use of 
participial constructions – i.e., “infinite” verb forms – in his description of Mandelstam’s poems. 
One might recall, too, that nominalized non-finite verb forms are prevalent in Heidegger’s idiom 
– the present participle Seiendes and the infinitive Dasein are just two crucial examples. Why, one 
might ask, does Celan attribute to Mandelstam’s poetic idiom a linguistic idiosyncrasy much more 
characteristic of his own diction?605 It is certainly noteworthy that, in an effort to familiarize radio 
listeners with someone else’s poetry, Celan critically engages with the language of yet someone 
else altogether. In lieu of an accurately corresponding transmission, Celan’s radio introduction of 
Mandelstam is marked by an insistent interference.606  
 Given the unmistakable traces of Heidegger’s language in Celan’s essay on Mandelstam, 
it is curious that Celan, in the preface to his 1959 translations of forty poems by the latter, uses a 
word – Vorhandensein – that will strike anyone familiar with Heidegger’s terminology as 
decidedly unexpected in a discussion of something as elevated as poetry: “Der mit diesem Buch 
dem deutschsprachigen Leser vorgelegten Auswahl [...] soll zunächst die Chance gegeben sein, 
 
605 On this point, see Tatiana Baskakova’s commentary on Celan’s radio essay in Paul Celan, Gedichte. Prosa. Briefe, 
eds. Baskakova and Belorusets (Moscow: Ad marginem, 2008), 409.  
 






die unter den vielen die erste jeder Dichtung bleibt: die des bloßen Vorhandenseins.”607 Used by 
Heidegger to represent one of the modes of being, the term “vorhanden” has been translated as 
“present-at-hand” to render the sense of merely inner-temporal mode of being.608 And yet, 
precisely this mere availability is what Celan identifies as indispensable to poems. Differently from 
Heidegger’s ontological hierarchization of modes of being from more to less deficient, Celan 
points to poems’ irreducible vulnerability, against which no fundamental-phenomenological 
analysis can offer a safeguard. Rather, as Celan seems to insist, poems inevitably rely on the 
precarious gestures of translation and transmission. 
  Celan concludes his essay of introduction with a note on Mandelstam’s self-reported 
affinity for a grammatical category from the past, the Latin gerundive: 
In einer seiner letzten Veröffentlichungen, dem 1932 in der Leningrader Zeitschrift 
‚Swesda‘ erschienenen Armenischen Tagebuch, finden wir auch einige Aufzeichnungen 
zu Fragen der Dichtung. In einer dieser Notizen erinnert sich Mandelstamm an seine 
Vorliebe für das lateinische Gerundiv. “Das Gerundiv – das ist das Mittelwort der 
Leideform der Zukunft.” (DOM  221, Celan’s italics).   
 
Here, Celan is referring to Mandelstam’s 1933 prose piece Journey to Armenia, in whose 
penultimate chapter Mandelstam writes: “—What tense would you like to live in? – I would like 
to live in the imperative future participle, in the passive voice – in the having-to-be.”609 Having 
rejected a series of composite nouns as possible designations for Mandelstam’s poetry in the 
beginning of his essay, Celan closes it by invoking a concept composed of not one but three 
composite nouns: “das Mittelwort der Leideform der Zukunft.” As Bernhard Böschenstein has 
pointed out, this formulation is a bizarre substitution for the familiar Latin grammatical 
 
607 Celan, Gesammelte Werke, 5:623. 
 
608 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1962), 100.  
 





designations: Partizip, Passiv, Futurum.610 In contrast to Heidegger’s appeal to Latin philosophical 
terms (e.g., “veritas transcendentalis”) at the beginning of his introduction to philosophy proper, 
Celan concludes his own introductory text and its apparent task of familiarization by 
defamiliarizing the most perfunctory tools of language and thought: grammatical concepts, that, 
qua invisible infrastructure, would seem to transcend the necessity of translation in the first place. 
Peculiarly tangible and concrete, these superfluously translated German words – “Mittelwort,” 
“Leideform,” “Zukunft” – stick out as irreducibly foreign, belying the apparent neutrality of 
linguistic terminology and its promise of translation as correspondence and equivalence, without 
remainder.  
Somewhat abruptly concluding his sketch of Mandelstam’s poetry with the word Zukunft, 
Celan reaches out beyond this introductory text’s borders, as though pointing to a dimension of 
the to-be-introduced poet and poetry that cannot be congealed into an individual image, contained 
within a familiar frame, and preserved in a transmissible, introducible past. To be sure, Celan’s 
reference to something that is yet to come (“Zukunft”) is peculiarly ecstatic, oriented beyond itself 
and toward something or someone else. Yet, differently from a neutrally structural-Heideggerian 
sense, it is also bound up with a foreshadowing of something irreducibly concrete and ontic, to use 
Heidegger’s vocabulary: a “suffering” latently legible in the word “Leideform.”611 Notably, too, 
these final remarks, meant to conclude an essay of introduction, are cited from the to-be-introduced 
poet’s own reflections on questions of poetry (Dichtung). In this manner, Celan’s essay ends with 
a peculiar intertwining of a concrete life and poetry, insisting on a notion of the latter that does not 
 
610 Böschenstein, “Celan und Mandelstam,” 158.  
 
611 I thank Alexandra Richter for pointing out this sense of the word “Leideform” and its possible anticipation of 






lend itself to a generically atemporal definition: a poetry, that is, that always takes place as singular 




On March 26, 1960, a week after the transmission of Celan’s essay about Mandelstam by 
the Norddeutscher Rundfunk in Hamburg, Celan sends some reflections on translation to the 
aforementioned journalist and literary scholar Werner Weber, on the occasion of his, Celan’s, 
recently completed translation of Paul Valéry’s long poem “La jeune Parque” – a fragment of 
which the poet had promised to the critic in place of the originally requested Lyrik:  
Denn die Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden – 
geschieden durch Abgründe [...] Ja, das Gedicht, das übertragene Gedicht muß, wenn es in 
der zweiten Sprache noch einmal da sein will, dieses Anders- und Verschiedenseins, dieses 
Geschiedenseins eingedenk bleiben. [...] Aber wieviele sind es heute, die solche Aspekte 
des Dichterischen überhaupt wahrnehmen? Das Gedicht wahrnehmen als menschliche – 
und mithin einmalige und vom Geheimnis der Einmaligkeit begleitete – Präsenz? Wieviele 
sind es wohl, die mit dem Wort zu schweigen wissen, bei ihm bleiben, wenn es im Intervall 
steht, in seinen ‘Höfen’, in seiner – schlüsselfernen – Offenheit, das Stimmhafte aus dem 
Stimmlosen fällend, in der Systole die Diastole verdeutlichend, welt- und 
unendlichkeitssüchtig zugleich [...]612  
 
This passage unmistakably echoes the radio essay, where, in a parenthetical note, Celan 
highlighted the significance of Interpunktion in Mandelstam’s poems: “(Dieses Vibrato ist überall: 
in den Intervallen zwischen den Worten und den Strophen, in den ‘Höfen’, in denen die Reime 
und die Assonanzen stehen, in der Interpunktion. All das hat semantische Relevanz.)” (DOM 216). 
In this manner, then, the radio essay’s reflection on what it might mean to write poems is echoed 
in the letter’s reflection on what it might mean to translate poems. As the resonance between them 
 
612 Weber. Briefwechsel, 148-9 (my italics). On the poetological significance of this letter, see Werner Hamacher, 
“HÄM. Ein Gedicht Celans mit Motiven Benjamins,” Jüdisches Denken in einer Welt ohne Gott – Festschrift für 
Stéphane Mosès, eds. J. Mattern, G. Motzkin, and S.Sandbank (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 2000), 173-197, here: 184; 






indicates, these two concerns – writing poems and translating them – are not strictly separated for 
Celan. Once again departing from Heidegger’s focus on language in the singular (die Sprache), 
Celan writes of languages in the plural (“die Sprachen”). In doing so, the poet envisions language 
from the perspective of its a priori difference, thereby subverting the familiar notion of translation 
as a posterior correspondence between an original and a copy. For Celan, the seeming 
correspondence (“entsprechen”) of languages to one another – insofar as uniform tools of 
communication – is destabilized by the unbridgeable separations between them: “Denn die 
Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden – geschieden durch 
Abgründe [...].” Here, moreover, the notion of correspondence and adequation, repeatedly invoked 
and revised by Celan elsewhere, acquires an added connotation. While the word “entsprechen” in 
this passage is most readily read datively in its familiar meaning “to correspond,” its proximity to 
the word “Sprachen” in Celan’s formulation – “Denn die Sprachen, so sehr sie einander zu 
entsprechen scheinen, sind verschieden [...]” – brings out the verb’s (admittedly nonidiomatic) 
accusatively negative resonance: ent-sprechen.613 That is, as much as they seem to do so, languages 
in the plural, Sprachen, cannot “de-language” one another into a single, originary language, can 
never cancel one another out without a remainder. No perfectly fitting translation could ever 
conceal the poem’s a priori translatedness. In this light, what seems like a merely appositive 
specification – “das Gedicht, das übertragene Gedicht” – suggests, more strikingly, that a poetic 
 
613 In his reading of Celan’s poem “Aus dem Moorboden,” which reads Benjamin and Kafka, Werner Hamacher also 
invokes this unidiomatic interpretation of the word “Entsprechen” in explicating the peculiar word “Ohnebild” in 
Celan’s poem: “Die Logik der Celanschen Sprache, die sich in diesem Wort kondensiert, ist ihre Ent-sprechung” 
(Hamacher, “HÄM. Ein Gedicht Celans,”177). Notably, in his essay, Hamacher ascribes a specifically historical 
aspect to poems: “Gedichte erheben sich aus ihrer Geschichte und erheben sich gegen sie” (ibid., 173). On Hamacher’s 
account, the historicity of poems resides not in their ability to preserve and transmit something from the past into the 
future but rather in their ability to open up a future in the first place, “weil sie Zukunft und damit eine andere als 
gewesene Geschichte eröffnen” (ibid.,173). Akin to Arendt’s insistence on a historical thinking that is open to the 
unprecedented, Hamacher characterizes poems as “geschichtskritisch” in the sense, perhaps, that poems have the 





text, for Celan, is by definition a translated one, oriented beyond itself. The mode of being of the 
poem – and not just of the translated poem but of every poem as translated – is then not so much 
the Heideggerian Sein, Being, as a Geschiedensein. It is as though, through a practice of translation 
and transmission, Celan’s poetological concern has undergone a transformation: The poet’s 1954 
poetological hesitancy about translating the word into the word in the poem has, by 1960, been 
revised into a question of “the poem, the translated poem.”  
In his letter to Weber, Celan inscribes “poems” into his remarks on translation, tersely 
stating, “Gedichte sind Geschenke.” As at several other points in his letter, Celan implicitly 
references Heidegger’s vocabulary – here, specifically, the philosopher’s understanding of a poem 
(Gedicht) as a gift (Geschenk).614 Yet, here too, Celan revises the philosopher’s neutrally accretive 
equation (“Gedichte sind Geschenke”), punctuating it with several stumbles and correctives: 
“Gedichte – ja, Gedichte sind Geschenke; Geschenke – aus wessen Hand?” Celan’s revision is 
further legible when he not only downplays the poet-translator’s feat of handling the 
untranslatable615 but also situates this elliptically implied poet on the receiving end of the donation 
(Geschenk) that is a poem. In an odd abdication of authority, Celan registers his wonder at having 
been approached by his German translation, Die junge Parze: “Mir erscheint es noch heute 
wunderbar, daß dieses Gedicht zu mir kam [...].” Instead of producing the poem in full mastery of 
its composition and meaning, the poet is visited, approached by the poem. Notably, too, the poem, 
which Celan recalls to have come toward him, is the German translation, Die junge Parze, and not 
the French original, La jeune Parque. 
 
614 On Celan’s borrowing from Heidegger of the notion of the poem as a gift, see Lyon, Unresolved Conversation, 
113; Olschner, “Grenzgänge und Gegenwart,” 252. 
 
615 On Rilke, who was an avid translator of Valéry, considering “La Jeune Parque” untranslatable, see Ute Harbusch, 






Two months later, once again declining Hans Bender’s request for collectible poetological 
insight, Celan will take up this figure of the hand and its insistence on the inextricable boundedness 
of the poem to a moment of encounter and relation:  
Handwerk – das ist Sache der Hände. Und diese Hände wiederum gehören nur einem 
Menschen, d.h. einem einmaligen und sterblichen Seelenwesen, das mit seiner Stimme und 
seiner Stummheit einen Weg sucht.  
 
Nur wahre Hände schreiben wahre Gedichte. Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied 
zwischen Händedruck und Gedicht.616 
 
In considering a poem to be in no essential way different from a handshake – seemingly, nothing 
but a conventional, almost perfunctory gesture of greeting – Celan in fact emphasizes the poem’s 
other-directedness: its boundedness to a singular moment of encounter, its exposure to an 
irreducibly singular other. It can hardly be overstated how peculiar this conception of poems is. 
Traditionally and since the emergence of poetic and artistic autonomy at the end of the eighteenth 
century, poems – particularly, of the lyric variety – are considered under the umbrella of the poetic 
genius, of individuality, and their mode of entering the world is traditionally that of expression or 
exteriorization, Ausdruck. Against this tradition of poetic provenance, Celan proposes a relational 
conception of a poem as a singular moment of encounter that, as such, is situated in an irreducibly 
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